

THE 2nd COMMON
SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
OLYMPIAD



Athens, Greece, 7-9 May 2014





THE 2ND COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OLYMPIAD
ATHENS, GREECE, 7-9 MAY 2014

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Welcome speech from the Commanding Officer of the Hellenic Military Academy, Major General Konstantinos Velegrakis

Dear Officers,
Dear Professors,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Cadets,

I welcome you all to “EVELPIDON” the Hellenic Military Academy, which is located in the suburban town Vari of Attica Region.

I welcome you to the 2nd Common Security and Defense Policy Olympiad.

The Hellenic Military Academy is the oldest higher education institution of modern Greece. It was established in the city of Nafplion in 1828, by the first Governor of Greece, Ioannis Kapodistrias. The name given by the governor to the Cadets of the Academy was “Evelpis” which in Greek means “Bearer of High Hope”, and reflects the aspirations of the Greek Nation from the Academy.

The mission of the Academy is:

- To produce and transmit knowledge to Cadets, with the teaching and research of military science and technology, as well as related theoretical, pure and applied Sciences.
- To develop the military virtues and military action, in order to formulate the Land Army, Officers with military awareness and top-level education, as well as social cultural and political education and action, giving them the means to become capable Leaders, and with highly professional and scientific training.

Currently the Academy hosts 964 Cadets from 12 countries.

The Olympic Games in ancient times, called ‘The Olympia’, were the most important event in ancient Greece and were held in ancient Olympia Town, every four years, since 776 B.C.. At ‘the Olympia’, which gradually acquired great prestige, athletes were participating from all over Greece and later on from other places too. They were held until 393 AD, when they were discontinued, to revive again in Athens in 1896 in their modern known form, named as “Olympic Games”, and are since held as international games.

The ancient Olympic Games were held based on the Olympic truce. The sacred truce defined that all Greek states could not attack and conquer the Olympia town as well as the cessation of all military hostilities at the starting period of the games.

Another very important institution in Ancient Greece was ‘the Amphictiony’. The Amphictiony was the organization of ancient Greek cities - states in associations, numbering members from many cities-states, around several holy places, like temples. There were several amphictionies, most prominently that of the Delphi in Central Greece. The main task of an Amphictiony was to supervise these holy places, but they often acquired political power. The amphictiony is seen as the historical equivalent of modern international organizations like the United Nations.

The Hellenic Military Academy, true to its noble rivalry, healthy competition, cooperation for peace and security, which inherited through ancient Greece from the Olympics and the Amphictionies, and following the developments of modern times which require a common European Security and Defense Policy, participates actively in the initiative “Military Erasmus”. The Academy takes part in the meetings of the Implementation Group with a permanent representative from the very beginning of the initiative, participates with Cadets in Common Modules that are conducted in other Academies around Europe and is at the final stage of completing the prerequisites of the Treaty of Bologna. Our strong motivation to actively participate in this initiative was our deep belief that creating a common European Security and Defense Policy is a basic element of the European integration process and that this procedure was the best way to achieve such a goal.

In this context, starting from next year, our Academy has included in it’s training program the Common Module “Law of Armed Conflict”, in which Cadets from other Academies will be invited to participate.

This year our Academy has the great honor to host the second Common Security and Defense Policy Olympics. 31 students from 13 countries began an effort in August 2013 which will be completed in 2 days, starting tomorrow with the presentation of the 10 best papers before the members of the Implementation Group and the other contestants and the day after tomorrow with the written examination on the Common Security and Defense Policy. In total, this activity will give you the opportunity to take a closer look at the institutions, the procedures and the organization of the European Union in Security and Defense matters.

Moreover, in the meantime, these 3 days will be a good chance for you to meet colleagues from other countries and make new friends, you will see the Greek customs, you will walk in traditional Greek streets, you will visit the new Acropolis Museum and the Kalimarmaro Stadium, from where revived the modern Olympic Games in 1896 and will discover the ancient classical culture.

In the end, when you return back home, we hope you take with you all the best memories from this trip. I firmly believe that the 2nd Common Security and Defense Policy Olympiad will be a fantastic memorable experience for all of us and will be an invaluable instrument for the European education and training of our young Officers.

With these thoughts I welcome you once again at the Hellenic Military Academy and wish you all good luck for the contest and enjoy your stay.



Opening speech of the deputy chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff, Vice Admiral Alexandros Theodosiou

Head of the European Security and Defence College
President of the Implementation Group
Professors,
Cadets,
Ladies and Gentlemen



Located in a sensitive area and having carefully observed the effects of the recent regional crises in Libya and Syria, Greece strongly believes that enhancement of European Union's defense capabilities is a means of assuring peace and security in Europe. Therefore Greece is committed to support further development of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy, its instruments, as well as missions and operations conducted in the frame of CSDP.

Consequently, the ability to operate in a multinational environment is a constant requirement for military personnel of EU Member states. The procedure of fulfilling this requirement should primarily aim at developing a common European culture. This common EU culture should originate from our common values, common knowledge, common education and training and common experiences.

I believe that the most suitable audience is our young officers and cadets. By developing a common EU culture at the beginning of their careers military personnel would be better prepared to effectively work and operate together during an EU mission or operation. And the European Security and Defense College can greatly contribute to this goal.

Dear Cadets

I urge you to take advantage of your participation in the second CSDP Olympiad, organized by the Presidency in cooperation with the European Security and Defence College. It can be an excellent starting point for each one of you in order to become an active link that would strengthen the European Union Defence posture.



During your military career it is possible that you will be called to serve in a European Union military operation as others have done before you. At that point you must be able to present the same qualities and defend the values that inspired the founders of the European Union: Peace, Democracy, security and prosperity.

With that in mind I would like to thank you for being with us today and I declare the opening of the second CSDP Olympiad.

Closing remarks by the Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff, General Michail Kostarakos

Dear Head of the European Security and Defence College,
President of the Implementation Group,
Representatives of the Branches of the Hellenic Armed Forces,
Professors, Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen

Dear cadets,

Last December, Heads of State and Governments gave clear political guidance in order to enhance the effectiveness of the EU CSDP by initiating the Comprehensive Approach concept, the appropriate Capability Development, and the improvement of the EU Crisis Rapid Response Mechanism etc.

Against this background, we all realize that the best conceptual work, the most efficient organization structures, the most effective capabilities, all these are useless without the appropriate personnel, which should be suitably trained, educated and qualified, and which will put all these into action.

Having said that, it is more than obvious that Military Academies and national training facilities must initiate the process of building up CSDP culture and mentality in bottom-up logic in a coordinated and harmonized way.

At this point, I need to go back in 2003, when the Hellenic Presidency introduced a “Common Training” initiative, with the aim to create a common European security culture. In support of this aim, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) was established in 2005, as a network bringing together existing training

institutes dealing with aspects of CFSP/CSDP, including diplomatic academies, police colleges, as well as other civilian institutes and universities. In this context, the role of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) is extremely crucial. In accordance with its mission to provide high quality training in the field of the EU CSDP, and in order to develop and promote a common understanding among civilian and military personnel, the College will give military personnel the most important CSDP knowledge.



SECTION A

I need to commend the ESDC for sharing our vision in the field of training and also for its valuable support in our effort to organize this event, which, I hope met the participants' expectations.

Within this context, the EU Initiative for the exchange of young cadets inspired by "Erasmus", launched in 2008, should be considered as a fundamental contribution to the European culture. It shapes the ground for a future European integration in the initial education and training of the EU military elites. During our ongoing Presidency we introduced a co-



sponsored and supported initiative to drive the "Military Erasmus" even further. The value of the exchanges among young officers and cadets on the very beginning of their careers is essential and practically will enhance Member States' common military understanding. It is not my intention to repeat all those well-known details regarding our initiative. However, I believe that there is some added value to I mentioning a number of advantages such as:

the establishment of friendly and cooperative relations and common mindset between students, through the participation to the joint program and by creating synergy grids among military institutions exchange of culture, civilization and military spirit and cooperation among the academies' students.

As we understand, all these are expected to create common European Military mentality which is our distant target. I would like to conclude my speech by extending some words particularly to Cadets from our allied countries Dear Cadets I want to thank you for your presence here in the second CSDP Olympiad, and I really hope that this event is actually what was meant to be from its beginning. This event should be perceived as an excellent starting point for your international careers. For us, the current military leaders, you are the best and the most noble investment for the EU's future defence and security.

In your presentations, you clearly described the EU portrait, as a calm, cultured and trustworthy global player, which through its wide array of instruments contributes to the peace, security and stability, always complying to international law and the fundamental EU principles. It seems to me that in the years to come the European freedom and security and your common values will be well served and defended. I would ask you to take back home our warmest wishes for success and prosperity for your countries.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to all those who contributed to the successful organization of the 2nd CSDP Olympiad in every possible way.

Thank you for your attention and for honoring the 2nd CSDP Olympiad.

Address of Mr Dirk Dubois, the Chair of the Implementation Group of the "European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers (Inspired by Erasmus)"

Generals, Ambassadors, Commandant,
dear Head of the ESDC,
dear colleagues of the Implementation Group,
dear participants,

It is a very great honor and pleasure for me, in my capacity as Chairperson of the IG for the European Initiative, to be here and to address such a distinguished group of dignitaries. Let me start by thanking the Greek presidency of the Council of the EU, represented here by the Deputy Chief of the Joint General Staff, Vice Admiral ALEXANDROS THEODOSIOU. Thank you General, for taking up the challenge of organizing this 2nd Olympiad as a token of your continued support to the ideas to the military Erasmus program, as this Initiative is often unofficially called. Allow me also to congratulate the 118th Commandant of the Academy, Major General VELEGRAKIS KONSTANTINOS and his complete team who have accepted the challenge of the practical organization of this event in their distinguished Academy.

But gentlemen, allow me to keep this official introduction short and to address in the first place the participants. When we started the initiative in 2008, there was as always an official agenda and a less official one. The official agenda was to give young military officers an opportunity to learn and traintogether. The less official agenda was to take this opportunity and to have them learn a little bit more about Europe, its Institutions and more in particular the CSDP. This Olympiad achieves both goals.

The location of the event, here on the peninsula of Attica, only a few kilometers away from Athens, is symbolic indeed. It is very close to where the battle of Salamis took place, the sea battle in which the ancients Greeks defeated the Persian fleet. As the last of the great battles of the Persian wars, it is one of the battles that allowed the Western world to emerge and to take all those great ideas from ancient Greece and flourish.

One of those ideas, forever linked to Greece and in particular to Athens, is democracy. This has become almost 2.5 millennia later, one of the cornerstones of the great European project that we are working on together. Now one of the characteristics of a democracy is that the military should be under



SECTION A

democratic control. This does, my dear friends, in no way mean that we should not be interested in politics, on the contrary. In the first place we should be interested in the security implications of politics. We have to be able to give an advice about the consequence of choices in the field of politics. What is the cost, in terms of money, of casualties and material, of undertaking an operation, but also what is the cost of not acting?

At the end of this month we will all be allowed to go and vote for the European Parliament. Many of you may have heard about the democratic deficit of the EU, meaning that the people, represented in Parliament, have little influence. You may also be convinced that EU is far away in Brussels and does not influence your life very much. I hope that your studies for this Olympiad have given you the opportunity to think about these two statements, because both are wrong. Since the Lisbon treaty, the EP has more power than ever before. In the next election, we will get to elect the President of the Commission, just like you would elect a head of state or government in a MS. EU legislation is directly at the basis of national laws – for better or worse – in 70% of the cases. It rules everything from cheaper telecommunications to consumer rights.


So far, however CSDP is still largely under control of the MS. It is not up to us, military, to criticize this or to decide otherwise. But we should give a clear advice that if Europe wants to continue to be a major power in the world or even just a relevant regional player, we need to work closer together also in other fields than that of the economy. We should also be prepared ourselves to work together. And for that we need to know and trust each other's capabilities. This friendly competition is an opportunity, like during the old Olympic Games in ancient Greece, to learn about each other, see what we are capable of and to forge new friendships across the boundaries of our own military.

During the preparatory phase you were given the opportunity to learn about the CSDP and to write a paper on a related topic. I have had the opportunity to read some of these papers and I must say I was pleasantly surprised with the quality of the content. The best 10 participants will get the opportunity to present their ideas to the others. All of you will get the chance to compete against each other in small teams, testing your knowledge of the studied topics. I wish you all good luck in this competition and may the best man – or woman – win!



Curiosity, interest, commitment and mastering

Remarks on the event by Sylvain Paile-Calvo,
Senior Researcher, University of Liège (Belgium)



If the success of such event could be measured with the difficulty for the participants to say goodbye, then the 2014 Common Security and Defence Policy Olympiad was undoubtedly a most successful event. Friendships have been created and these links pre-figurate the expected future of the Common Security and Defence Policy: knowing the other, working together.

Knowledge has also been spread on this too often insufficiently known policy of the European Union. This generation of future military elites, of future forefront actors of the European defence – be it assured multilaterally ad hoc or with organizations like NATO or the European Union, in the field, in the capitals or in Brussels – showed curiosity, interest, commitment and mastering of the functioning of the policy. They have made clear that, alone, no European Union Member State is able to cope with the challenges of our modern – “too” modern – world. Nevertheless, their support is a smart and constructive one as they demonstrated their capacity to challenge the orientations followed by the policy and actions of the Union and its Member States.

When witnessing this event and the life that animated it, one shall be proud of the achievements of the Initiative for the exchange of young officers, inspired by Erasmus. Back in 2008 before the Initiative promoted them, the Common Security and Defence Policy (then European Security and Defence Policy) and the European Union itself were far from being commonplace in the basic education and training of a European officer. The road ahead of us is still long, as the European Union efforts for assuring the security and defence of its citizens are also far from being universally known. However, the Initiative created a momentum that shall be acknowledged and highlighted. Mobility, foreign languages and CSDP are now widely considered to be key for the basic education and training of our military elites. The Initiative was responsible, for a large part, for putting them on the agenda of the Member States, of their military education and training institutions and, as seen from this event, in the curricula of the cadets themselves. The European Security and Defence Culture the Initiative set as an objective becomes, little by little, actions after actions, more tangible. Complete realization may seem far, but this shall not prevent us from looking with satisfaction at the work done.

The CSDP Olympiad 2014 is not only an achievement, it is an inspiration for going further: further in the dissemination of information about the EU and its CSDP, further in the development of the mobility of the cadets, their teachers and instructors, further in the integration of the European military higher education.

Winners of the competition

Knowledge Competition Winner
and 2nd Olympiad winner:

Paolo Faneli (Italy)

Best Cover Winner:

Manuel Kurbantfinski (Austria)


Best Paper Winner:


Gonzalo Vallespin Terry (Spain)



The Importance of a European Maritime Security Strategy for the EU

Gonzalo Vallespin Terry
Naval Academy, Spain





Common Security and Defence Policy



Politique de sécurité et de défense commune

2nd CSDP Olympiad Athens 2013

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List of Acronyms

CFSP:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP:	Common Security and Defense Policy
EBGT:	European Border Guard Team
ESS:	European Security Strategy
EU:	European Union
EUCAP:	European Union Capacity Building Mission
EUNAV:	European Union Naval Mission
EUROSUR:	European Border Surveillance System
EUTM:	European Union Training Mission
FRONTEX:	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
JO:	Joint Operation
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UK:	United Kingdom
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD:	Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. Introduction

The bulk of world trade is carried out by sea, as a matter of fact Europe imports most raw materials by sea. Some of the world's main maritime routes' choke points lie in the European Union's (EU) maritime borders, like the Strait of Gibraltar or the Suez Canal. Therefore, it is in the EU's best interests to ensure that these trade routes are free of threats.

The EU has gone to great lengths in the last two decades to create a common security policy. However, due to their geographical location, not all member states share commerce interest; therefore and inevitably, not all will seek to protect this means of trade with the same determination because each member strives towards that goal in the proportion it finds fit to benefit its interests. Furthermore, it is not a matter of underpinning the blame on those who do not put effort into this cause when, theoretically, the goal is to work towards a common target. Therefore, lack of consensus amongst member states may easily be the biggest problem in defining a common security strategy, but no matter how much effort is put into common security, countries can be skeptical about jeopardizing their interests over a conflict that might not be of their concern.

EU Member States must come together as they have on many other aspects. Once this barrier has been overcome, a maritime security strategy is sure to find a true identity. It is only of common sense to want to combine efforts to protect Europe's most important source of commerce and income of natural resources.

The objective of this essay is to discuss the importance of a common security strategy in the maritime environment. The 'Securitization Theory' of The Copenhagen School provides the proper theoretical basis to explain the factors that are to be considered in defining a maritime security policy and to support the findings of this essay.

2. Theoretical Approach: The Copenhagen School 'Securitization'

The Copenhagen School emerged with the writings of Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde, among others, in the post-Cold War era (Collins 2007: p.110). The main model developed by this school is the 'Securitization Theory', which expands the definition of security from its traditionally military view into a wider spectrum including non-military matters such as political, societal, economic and environmental security (ibid.: p.109-125). In this model, securitizing actors such as political leaders, governments, pressure groups, etc., seek to declare a referent object's (national sovereignty, a state, collective identities, etc.) survivability as threatened, arising the need to securitize it (ibid.: p.109-110). In this process the securitizing agent must also convince a general or specific audience such as politicians, public opinion, military leaders, etc., that a threat to security exists; and if this audience is persuaded, the securitizing agent will be granted the right to employ extraordinary measures (ibid.: p.111-117).

The five sectors are very closely related and many times the majority or all of them are present in the same issue, as will be demonstrated later on in the essay. It is necessary to explain each sector. Firstly military security refers to the threat or actual use of organized violence against a referent object, which is usually the state. Political Security refers, for the most part, to the internal security of a nation and its government structure. Societal security relates to society in the likes of social unrest or crime rates. Economic security discusses all issues that have repercussions to the economy. Finally, environmental security relates to all those issues that affect the environment (ibid.: p.134-136), pollution being a good example of this.

3. Case Study

The securitization theory is an essential tool to understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The process goes through four different steps in order for the securitization to be successful. In the first step, the securitizing actors are the policy makers who are constantly predicting what consequences arise from the world's geopolitical events. Second, the EU is the referent object to be securitized and, more to the point in this essay, its maritime element. In the third step, the threats that the EU is to be securitized from are terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), illegal immigration, etc., and the areas where they are present, these threats will be analyzed later on in more depth. Inevitably these threats will affect various security sectors, however, and those that will have a greater role in this essay will be the economic, social and political sectors. Finally, the fourth step is demonstrating to the audience that the threat to security exists. The EU is very transparent when it comes to letting its citizens know what is going on around them. Moreover, member states' leaders or representatives are present when a decision has to be made regarding security matters. The successful completion of this process allows for extraordinary measures to be taken, these are for example, the CFSP and more specifically the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the creation of the FRONTEX agency, etc.

3.1. The threats

The European Security Strategy (2003: 3), states that Europe is the largest importer of oil and is also the largest trading entity in the world. Furthermore, it states that security is vital for the UE to be able to maintain this amount of business conduct, not just security within our borders; but also security in neighboring countries and even nations that are on the other side of the globe. These arguments are clear examples of the economic security sector of the securitization theory. The fact of the matter is that the EU conducts business far away, and regional instability in south-east Asia, for instance; could imply economic repercussions in Europe.

The maritime borders are harder to protect than land borders, as one cannot simply put up a fence. Moreover, the sea is a complicated element. Many countries with a maritime responsibility have invested considerable funding in procuring, combining and coordinating many different assets

and manpower in an attempt to properly control the sea. And not always have the results been what they were expected to be.

The maritime environment faces threats like terrorism, organized crime, state failure, regional instability, and proliferation of WMD's (ibid: 3-5) and all have a close relation between them. The piracy issue in Somalia, for example, shows a failed state where there is a worrying amount of instability and where local authorities do not possess the means to counter piracy and organized crime. It is an example of a lack of political, social and environmental security, which in turn will lead to economic insecurity in a different region of the globe. Another example of lack of political and social security leading to economic instability later on is demonstrated in the recent «Arab Spring» in the southern Mediterranean countries, which has been followed with deep concern in Europe.

3.2. Geographical Hotspots

Under the current geopolitical situation, some of the maritime regions of the world that the EU must keep in close observation are the Mediterranean, Black and Adriatic Seas, the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz and finally the Western African Coast and the Gulf of Guinea. As is inevitable, various security sectors of the securitization theory will arise, depending on the region that is being analyzed. Nevertheless it is the best way to realize that no one region or threat will involve just one security sector.

The North Sea and the North Atlantic can be left out because they can be considered securitized. Being surrounded by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Members States made for a reasonably safe sea. Countries surrounding the Black Sea could be taken into account because of organized crime and drug and weapons trafficking from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Middle East into Europe, however most of these illegitimate activities are carried out through land routes.

3.2.1. Strait of Hormuz

The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz could be considered the most important oil shipping route in the world. In 2013, 35% of world oil tanker traffic transited this strait (EIA 2012). Therefore, it is a very sensible region in Europe's supply line. Instability could cause huge economic setbacks for the EU. For example, a high amount of maritime traffic in a small span of sea is an excellent condition for terrorist attacks. This relates mainly to the economic securitization sector.

3.2.2. The Horn of Africa

Somalia lies next to one of the most transited maritime trade routes in the world, because here the Asia-Europe and Middle East-Europe trade routes unite before entering the Red Sea. It is also the quickest maritime route to import the much needed Middle Eastern oil into the EU. Piracy has turned out to be a profitable business for Somali pirates and their organized crime organizations, which are so complex that they even have networks in important financial cities across the globe

SECTION B

(Stuart Yikona 2013). Pirates hijack many ships and people. This has repercussions in the economic, social and political sectors, because it is not just about the ransoms, countries try to securitize this issue in order to protect trade and the welfare of their citizens.

The EU was slow in responding, very little was done to address this until the situation had gotten out of hand. However, once the issue had been securitized the EU clearly reacted correctly, by employing extraordinary measures that were not only military means to defend merchant and fishing vessels (EUNAV Atalanta and EUTM Somalia), but also by employing civilian and economic assets as was the EUCAP Nestor. These actions seem to have been effective: in 2009 over 214 ships were attacked (Mark McDonald 2009), resulting in 47 hijackings, however in October 2013 only 17 attacks were reported that year (New York Times 2013).

3.2.3. The Mediterranean

The Mediterranean is perhaps the most important border to be considered because it is the closest area to the EU of the mentioned regions. As of 2012, its southern coast has seen its relative stability turn very unstable due to the «Arab Spring». This is also a major concern for the EU, as organized crime in the Mediterranean is to blame for illegal immigration and weapons and drug smuggling into the EU.

Affecting political, social, and economic sectors of the securitization theory, these factors imply that the southern Mediterranean could be considered an unstable region, or at least relatively so. The Suez Canal and Red Sea could also be included into this category. Egypt has been involved in a change of political regime in recent years but has so far maintained the Suez Canal secure, so it is definitely an area to be kept under watch.

3.2.4. West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea

The Gulf of Guinea is an important region because of its oil production and export. In 2013, over 30 pirate attacks were reported. This shows that piracy attacks have increased over the past few years. Again, the main cause for this is the fact that countries in this region do not have stable governments and effective agencies in fighting terrorism. However, it is true that African countries from these regions do possess more naval means to counter piracy and they are taking measures to increase the fight on piracy. Still, the EU should certainly do more in this region. The security sectors that are present in this region are the same one that in Somalia, the only exception being that insecurity is not as high.

Further north, countries like Senegal or Mauritania lack in raw materials meaning that there is very little prospect for wealth. This is the main cause for illegal immigration. Illegal immigration can cause social and political insecurity in the countries of destination.

4. Taking Action

It has been made clear that the EU faces many challenges, which vary in size and form, throughout the globe and policy makers have taken huge steps in securitizing them, convincing political leaders and the citizens they represent that they are referent objects to be securitized. The creation of the CFSP and the CSDP are a result of the securitization process. But, what more extraordinary measures can be taken?

4.1. Solving Disputes between Member States

Different points of view between Member States tend to erupt in almost any issue. If the discussion concerns a lesser issue these differences are usually put to the side to work together. However, when faced with a greater issue, as for example the invasion of Iraq in 2004, the EU faced itself with the greatest challenge to the integrity of the CSDP (Biscop 2007: 10). At the time, instead of reaching a consensus between all the Member States, it was decided to leave the debate be in the hope that time would make the differences disappear. This shows that even though the ESS is a good document, which should serve as a foundation for any security or defense policies in the future, it is not always taken into account in the policy-making process (ibid: 10-11). But, it is not logical to create this policy-making tool, and not use it.

The main reason why the ESS is not given the proper importance is because not all Member States seek the same objectives. Just as the EU makes an effort in creating policies that help develop neighboring countries in the hope of maintaining the EU more secure and stable; for the same reason, EU Members must seek to share objectives of other Members. It has to be seen as an investment in the future. All Member States should work toward common objectives and policies because on the long term it is beneficial for all. Stability is the key to welfare.

4.2. Helping Development in Neighboring Countries

As the «A Safer Europe in a Better World» document clearly states, in order for Europe to be safe, the world needs to be safe. Truth be told, this is impossible. But it is not that far-fetched to try to stabilize the neighboring countries. It is the most immediate danger to the EU. This is especially necessary in the Mediterranean border.

The Mediterranean is a vital trade route for Europe, as most of the shipping to the EU passes through here. The access to the Mediterranean is also complex. Two traditional choke points: the Suez Canal and the Strait of Gibraltar. This means a lot of world shipping passing very close to land. If even part of the coast around these areas were to be unstable, this could have huge implications. Piracy networks could arise practically overnight. There could be a new scenario very much like the one in Somalia. Illegal trafficking could also sparkle, meaning more drugs, weapons and human beings would be smuggled into Europe.

The most effective way to keep Europe safe is by preventing a crisis from ever taking place as far away from Europe as possible.

4.3. FRONTEX

Once the securitization of the maritime borders is complete, the securitizing agent will take extraordinary measures. One of such extraordinary measures that the EU took was creating the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) in 2005. Its main mission is to coordinate national border efforts of Member States to ensure the safety of the EU's borders, including the 35,633 Nautical Miles long sea border. This agency is an excellent tool to protect the EU's borders from piracy, terrorism, organized crime and illegal trafficking of weapons, drugs, human beings, etc. FRONTEX is, after all, an aggregation of national law enforcement and border patrol assets that have a long experience in fighting these threats.

Each nation protects its own borders by deploying patrol boats, aircraft and many other assets necessary to patrol the seas, creating land-based monitoring stations and coordination centers from where each country coordinates its own efforts. However, with the creation of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) in 2008, national law enforcement agencies of Member States can now share information between each other, while FRONTEX helps to organize the information and coordinate between institutions and agencies involved in this field. Member States can benefit greatly from sharing efforts because, for example, the best way to bring down terrorist groups or organized crime organizations is with good intelligence.

FRONTEX has European Border Guard Teams (EBGT) at its disposal, these teams are composed of law enforcement agents from Member States and experts on border control who can be deployed anywhere in the EU when need be, as has been the case in the past, for example in the Hera Joint Operation in the Canary Islands area or the most recent Hermes Joint Operation (JO) in the Lampedusa Area. Illegal immigration is a problem that will continue to exist as long as there is financial and economic inequality between countries.

FRONTEX has been the solution, but only on a temporary basis. If the EU wants to put a stop to illegal inflow of immigrants, it cannot contempt itself by creating a temporary mission here and there; it must seek to address the root causes. The best way to do this is by giving proper judicial backing and supranational jurisdiction, enabling FRONTEX to act across the EU and its maritime frontiers against terrorism, illegal immigration, organized crime and smuggling. Agencies carrying out their work in their areas of expertise sometimes see how their work is slowed down by nations due to complex jurisdiction problems resulting in long bureaucratic processes.

When creating a JO, the agency has brought in personnel from different Member States, which has shown good results. And even though a common personnel pool exists, they are only required for temporary missions. FRONTEX should seek to have a much bigger permanent staff.

This Agency has great potential that has yet to be taken advantage of. With more funding, FRONTEX could maintain wider Joint Operations (JO's), or to be able to supply more personnel or equipment where needed. With a bigger budget, more could be done on a permanent basis.

4.4. A Maritime Task Force

There will come a time when civilian means will not suffice to address the threats, as has been demonstrated by the piracy issue in Somalia where it has been proven that maritime security cannot always be undertaken by purely civilian means, as a result the EU had to deploy military assets. It can be linked to different factors like the fact that the Area of Operations is too far away for law enforcement agencies to act as their means are not designed to be deployed far away from their borders, they do not possess the necessary logistic branch to carry out the mission or simply because they are not designed to cope with such levels of violence.

We have a great example: EUNAVFOR Atalanta was a civilian mission protecting a vital trade and fishing route to the EU and world trade in general which was carried out by ships from different navies, as well as aircraft and other elements. The challenge did not lie on the operational level, as countries train and maintain their military constantly. A frigate, for example, trains in many different kinds of missions throughout the year and if deployed, it will be able to carry out orders regardless of who gives them: NATO, EU, national authority, etc.

The difficulty lies in creating a common military structure to give out these orders. Since the EU had never created a maritime task force, Operation Atalanta had its headquarters located in Northwood, United Kingdom (UK). Northwood was proposed by the UK because it is home of NATO Maritime Component Command Head Quarters, which is in charge of NATO maritime operations, and the UK Maritime Forces Head Quarters, meaning that at the time, the UK was perhaps one of the most qualified Member States to host the maritime headquarters.

Operation Atalanta proves that the EU is capable of deploying a maritime task force when required and that it can accomplish the mission successfully. As was demonstrated earlier, pirate attacks in the area have been drastically reduced. Therefore, a maritime task force can very well be the solution when the situation is above FRONTEX's capabilities.

5. Conclusions

The EU is clearly on the right track to implementing and maintaining a dynamic security strategy, however, this strategy is still on a general level. More effort has to be put into the details concerning more specific aspects in the security strategy, specially the maritime aspect.

The documents regarding CSDP are overall very good tools for what they were created, this is to guide the EU when creating defense policies. Also, they are dynamic; which allows for their modification to correct imperfections or to adapt them to changing times. EU Member States have proven to have different approaches to issues, which is understandable, as it is almost impossible that 28 countries share the same view in any topic, however, a more open-minded attitude of all Member States is needed if a common security strategy is to succeed.

The ESS is clear on the fact that in the majority of crisis management situations, military operations have succeeded almost every time and unfortunately follow-up humanitarian or civilian operations have not been as successful. The EU is well aware of this and has made clear the importance of the civilian aspect in crisis management.

Even though Europe is well aware of the different kinds of threats it will face, knowing that these threats are all present in the maritime environment, it has to place more resources into tackling these threats, starting in its maritime borders. By boosting FRONTEX, the EU could, for the most part, properly challenge the threats collected in the ESS before they reach European soil. It is the best weapon Europe has to address the Security aspect of the CSDP.

Neighboring countries are the first frontier the EU must stabilize, and the southern Mediterranean countries are especially sensible after the «Arab Spring» took place. Therefore one of the EU's main priorities must be to bring peace to these countries, moving danger further away from its borders. By achieving economic, social and political security, these countries could engage the threats more effectively. The safer Europe's neighbors are; the safer Europe will be.

Europe must pay more attention to the sea as it is the most vulnerable factor to economic security. If economic security cannot be fulfilled, then a domino effect can occur very quickly resulting in lack of social and political security, which could even develop into military insecurity. Therefore, the sea is the most vital element not only for Europe's prosperity, but also for its survival. Europe feeds from the sea, it conducts business through the sea and it brings necessary energy and natural resources through the sea. Europe must protect it adapting to a constantly changing world, remembering that «World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it» (Schuman 1950).

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**Exchange of information between
Computer Emergency Response
Teams (CERTs) and the law
enforcement community in
Europe: the legal and operational
barriers.**

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*2nd CSDP
Olympiad*



Greece, 7-9 May 2014



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List of Acronyms

CERT : Computer emergency Response Team

CERT ITC : CERT Insider Threat Center

CSIRT : Computer Security Incident Response Team

CSIRT-ECB : Computer Security Incident Response Team - European Central Bank

EC3: European Cybercrime Centre EU : European Union

Europol: European Police Office, the European Union's law enforcement agency

FIRST : Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams

ICT : Information and communications technology

Interpol: International Criminal Police Organisation (ICPO)

IP : Internet Protocol

NASA SOC : National Aeronautics and Space Administration - Security Operations Center

NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO CCD : NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence

NATO CIRC : NATO Computer Incident Response Capability

NSA : National Security Agency

UN: United Nations

USA : United States of America

Introduction

I) WHAT IS CERT

A CERT, Computer Emergency Response Team ¹, is a team of computer professionals who are able to react in case of a security incident involving computers or within a network. Because CERT is officially a registered mark of Carnegie Mellon University, some use the more general term CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team). Their goal is to reduce and repair damage, but also to help prevention and preparation to incidents. They can be seen as the team that will react as first, while other agencies might help in a secondary phase.

II) HOW CERT/CSIRT HELPS THE COMMUNITY

By providing a rapid reaction service to incidents, a CERT can help to contain security breaches in a certain network. Due to the sensitivity of certain data, big companies have their own emergency response teams.

Within the financial world, it is a common practice to have an own team for two reasons. The first is the rapid reaction to a certain incident or data breach. With a fast reaction, the possibility of interception of the perpetrator is much higher. The second reason, is due to the nature of a bank. A financial institution makes its profit based on the trust of costumers who put their life savings in the hands of that bank. If a costumer were to know there is a data breach in a bank, or even a rumor of its money being endangered, he would remove his money, and thus endangering the bank. A bank therefore prefers to solve their computer related problems by itself rather than letting the media allow to spread their security threat.

Computer security threats however, are not only common in the company life, but also in the government. It is obvious that a government needs to be hack- proof, not only towards enemies, but also to maintain the confidentiality of certain sensitive data.

III) WHY WE NEED AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

The CERT is only the first line of defense. The teams will react towards the victim of a certain incident. There is obviously also a need to come up with a secondary reaction to the incident towards the perpetrator. Therefore, the CERT will need to rely on the expertise of the law enforcement services. These will try to identify the perpetrators and take the necessary legal acts. Due to the fact that some threats towards a organization can also be a threat to other homologue organizations, the exchange of information is very important.

¹ Sometimes also 'Cyber Emergency Response Team'

Exchange of Information

I) EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR PREVENTION

An incident offers an amount of lessons from which not only the victim, but also others can learn. Certain new infiltration methods, practices and unexpected targets can be shared with others. By preventing all types of incidents to which a system has been exposed, it can avoid being the subject of the same style of intrusion.

Most public services cannot even afford a single incident. Hospitals, energy facilities, public transportation and many others depend on their networks and the slightest incident can have catastrophic consequences. In this case, prevention is their strongest tool for survival.

The changing nature of incidents due to the creativity of hackers and rapidly evolving technology leads to a special challenge. The protection needs to be up to date, but that is not enough, it always has to be one step ahead while they think forward to new vulnerabilities and possible techniques that could be used by malicious hackers. This race between the intrusion and security is an expensive and difficult one, therefore the exchange of expertise is not only necessary but even one of the mainstays of our modern civilisation.²

II) EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR REACTION

After each incident, some lessons must be identified. This both towards the prevention as mentioned before, but also towards the preparation of the adequate reaction for each incident. These identified lessons need to be translated to lessons learned, that afterwards need to be shared with all concerning actors as to prepare all to react satisfactory.

III) TRAIN AND INFORM LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES

The law enforcement community needs to be up to date about new techniques used by the perpetrators. Identifying the source of a certain cyber attack is an exhaustive struggle that can be compared to peeling an onion. Hackers use multiple 'layers' to protect themselves and to hide the true IP-address they have used, and thus the location from which they attacked.

Once a layering technique dismantled and deciphered, law enforcement can adapt their future investigations based this new learned system of concealment. This experience needs to be shared with other colleagues around the globe so that they can also benefit from the 'dismantle-system'.

² based on the ideas formulated by Lt Col De Bruycker, Infosec & Cyber Defense, Belgian General Information and Security Service.

Existing organisations

I) FIRST

FIRST is the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams. FIRST combines a wide variety of individual computer security and incident response teams from around the globe. These security teams have origins including government, law enforcement, commercial, and academic sectors. They work together voluntarily to deal with computer security problems and their prevention. First consists of four permanent committees: Membership Committee, Intellectual Property Rights Committee, Education Committee and the Conference Program Committee. This global forum has a lot of members, like the NATO CIRC³, NASA SOC⁴, CSIRT-ECB⁵ and several big companies and banks.

II) ENISA

ENISA, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security is the sharing-platform for the European Union and its members. Within this platform members can share information, practices and knowledge about cyber-security. By developing a culture of Network and Information Security the ENISA helps organisations within the EU, both the public and private sector by promoting prevention and working as a pool of expertise.

III) NATO

Since its founding, NATO has been one of the leading organizations in the security and defence sector. With their Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence (CCD), they took a leading role in the cyber-world. The CCD is composed of 4 branches; research and development, training and doctrine, legal and policy, and the administrative branch. The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare is a manual that may well become the fundamental reference document for cyber-law in the coming years.⁶

Political leaders of the NATO members keep on reconfirming their trust in a centralized cyber defence, and keep on improving the NCIRC, the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability. Other organizations can learn from the NATO expertise, they are even cooperating with the industry through genuine partnerships.

3 NATO Computer Incident Response Capability

4 NASA Security Operations Center

5 Computer Security Incident Response Team - European Central Bank

6 ICRC is discussing to use the Tallinn Manual as reference in the IHL.

IV) EUROPE'S DIGITAL AGENDA

As a part of the bigger Europe 2020 strategy from the European commission, the Digital Agenda for Europe, want to get the most out of digital technologies by helping citizens and businesses in order to reboot the economy in Europe.

The Digital Agenda consists of 7 main pillars and a total of 132 actions like ' Action 32: Strengthen the fight against cybercrime and cyber-attacks at international level⁷'.

The 7 pillars are: Digital Single Market, Interoperability & Standards, Trust & Security, Fast and ultra-fast Internet access, Research and innovation, Enhancing digital literacy, skills and inclusion and ICT-enabled benefits for EU society.

The 'raison d'être' of the third pillar is defined as:

"Only 12% of European web users feel completely safe making online transactions. Threats such as malicious software and online fraud unsettle consumers and dog efforts to promote the online economy. The Digital Agenda proposes a number of practical solutions, including a coordinated European response to cyber-attacks and reinforced rules on personal data protection.⁸"

V) OTHER

Beside the ENISA and the Digital Agenda, the EU has a fair amount of organs that help improve cyber safety. Alongside those EU-led organisations, the European Space Agency⁹ and the European Central Bank¹⁰ have their own CERT as well. Furthermore, they are both permanent member of FIRST.

The European Union's law enforcement agency, Europol, has developed its own European Cybercrime Centre (EC3). Their mission in a cybercrime-free EU. Its international equivalent, Interpol, also focuses on cybercrime as one of its main crime areas. Their program is built around both training agents and conducting anti-cybercrime operations.

⁷ based on: <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/pillar-iii-trust-security/action-32-strengthen-fight-against-cyber-crime-and-cyber-attacks>

⁸ based on: <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/pillar-iii-trust-security/action-32-strengthen-fight-against-cyber-crime-and-cyber-attacks>

⁹ ESA Computer and Communications Emergency Response Team

¹⁰ ESA Computer and Communications Emergency Response Team

Operational Barriers

I) THE INTERNET IS NOT AREA-BOUND

One of the main problems linked to the internet is that it is borderless and not area-bound. The network stretches itself from North America to Australia, from southern Africa to Asia. As the internet in Europe is only a part of that bigger global, world wide web, it is impossible to lay down rules and to enforce them to all internet users. If Europe wants to forbid a certain act, and qualify it as a cyber-crime, it can only be applicable to European users. Therefore, a discrimination would be inflicted between European and non-European internet users.

If a network is being attacked by hackers outside the European union, it is impossible to work with the same framework then when it is being hacked by a European citizen. The sharing of information within the European law enforcement community is limited by its area of operations, and cannot be extended to other areas without a structural, operational dialogue. The framework needed for this global sharing cannot be limited to Europe alone, but needs to be coherent with the Asian, American (North and South) and African community to ensure some kind of interoperability.

Working together within an European framework for a global problems can lead to diplomatic tensions between members and the other states. Consider a European company being attacked by an Asian hacker. Due to diplomatic reasons, a certain country might consider to conceal this attack from the media to maintain their good relations with the country of the hacker. Other countries however, not being bounded to this diplomatic relation could react in a more exposing way towards that attack and the attackers country.

In the pursuit of the source of an attack, the law enforcement community could be facing the problem of needing to go through multiple layers to find the origin. Throughout this onion-peeling struggle, the areas crosses can be impressive. While going through these layers of IP, they will need to gain access to other territories, outside the European union, while the origin might be in Europe itself due to the fact the hacker hid himself behind a wall of multiple countries and continents. To improve this process, multiple monitoring teams need to be focussed on those territories, with continued access to networks outside the operational area of the EU.

II) THREAT

The danger with cyber-crime is the amount of simultaneous damage it can cause. Once a certain perpetration has developed a new high-end worm or spyware, the application is not limited to one network. Compared to a firearm, the cyber-attacker has no need for reloading, but has 'unlimited ammunition'.

With one bullet -a virus-, he can hit -infect- the entire world. Therefore the perpetrator will adapt his strategy towards this advantage by attacking or infecting multiple targets simultaneously, or even attacking one computer as a decoy, while infecting the entire network with another malicious software. The sharing of information about risks can also become the sharing of decoys. If all

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CERTs are being diverted by the decoy, the perpetrator has enabled himself a free-play mode, as all CERTs will focus on the decoy, and the real malware can hit all its planned targets.

Economical cyber terrorism is an upcoming kind of terrorism that is linked to the relatively recent economical terrorism that gained in importance. When a terrorist attack is committed on a company, the share prices drop tremendously. Therefore the terrorist will short sell¹¹ shares of the company before the attack, in order to re-buy them at a low price trough to the share price-drop after the attack. This idea of economical terrorism can also, and much simpler be executed with a cyber-attack or cyber threat instead of an actual bomb. Without leaving his computer a hacker can short sell shares, attack the company' network and walk away with a huge profit.

III) TRUST

As in all security related issues, trust in one of the key elements to allow collaboration. If, between countries, a lot off sensitive information; like vulnerabilities and weaknesses, is being shared, the trust between them must be almost unconditional. If a country knows the vulnerabilities in the network of another one, the later can easily be the subject of an attack. Even threats or blackmailing to exploit this weakness or to publish or share this information with the wrong people can paralyze a country within seconds.

The second trust related problem is not between countries, but between companies or organisations that are competitors. This rivalry might lead one to abuse the trust to gain an advantage over the other. Pressure within the market or even within a company or rivalry for a job-function might lead to this leak of sensitive information about another company.

Each law enforcement agency has its own way to deal with a problem. Due to the complexity within the cyber-world, some tasks will need to be outsourced, or coordinated with other agencies. Most cyber-crimes need multiple parallel processes in order to deal with them efficiently. If there is a lack of trust, or a feeling of superiority over the other companies, this outsourcing will not take place. While a reaction towards a cyber-crime is very urgent, the lack of efficiency due to trust related problems might jeopardize the entire operation.

III) HUMAN FACTOR

Recent events in the media have shown the impact of one whistleblower on the world. By leaking information about the NSA to sites like Wikileaks, their entire existing and function as an organisation is questioned. The impact of one individual towards all that sensitive information has huge consequences.

The human factor within the exchange of information can be considered as a operational barrier. Exposing vulnerabilities in networks can have tremendous effects. One insider that has authorised access to vulnerable information can abuse this information for personal gain or revenge. If this

¹¹ Short selling (also known as shorting or going short) is the practice of selling securities or other financial instruments that are not currently owned.

exposure is not only limited to one organization, but the vulnerability is confirmed by multiple CERTs in the system, the impact will be much bigger. This problem of the insider threat is currently being researched and analysed by the CERT ITC¹².

Furthermore, within the CERT environment, the exchange of information towards the law enforcement community can happen in an unfair way due to personal relations with one another. Prioritizing issues related to CERTs of an organisation of the same country can be a predictable practice due to the human factor. If one has friends in a certain law enforcement agency, the possibility to be prioritized instead of the most urgent topic can have a considerable impact on the operational process of the entire information exchange. However, these personal relations between both the CERTs and law enforcement communities also have the advantage that they will lead to an informal, un-official organizational structure where information will be shared much faster with the right people, instead of following the official, slower procedures.

IV) FINANCIAL FACTOR

Establishing, training and maintain a CERT costs a lot of money. For big companies, this investment is remunerative due to the risks they face. However, if a CERT uncovers a threat that may also be directed to rival companies, sharing this information will be some kind of a lost investment. Companies could be persuaded to take advantage from other CERTs instead of doing the work and the investment themselves. Other smaller CERTs could start 'bandwagoning'¹³ with the bigger ones and lose their efficiency as their bigger counterpart will do all the work. Sharing expertise and information can lead to a feeling of a lost investment, depending on the return the CERT has from the common platform. Withholding the most precious and valuable information because they made the effort can become a common practice, and thus a guaranteed return for all partners must be ensured.

12 CERT Insider Threat Center

13 Usually used for states; to align with the bigger one, under its umbrella of protection.

Legal Barriers

I) THE INTERNET IS NOT AREA-BOUND

As explained before, the internet is not area-bound. Therefore a threat cannot be contained to one continent nor be traced within one continent alone. If, a European legal framework would be constructed, the borders will need to be crosses. Therefore, legal agreements need to be established with other partners outside the European area, in order to be able to move freely in cyberspace. Otherwise, a trace would need to be interrupted each time it leaves European cyberspace.

Some countries have other privacy priorities than others. Therefore, the protection of individual data will rarely be shared, unless a really good reason is provided. These 'privacy paradises' are commonly used by people for their malicious cyber activities. The prioritising of privacy above security can lead to major issues in the cyber-security. Law enforcement agencies could be blocked by this wall of privacy, even when for them there is enough legal evidence to dig deeper in the data of the suspect, but for the concerning country it s not enough for a breach in the suspects privacy. This barrier can be found both within the EU, as well as outside. The hacker would just need to go to a 'privacy paradise' in order to be protected from all types investigations.

II) LEGAL BASIS FOR (RE)ACTIONS

On the distinction between a cybercrime, a cyber-attack and other malicious cyber-activities is not global consensus. Therefore, a cybercrime in one country can be considered as legal in another. Without a equality in legal view towards cyber-activities, there is no possibility for a common platform to react to an incident. The grey area in cyber-activities is rather large due to the various possibilities like downloading, trespassing in secured networks, spreading malware,... However illegal downloading is commonly seen as something that can lead to economic problems, its economical damage is still uncertain as studies show the opposite.¹⁴

If however, a CERT is confronted with a large-scale cyber-attack, and the criminal nature of the act is clear, there is still a lack of global legal bases for reaction towards this attack. Within this problem, the principle of 'nulla crimen sine lege' or 'nulla poena sine lege' is very important. Furthermore, there is no real common law upon which a judge can fall back. If only there were a global consensus towards the allowed and forbidden acts on the internet, a global set of rules and actions could be used as guideline. The view of the UN hereby is essential as a global representative, if however all states accept the terms.

¹⁴ <http://entertainment.time.com/2013/03/21/illegal-music-downloads-not-hurting-industry-study-claims/>

Concluding ideas

Sharing information can lead to a common win-win situation. Burden-sharing, risk-sharing and responsibility-sharing sounds great for a better EU collaboration though a common cyber-approach. However, a cost-benefit analysis must be taken into account while both disadvantages and barriers must be coped with.

A platform for the exchange of information between CERTs and the European law enforcement communities can be a fantastic initiative that could improve the readiness towards cyber threats and improve the European cyber-security. Cooperation between governments and companies could benefit both and fits perfectly within the goal of the European Union. This centralisation can collect data from all CERTs and cyber-divisions of the law enforcement agencies.

Being positive about this opportunity is good, but the flip side must also be analysed. Internet isn't limited to Europe alone and both from an operational level as a legal barrier, this might cause problems. We can ask ourselves, is Europe enough, or do we need a global platform that could be led by the UN to counter the problem of the internet as a network, not being bounded by borders. Due to the complexity and changing nature of the internet the cyber-threats that come with it, most international organisations understand the importance of cyber-security. The amount of possible initiatives are uncountable. But the things the EU could do to improve cyber-security are not always the things the EU should do. As with all things in life, there will need to be a kind of compromise that allows most parties to profit with the give-and-take decision.

Trust between participants is a key element that might lead to the fact not all CERTs will board the sharing-train. However if the exchange-platform proves its usefulness, other parties might be interested to join and allow it to grow over time. The EU might, again, take a leading role in this cooperation and show the world an exemplary role and over time become a reference for future global initiatives in cyber-security.

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The contribution of the Common Security and Defence Policy in developing a globally leading role for the EU in the field of counter-terrorism by taking collective operational action by political and military means from the Member States

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List of Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
C-T	Counter-terrorism
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUBG	European Union Battlegroup
ESS	European Security Strategy
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SF	Special Forces
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States of America
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction

Analysis of the title

Common Security and Defence Policy and counter-terrorism

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) - formerly the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) - launched in 1999, was not created as a tool to fight terrorism, since terrorism was considered as being of an internal nature at that time. However, the events of 9/11 2001 contributed to a shift in this approach and the EU realized the importance of adaptation to a new global threat.

Naturally the common approach requires an overall umbrella document drawing up a comprehensive and united strategy. This was partly solved by the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS). «The adoption in 2003 of the ESS was a step forward in creating some sort of strategic framework for EU external action, including Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP. One of the undeniable strengths of the ESS is that it defines a number of contemporary and potential threats.»¹ One of the main threats defined in ESS is terrorism. And yet, now in 2014, terrorism still remains a major threat to our livelihood, perhaps an even closer and more imminent threat than in 2003. Since 2003, terrorist attacks in Madrid and London have taken place and many others have been prevented. Furthermore, several Al-Qaeda support bases and cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Therefore it has become certain that Europe is both a target and a base for terrorism.²

However the problem regarding concrete Counter-terrorism (C-T) policy remains: «While there are many strategic documents elaborating on various dimensions of the ESS - e.g. on the Neighbourhood, on Africa, on WMD, on terrorism - there is no specific strategy for CSDP. Hence there is a missing link between the vague yet ambitious goal expressed in the ESS - «to share in the responsibility for global security» - and the practice of CSDP operations and capability development. Because the overall goal of the ESS has not been translated into clear objectives and priorities, CSDP to some extent operates in a strategic void.»³

In spite of the fact, that terrorism can be found within the CSDP task catalogue of Art. 43 (1) Treaty on European Union (TEU), the CSDP task catalogue does not include C-T operations directly - it includes the Petersburg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and crisis management tasks of combat forces, including peacemaking) and afterwards additional tasks introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon (joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping and post-conflict stabilisation). While all these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, none of them can be directly called a C-T task.

All EU citizens are entitled to an integral whole of public goods and one of these public goods is: Security or freedom from fear.⁴ Since the objective of terrorist actions is to spread fear within the population and thereby influence political decisions, terrorism in its essence prevents citizens from enjoying this public good. Additionally, when we talk about terrorism the first line of defence of this

1 [4] BISCOP, COELMONT. *Europe Deploys - Towards a Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*. p. 11

2 [11] *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World*.

3 [3] BISCOP, Sven and Jo COELMONT. *A strategy for CSDP. Europe's ambitions as a Global Security Provider*. p. 3

4 [2] BISCOP, Sven. *The value of power, the power of values: a call for an EU Grand Strategy*. p. 15

public goods is located often abroad, where many terrorist groups' roots might be found and where ideological and financial support originate. Furthermore, terrorism also imposes large costs and endeavours to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies.

Components of Counter-terrorism

Counter-terrorism might be defined as the «*practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments, militaries, police departments and corporations adopt in response to terrorist threats and/or acts, both real and imputed.*»⁵ The EU set a comprehensive and long-term approach to countering threats (including terrorism) - the ESS says: «*The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.*»⁶ More specifically the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, from 2005, is based on a four-pronged approach: preventing radicalisation and recruitment and the factors behind them; protecting potential targets; pursuing terrorists; and responding to the aftermath of an attack.⁷ However, regarding the «pursuit» aspect of the EU's counterterrorism policy, the EU is currently relying on its member states and their capabilities only.⁸

The current wave of terrorism is often linked to violent religious extremism. Such terrorism arises out of complex causes, e.g.: pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies.⁹ Furthermore terrorism is frequently connected with other problematic areas or threats like proliferation (possibility that terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction). Armed conflicts or civilian wars and subsequent state failure lead to extremism and terrorism. Last but not least, organised crime often also has links with terrorism. Thus terrorism is interconnected with other threats and issues that are in the EU's scope. Therefore, countering terrorism requires the cooperation of wide range of tools and actors - a mixture of civilian and military instruments. The military instruments are required especially for external actions of C-T.

Nevertheless, when talking about crisis management within CSDP, it is mostly «soft» crisis management focused on civilian actions and avoiding use of force. Although some voices have already spoken in favour of, or even of a necessity of, introduction and support of «hard» tools, the Lisbon Treaty pushed CSDP even further into «soft» crisis management. In the present day the EU's C-T retains several principles. The first, and in my opinion most important principle, is *prevention*: «*This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early*», as the ESS states. *A permanent strategy of prevention and stabilisation, addressing the root causes of threats and challenges, aims to prevent conflict so that, ideally, coercion and the use of force will not be necessary.*»¹⁰ Contrary to this statement I believe the use of precise and limited force might in many cases be part of the prevention principle. This opinion lays fundamentals to my research questions in argumentation part of this submitted paper.

5 [9] KOLODKIN, Barry. What Is Counterterrorism?

6 [β] European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World. p. 10

7 [11] *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World.* p. 4

8 [5] BOSSONG, Peer reviews on the fight against terrorism a hidden success of EU security governance?

9 [β] European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World. p. 3

10 [2] BISCOP, Sven. The value of power, the power of values: a call for an EU Grand Strategy. p. 21

Leading role for the EU in the field of counter-terrorism

Achieving a leading role on a global scale is a general ambition of the EU. But this global ambition is not limited to humanitarian aid or trade, areas in which the EU has long been a global power, but also includes the politico-military dimension.

Firstly, representing a globally leading role in the field of C-T requires being active. But despite many conducted (or still ongoing) operations, we cannot honestly say the EU is being active in the field of C-T, as neither is it active in other CSDP operations. *«Eight years after the adoption of the ESS, we can only conclude the failure to reach this target. The high number of CSDP operations and missions conducted might give the impression of an EU that is «more active». But in reality nearly all interventions were motivated by the urge «to do something», to be seen to do some good in an area where, by coincidence, we were capable of doing so. Durable effects were rarely explicitly aimed at, just welcomed if they happened to materialize. Not exactly the level of ambition of a global actor... Our interventions have not been preventive either. At most, we have been able to react quickly, like in Georgia and Libya. In both cases, a lot of improvisation was required, with all that it implies.»¹¹*

Moreover, taking activity (and also resources spent) into account, the US has been the global leader in C-T for more than a decade. However since US citizens' support has decreased, budgetary issues occurred, the US military has become somehow weary and particularly US foreign policy focus shifted farther to Asia, the US will no longer be as active player as it used to be, especially concerning C-T in the EU's neighbourhood. The 2011 Libya crisis graphically illustrated the US's: *«unwillingness to continue to play a lead role in upholding stability in Europe's neighbourhood and the EU's inability to fill that vacuum.»¹²*

Thirdly, the lack of CSDP strategy has been reflected by ad-hoc solutions and a decrease in CSDP operational activity. This vacuum has been filled by a more active NATO. Yet again, the leading member (military capacity, financial contribution) of NATO is the United States and therefore the EU cannot cede the responsibility for C-T (particularly, but not only, in its neighbourhood) to NATO alone any longer. This all indicates the need for CSDP strategy in general, and more active C-T policy in particular.

Collective operational action by political and military means

Some countries may not feel as threatened by terrorism as others. But this current feeling should not be fundamental for C-T course. Decision-making on the base of present day issues is not the right strategy and neither is it a wise and far-sighted approach. We can apply the same analogy on territorial concerns and interests. *«Too often, «to have an interest» is confused with «being interested»: Belgium may be more interested in Central Africa and Poland in Ukraine, but objectively the stability of both is equally important to, and thus equally in the interest of both Brussels and Warsaw.»¹³* Such a model of attitude is even more valid regarding terrorism. Terrorists are now able to operate worldwide: their activities in central or southeast Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens.

11 [4] BISCOP, COELMONT. Europe Deploys - Towards a Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP. p. 34

12 [13] SIMÓN, Luis. CSDP, Strategy and Crisis Management: Out of Area or Out of Business? p. 101

13 [2] BISCOP, Sven. The value of power, the power of values: a call for an EU Grand Strategy. p. 16

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The EU has been doing great work in collective action in the field of humanitarian and development operations so far. On the other hand the EU together has not yet proved such effort and success in the field of military actions. Although for the purpose of military planning, as well as to guide military capability development, the EU military bodies have elaborated five illustrative scenarios (One of them is a Counter-Terrorism Scenario),¹⁴ the EU's military collective operational actions have not been convincing so far. This is partly due to insufficient and inflexible collective political decision making.

14 [4] BISCOP, COELMONT. Europe Deploys - Towards a Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP. p. 4

Argumentation

Introduction to research focus

Both civilian and military missions undertaken in the CSDP's framework have not been specifically used to fight terrorism and these missions are characterized by using a «soft» policy approach, that works well in conflict prevention, peacekeeping or post-conflict stabilisation operations. And of course, such operations consequently lead to suppression of the breeding ground of terrorism. However, the results of countering terrorism in this way are attained on a long-term basis. Also the efficiency of resources spent on «soft» power missions might be debatable, taking the impact on the decrease in terrorist activity into account.

Against this background, my paper aims to examine the possibility and benefits of developing and using a specific military tool intended to proactively deal with pressing terrorist threats or actual terrorist roots and bases located abroad. In this argumentation part of this paper I would like to focus more closely on the following questions: Why and how might a proactive C-T military tool (in frame of the CSDP) be beneficial for the EU's comprehensive approach? Would such a contribution of the CSDP help in developing a globally leading role for the EU in the C-T field? How might such collective operational action by political and military means from the member states work, and what might create barriers or even make it unattainable?

Let me start my argumentation with presenting Mr. Luis Simóos criticism of the EU's «soft policy»: *„...(soft) crisis management has become progressively obsolete in the light of a rapidly changing geopolitical environment characterised by an overall retreat of Western power globally, a weakening of America's commitment to European security, an increasingly tumultuous European neighbourhood, and Europe's financial troubles. In order to meet the demands of a changing geopolitical environment, CSDP must break away from its distinctively reactive approach to security to include all the functions normally associated with the military including, chiefly, deterrence and prevention. This would allow the EU to actively shape its regional and global milieu.»*¹⁵ In my opinion, the break away from this distinctively reactive approach is even more important in the field of CT.

Due to US Foreign Policy there are two aspects of counter-terrorism. The first is to make citizens safer from terrorist threats through screening of airline passengers, placing video cameras and metal detectors in public places, etc. The second is the neutralization of terrorists through arrests, assassinations, raids on terrorist facilities, military action, etc. Full counter-terrorism comprises threat reduction by making the US a «harder target» and actively «going after» terrorists.¹⁶ I am certainly not claiming (and I am also not going to assess) whether the US's C-T is better or more effective than the EU CSDP's approach. Nevertheless, it is obvious that C-T under CSDP is short of the «hard» part of the second aspect, «going after» - raids on terrorist facilities, military action etc.

The EU consciously uses its power in a different way to the US. The EU's comprehensive approach prefers persuasion over coercion and diplomacy over the military. According to the EU's approach, the best way to counter terrorism would be by tackling the root causes of terrorism through increased

¹⁵ [13] SIMON, Luis. CSDP, Strategy and Crisis Management: Out of Area or Out of Business? p. 100

¹⁶ [9] KOLODKIN, Barry. What Is Counterterrorism?

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democracy, literacy, equality and economic growth. However, let me again raise an objection that such policy brings benefits to counter-terrorism only indirectly and mostly on long-term basis. In practice the EU would have to solve the world's problems before effectively tackling terrorism.¹⁷ I certainly do not want to underestimate the brilliant idea behind the EU's comprehensive approach and soft crisis management, but I strongly believe an addition of some, cautiously employed, »hard« tools might be beneficial for C-T within CSDP in several ways.

Contributions and benefits

Failed states are often safe havens for terrorists. The inability of such states to detect and arrest terrorists makes recruitment of new members and the planning of terrorist operations, that might be aimed at an EU state, possible. In the short term, an active approach is what actually solves such problems.

Firstly, having a force able to conduct effective actions abroad (e.g. in countries providing safe heaven or simply tolerating terrorist bases and training camps) creates a deterrent attribute. Deterrence is basically: «*strategic interaction in which an actor prevents an adversary from taking an action that the adversary otherwise would have taken by convincing the adversary that the cost of taking that action will outweigh any potential gains.*»¹⁸ As long as we can deter some terrorists from engaging in certain types of terrorist activity, deterrence should be an element of a broader counter-terrorism strategy.

Secondly, proactive military C-T units would also serve for terrorist attack prevention. Of course, let me repeat again - peace-building and long-term poverty reduction are essential to this. However, we might compare this longterm approach to Chinese medicine, which is complex in its approach to treatment and gentle to the patient's body. Chinese medicine literally focuses on treating the root causes of the disease. However, there are unfortunately some health conditions that cannot be solved without modern Western medicine. For example: a broken bone has to be x-rayed and needs an orthopaedic cast, some tumors cannot be absorbed by the patient's body and have to be cut out, and when an infection cannot be ceased by homeopathic drugs, amputation alone can save the patient's life.

Let me apply this medicine analogy to the issue of this paper. For instance, terrorist training camps might be compared to dangerous tumor. By all means, the best way would be to use a preventive approach to preserve health and avoid forming of any tumor in first place. Yet we have found ourselves at a point where the tumor had already formed - in fact, there are quite few of them. Chinese (comprehensive) medicine would expend many methods and a lot of time to treat the patient complexly, but eventually would fail. In this case modern medicine should be applied, which means the tumor should be cut out. Also, highly infective diseases (extremely radical islamist »educational« facilities) or dangerously deteriorating conditions (terrorist's potential access to potent arms, explosives, or even weapons of mass destruction) should be treated with modern medicine. In other words, proactive military intervention might in many cases be necessary to prevent the realization of a terrorist threat or at least very useful in accelerating the process of healing and reducing damages caused during the healing process.

Increase in efficiency of CSDP operations

Terrorist activities also frequently create an obstacle to the merit of the CSDP crisis management operations. Terrorists and radical rebels do not want to see changes in «their» territories and

17 [s] KHANDEKAR, Gauri. The EU as a Global Actor in Counter Terrorism.p. 4

18 [10] KROENIG, PAVEL. How to Deter Terrorism. p. 22

are therefore trying to undermine the EU's efforts to promote human rights and democracy. The consequence of this is an essential lowering of the effects of »soft« crisis management operations. And effectiveness is exactly what we should, in our present-day economical and fiscal situation, strive for. Deployment of a proactive military tool that would eliminate such radical obstacles, would lead on that account to an increase in effectiveness of our otherwise »soft« comprehensive endeavour. More importantly, the overall outcome of it would be a faster promotion of human rights and democracy.

How to build military C-T capability

Countering current global terrorism requires a more effective use of resources. This statement is naturally relevant for building and deploying C-T proactive apparatus as well. «Hard» tools for external actions are secured mostly by military means and the CSDP has already some military capacity in disposal - the EU Battlegroup (EUBG). Within the EUBG there is, besides other things, a special forces (SF) component, which might in my view be essential for a C-T military unit designated for external actions. However the EUBG is more or less designed to deal with «soft» tasks faced by the CSDP. In other words, EUBG is not a tool for counter-terrorism operations. Meanwhile, another available option suggests itself: the EU could create a military rapid response mechanism, which could work in pursuit of the perpetrators and safeguard the security of Europeans.

How to create such a mechanism by the Member States? Simply, in my opinion, the best way to build military C-T capability would be according to already existing EU framework: pooling and sharing. Member States shall make some of their military capabilities available to the EU for the implementation of the C-T CSDP tool.

For the time being, NATO's capabilities seem far more suited to deploying and executing direct military operations and are more oriented to actions in combating terrorism. However, based on the introductory part of this paper where I mentioned the changing interests of the US, and thus changing interests of the NATO, the need of the EU's deployable and active military capability remains. The EU's leaders already discussed this issue many years ago (in 1998) in St. Malo, where all participants reached an agreement: Europeans should take the military instrument more seriously in general and concentrate on the development of expeditionary capabilities in particular. The level of military ambition "was not an issue": both countries wanted CSDP to prepare Europeans for high intensity combat operations.¹⁹ And yet, in the present day, when two important aspects - the US shift in strategy interests and the global threat residing abroad represented by terrorism - are more significant, the EU still does not have the military capability, nor strategic and political support enabling it to tackle serious threats, and thereby protect its citizens and contribute to worldwide peace.

Another significant issue regarding the EU's military actions within CSDP is also intelligence. Planning and conduct of every military operation rely heavily on intelligence, but accurate and reliable intelligence is even more crucial for C-T operations. Counter-terrorism operations which are perceived as unfair or cause substantial collateral damage, in the worst case civilian casualties, serve as a recruitment tool for terrorists, and subsequently may create even more terrorists than they incapacitate. But unlike the member states, EU cannot offer sufficient intelligence support.²⁰

19 [13] SIMON, Luis. CSDP, Strategy and Crisis Management: Out of Area or Out of Business? p. 102

20 [4] BISCOP, COELMONT. *Europe Deploys - Towards a Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*. p. 30

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Some member states already possess military C-T capabilities for external actions

As an example we might take a look at Amenas hostage crisis²¹, during and after which responses of some member states were taken, yet the relevant EU institutions remained silent. «French and American special forces participated in hunting down the mastermind of the hostage incident, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, in Mali and Chad. France and the UK had their national interests at stake and they did have the capacity to respond operatively to the situation. In the Algerian case, both France and the UK sent their special troops to Algeria and Mali, but that is because their nationals were involved in the incident and they had their own capacity to do so.»²²

Even though these operations were not preventive but rather a response to the crisis, it showed the ability of the EU's military great powers to deploy quickly and effectively use their military tools in C-T operation. However not all European countries are able to send national forces to protect their interests and citizens abroad. Also, such cases might require the EU's military C-T capacity that would be available for all the member states and the EU as whole.

Political support

Creating and putting a proactive C-T unit into force would certainly need political and legal foundations at first, since the EU has no clear political mandate for direct military intervention against an external terrorist threat. Naturally, merely the idea of offensive C-T military operations under the EU flag would face political disputation and probably also public resistance.²³ Besides, there would also emerge a deficiency in EU's authority and strategy - for example the ESS does not even define objectives for regions other than the neighbourhood - what about potential offensive military actions in the Gulf and Central Asia? More importantly, the Military Rapid Response Concept document, which provides the conceptual framework for the conduct of EU-led military operations requiring a Rapid Response, has refused to consider at all the use of a military response for crisis situations associated with terrorism.²⁴

However, there exists also alternative to way to legitimate EU's military C-T action with the use of a solidarity clause: «Although the solidarity clause was created with crises occurring in the territory of the EU member states or in international waters or airspace in mind, terrorism is a typical threat that effectively blurs the boundaries between «internal» and «external». A good example of where the solidarity clause could hypothetically be used in relation to an external threat would be if a terrorist plot against a specific member state was uncovered outside the EU, the threat was regarded as imminent, and joint action was deemed necessary to prevent it from taking place on the territory of the targeted member state.»²⁵ This implies that there might already be a way to launch a proactive military C-T tool in critical situations, even under current political and legal conditions - and thereby secure the EU's safety by using military elements in external action.

21 Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists took over 800 people hostage at the Tigantourine gas facility near In Amenas, Algeria (on 16 January 2013)

22 [12] SINKKONEN, Teemu. Counterterrorism in External Action: The EU's Toolbox for responding terrorism abroad. p. S

23 [7] GUILD, Elspeth. *EU Counter-Terrorism Action: A fault line between law and politics?*

24 [1] ARGOMANIZ. Exploring the link between the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy(CSDP) and the External Dimension in EU Counter-terrorism. p. 5

25 [12] SINKKONEN, Teemu. Counterterrorism in External Action: The EU's Toolbox for responding terrorism abroad. p. S

Conclusion

Since 9/11, the CSDP has been linked to the EU's framework documents related to terrorist threat. However, the tangible aspects of counter-terrorism have not been a direct part of the CSDP operations so far. On that account, unsurprisingly, CSDP operations are also short of a proactive military C-T element. On the one hand, the EU writes and talks a lot about worldwide peace and prosperity, but on the other it is highly unwilling to undertake the requisite risks of possibly getting its hands even dusty.

Currently the EU's role in counter-terrorism reflects very much its consultative and peaceful nature. However, being one of the most impartial players in the settlement of international or national crises might be considered a weakness. *«EU cannot afford to continue to ignore this dilemma, for already the contrast between high-flown rhetoric about human rights and democracy and mostly rather hesitant policies in practice, has greatly damaged its credibility and legitimacy.»*²⁶ An illustrative result of the EU's hesitant policies in practice is that the EU does not have the proper political mandate in C-T actions against terrorist groups abroad and is probably not to going to obtain one in near future.

However, by not having a possibility to deploy forces designated to C-T operations abroad, Europeans gave up on the deterrent and preventive functions of the military instrument. Furthermore, the EU's CSDP crisis management operational efforts are often undermined by enemy powers and do not always bring results appropriate to resources spent. Active military tools might ensure higher effectiveness of CSDP's crisis management. And since the resources are limited, it is time for us to think about change. We need to think globally but also to act locally. The idle potential of CSDP actions needs to be better exploited. Focussing on proactive instruments that are more likely to provide a substantial added value should be seen as vital necessity.

Adopting a strategy for CSDP, which would contain C-T operations, should create consensus on priority issues. Moreover, the rules of use of force and a framework for building military C-T capabilities within CSDP should be set in accompanying documents. Military element should focus on the acute preventive function of CT, support the long-term efforts of the CSDP's crisis management operations, and also make us better prepared for response and pursuit actions in any contingency. The CSDP strategy containing more active external C-T tools is a key element of an effective comprehensive approach. Moreover, it would ensure and unite an ambit for taking collective operational action by political and military means from the member states. Yet, the member states are politically not in agreement over the use of force under the EU flag. For the time being, some of the most powerful member states might conduct more active C-T external operations to protect their interests and citizens abroad, but all this happens beyond CSDP and it cannot be called collective operational action beneficial to united Europe and systematically contributing to global peace.

²⁶ [2] BISCOP, Sven. *The value of power, the power of values: a call for an EU Grand Strategy*. p. 23

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If the EU does not change its external policy approach, it will remain considered as a «paper tiger» and might find itself in disadvantageous position in the near future. We are facing serious global threats, but at the same time we do have the chance to pull an ace from our sleeve. The EU now has the opportunity to gather political will and adopt a CSDP strategy containing an effectual C-T mechanism. This might contribute to achieving a globally leading role for the EU in the field of counter-terrorism. One part of the puzzle is to take advantage of the EU's comprehensive approach and »soft« crisis management and supplement it with tailor-made military capacity designated for C-T operations and used under cautious rules in problematic regions.

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Economic crisis and its impact on military budgets, in particular on the development of new EU capabilities of CSDP

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and Defence Policy Olympiad



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List of Acronyms

AtA	Air-to-Air Refueling
CBRN	Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EDA	European Defence Agency
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross domestic product
ISS	(European Union) Institute for Security Studies
NATO	North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NH90	NATO Helicopter of the 90s
R&D	Research & Development
RPAS	Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
USA	United States of America

1. Introduction

a. Explanation of the title

The title in its length explains already the most of its meaning. In the aftermath (or the during of) the economic crisis the world - and especially Europe - has to deal with, we can notice the effects of the shortcomings in financial reserves on the way European countries deal with their defence.

Sources show us¹ that the austerity measures the most of the EU-member states introduce have serious negative effects on the defence budgets. Not only on national level, but also in terms of support to our European Union, and so to its CSDP.

These austerities come in a time in which much input, financially as scientifically, is demanded of all the member states to be able to follow or even lead in this fast world. A world that has changed and is changing drastically.

But is the economic crisis the true leading factor why budgets and interest shrink for CSDP? We will discuss this further on in this paper.

b. Brief summary

As this paper discusses the effects of the economic crisis on the development of new EU capabilities, we will start with a short summary of what has happened the last five years regarding this topic. Part B of "Economic Crisis" will handle the actions the EU has taken towards the causes of the crisis as to the countries in problems.

In chapter three we will see the impacts of the economic crisis on military budgets. This chapter will be divided into four main impacts.

As the impact of the crisis is not only felt on national level, chapter four will discuss what it has brought to the EU Defence, after which we will see other causes (chapter five) for these problems Europe has to deal with.

In function of the evolution of Europe in between other players in the world, the EU has to develop new capabilities to be able to act towards future problems. This will be dealt with in chapter six.

Keeping in mind the economical issues and the various causes explained in chapter five, we will see what are the possible solutions and the actions the EU undertakes to resolve them.

We will finish the paper «Economic crisis and its impact on military budgets, in particular on the development of the new EU capabilities in support of CSDP» with the conclusions.

2. Economic Crisis

a. Short summary

The years before 2007

The first years of the new millennium are known for their rapid credit growth, globalisation of finance and strong leveraging¹.

Investors found techniques to invest with great interest and low risk, although, that's what they thought or told others. In fact those techniques were highly risky and would cause the collapse of a huge bank with an international impact. Lehman Brothers collapses

The collapse of Lehman Brothers was the big start of the problems. The bank was connected with almost the entire world and dragged many other companies and governments with him.

Investors began liquidating their money, before losing it because of collapses of other companies². There was a global sagging of confidence.

The cause of the global impact were the tight financial bonds of the entire world³. Increased Risk Aversion⁴

Now that the investors saw the extreme effects of high risk investments, they restarted with increased risk aversion, which led to the shrinking of the economy, by which also the financial position of the government kept shrinking. The situation came in a negative spiral. Banks had to be rescued, government debts kept growing and growth and competitiveness worsened. This is still the case today.

b. Reactions of the EU

Some member states ended up with serious debts, like Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. They weren't able anymore to deal with it alone, so they requested help from the EU⁵.

The EU had to take actions. The first important initiative was the European Financial Stability Facility (2010), followed by the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (2011). Later on came the European Fiscal Compact (2011) and the European Stability Mechanism.

The biggest problem of the EU is that it has a monetary union, but lacks a fiscal union⁶. First steps have been taken by the European Fiscal Compact, but there is still a long way to go.

1 (The Economist, 2013)

2 (Blenckner, 2009)

3 (Congressional Research Service, 2012)

4 (Buti, 2009)

5 (The National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, 2011)

6 (INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: European Department, 2013)

3. Impact on Military Budgets

a. Short term thinking

Citizens became very anxious towards the effects of the crisis on their personal life. This in combination with the need to save money, led to a lot of social unrest, especially in the countries that experienced lots of troubles.

Politics plays the card of the crisis: the priority is set on social actions to ensure the quality of life of the voters.

Major purchases are being postponed if they don't show a direct positive effect on the economic situation or the social stability.

This leads to short term actions by which the effects of investments, even by governments on the stability of our future is forgotten.

As defence is not seen as a gain delivering sector and the link with the citizens is quite poor, defence has to swallow serious cuts in its budget. It is indeed difficult to explain a permanent need of defence, in the way of securing a country against threats coming from beyond its borders.

As the wealth, expressed in GDP, has grown last decennia (before the crisis) and conflicts always happened far away of our communities, the citizens have no feeling with the threats with whom we are surrounded, because they are less clear than they were in the decennia before. People think they are safe in the bastion, built up with stable links with neighbour countries.

But to keep this safety, investments in it are highly needed.

As such, for the citizens and thus the popular politicians, there is no priority towards defence. So cuts in defence budgets are a logical effect of the crisis. In this budgets is a very important division included: Research and Development. In Europe, resources have shrunk to nine billion euro⁸ (a drop of four to five percent⁹). This is very low, compared with the investments of other strong countries. R&D is needed to be able to react on future circumstances, in other words, to have capabilities in the near and far future. Without these capabilities, a country will lose much of its power and image towards the world.

b. Trends

The general trend in times of crisis, is - as already mentioned - cutting in budgets of sectors who don't enjoy the image of being a priority.

This leads to two important implications:

firstly, major purchases are delayed until the necessity is becoming crucially high or secondly, purchase costs are multiples of the amount of budget the country is willing to spend.

Both reactions are done based on a short term thinking pattern.

c. Effects

We will explain five major effects of those two implications mentioned above. In the first place, with lower budgets and lowering the financing in R&D, no government is able to launch large new programmes on its own¹⁰. The necessary investments therefore are too high, with a national market which is too small. Countries are forced to launch projects together with partner states. Indeed, this follows the general idea of the EU, so in one way, the crisis has a positive influence on the way the governments work. But as said: it is a forced change!

Without investments, installations are doomed to fall in obsolescence and further on in aging. On a certain moment, costs are necessary, but not possible because of the lack on financial reserves.

Systems, instruments and devices don't work properly anymore. This leads to a negative image of national defence, which in its turn leads to the question of the community: why should we still invest in something that isn't worth anything anymore?

A third effect is already the case today: more than half of the budget of defence goes directly in salary and pensions, of which we receive no gain as company. The working costs of defence as such are too high.

As explained by A. Missiroli, «demilitarisation and deindustrialisation risk going hand in hand»¹¹. This idea is my fourth effect: as investments shrink, defence itself can't invest in industry for its purchases. As purchases of defence can go up to billions, industry loses opportunities for its own revenues. Industry itself will shrink, which again will have an effect on government priorities and budgets.

As fifth and last effect, which can be seen as a contraction of the above, this system tears itself deeper into the crisis. as explained in the fourth effect.

If we succeed to resolve this crisis, problems will be so much aggravated that costs to resolve it will be so serious that impacts will be exuberant. On the other hand, it even may be that solutions come too late. Rebuild defence to its prior glory will be a long-term work.

4. Impact on EU Defence

a. Trends

The general effects seen on national level, can be extracted to the EU level: countries retard or hold in various projects proposed within the EU. Investments in projects and organisations shrink. The risk costs for governments considering European investments become higher, and governments became risk averted. Governments put emphasis on other domains who seem more important or less risky, by which, as on national level, European defence has to pave way for other sectors the EU deals with, of which in first place the financial and sovereignty questions.

Apart from the regional cooperation, countries look at their intern household first, which leads to duplication of ideas and work. This duplication will be further discussed in the effects on EU defence. To underline the shrinking of defence budgets, Anna Barcikowska¹², shows in Alert 25 of the ISS that EU defence spending has shrunk from €251 billion to €194 billion in the past decade (2013).

b. Effects

Because of the risk aversion, few money is invested in R&D towards future capabilities and missions. Example giving the low inputs on anti-cyber attack and European navigation.

This means we will stay, or even become more dependent on other world players, e.g. the US, who keep funding their R&D.

This will be even worse when we don't change this evolution drastically, because the longer we wait, the more dependent we become of others, who will present their developments and products for whom we will pay much.

Due to the intern household strategy, the EU doesn't succeed to build up a steady framework for cooperation. Local initiatives are taken (e.g. the EATC), but this could be enlarged to an organisation in which all members participate. Another effect of this strategy is that equipment market stays highly fragmented, which increases the cost for maintenance of the defence devices and weapon systems. The lack of a European system in maintenance and logistics is a loss of opportunity to reduce costs one has to make on budgetary level.

We can thus say that the household strategy is working opposite than what could help to resolve the crisis.

The delays on evolution of European defence as a worthy counterpart of partners e.g. the US causes losses in the image the EU has in the eyes of other player in the world, not only speaking about governments, but also about global companies and organisations. We are losing our strong position in the world. The economic recession causes a global position recession, especially the longer it takes to recover from the crisis, five years ago.

5. Other Causes

a. Political will & Sovereignty

Historically, governments are afraid to loss of sovereignty¹³ and want to keep as much as possible in its own hand while at the same time trying to profit as much as possible of the institution of the European Union. But the lack of support or the courage to give things out hands in favour of the common interest of the EU, works the loss of sovereignty in hand.

By not giving the EU more influence on its members, every state will continue to work on its own (speaking of defence) which leads to less control on what happens around one country. The economic crisis is one example of this effect by far. By not giving the EU the power to control its member states' finances, the member states lost control of their own finances.

The poorer defence on national and international level becomes, the more dependent governments become of other global players. It is only by consolidating an cooperating with the other EU member states that each state on itself will be able to keep its sovereignty.

For this cooperation, political will is needed, certainly coming from the more powerful western European states, who will have to trust the poorer and less powerful countries (mostly with an unstable past) to work together for the common purpose.

b. Fast world

«Countries face a strategic landscape that shifts faster than their perception of it allows» - Olivier de France¹⁴

The capability of technology has exceeded the capability of the human being in the latest decennium. Government and institutional structures are much too slow for the extremely fast evolution of the technology it has to work with.

This is an enormous issue we, humans, will have to deal with as soon as possible. The way everything that is still in human hands (especially decision making, because of the bureaucracy effect) goes much too slowly.

The moment a decision has fallen, the decision itself has already been surpassed by the technology or the events. A very good example of this, is the name of NATO's helicopter program: NH90: NATO Helicopter of the 90's. About twenty years later, the helicopter is finally becoming operational.

Technology that is installed in weapon systems and devices has aged in about five years. This tells us that the price we pay is higher for a shorter life cycle. For this, there are two main solutions: or we find a strong framework for fast development of systems, which we can install fast enough to ensure the system is still up to date with technology evolutions. Thanks to this framework, the costs for R&D will be lower, so renewing the outdated system itself will be lower too. On the other hand, because of the fact that technology exceeds our human capabilities (e.g. High Definition screens that are too detailed for humans to be able to notice the differences in resolution), we could be satisfied with the level we have today for our systems, keep up the R&D and update our materials when there is a real break trough in technology.

Of course the first option is better considering the positive industrial side-effect, but this option is more expensive for defence itself.

In addition to the technological factor, we have to bear in mind that the world theatre is quickly changing, what means that we constantly have to evaluate our capabilities and our environment. En plus, it will be harder to predict new issues.

c. Incompatibility & Communication

The incompatibility in European Defence can be divided in two components: in one way, European defence in its total is too equipped. The capabilities the complete EU possesses is well beyond the needs of the institution, mostly because of duplication¹⁵ and overdeveloped systems and platforms. The duplication can be linked to the lack of communication between member states, which has the effect that different member states develop one comparable product, or in its form, or in its use. But the different systems are hardly compatible, so cooperation on the battlefield becomes very difficult. If investments were coordinated or communicated with the other member states, duplication will be rare.

□ On the other hand, the EU misses important capabilities or plans for future capabilities. For this capabilities, the EU needs a framework, by which input of various states can be added, to have a basis by which all products will stay compatible, or better, that all products are the same.

d. Gains

The defence sector has the problem that it doesn't deliver direct profit to countries. Deployment abroad costs the governments lots of money, without any direct positive effect for the citizen. In the most optimistic way, we can say the organisations, military of civil, that participated with the operation are better trained by real life experience.

If we consider the history of post-WWII of the USA, we can see very close links between the government and the defence industry. The USA itself was able to receive profits out of R&D. If the EU builds up a strong link between its industry and R&D, it could find a way to make defence as a profitable sector.

6. New Capabilities

a. Today

⁷If we follow the arguments of Missiroli in the ISS Report 16⁷, the EU can be seen as the second strongest military power.

This because of the highest levels of GDP among its member states, the social and human capital and Europe as an advanced industrial and scientific base.

Aside this arguments, we can also include the impact of the reforms after the Cold War, going on until today, which modernised the structures and organisation of the national defences.

b. environments⁸

The European Union has to work on five principle environments. Among those, we can find the three classical environments: Land, Air and Maritime.

Those three have to be further developed, as the EU wants to be capable to react on newer situations and crises.

⁹As said, we can add two more environments to the classical three: Space and Cyber. These environments are not yet deployed enough to put next to Land, Air and Maritime, but this should be the case in the future, because conflict will be replaced from conventional environments (the three classics) to an informational environment⁹: cyber as the game, space as structure to be able to keep ahead of the EU's threats.

c European Council¹⁰

The European Council summed up the new capabilities of the EU¹¹:

- drones
- air-to-air refuelling
- satellite communication
- cyber defence

For the moment, the EU has to use the capabilities of other organisations or states to be able to deploy its units abroad. Mentioning AtA-refuelling and satellite communication. The other capabilities are already in its R&D, but are still far away from the level that will be required for future operations.

⁷ (Missiroli, ISS Report 16: Enabling the future: Future Military Capabilities 2013-2025, 2013)

⁸ (Barcikowska, ISS ALERT 31, 2013)

⁹ (European Union External Actions, 2011)

¹⁰ (Council, 2013)

¹¹ (Missiroli, ISS Alert 44, 2013)

7. Solutions and Actions

a. Industrial framework

The EU has to support and encourage the R&D in its territorial industries. Therefore it needs clear strategies and a need for systems and platforms. The EU has to promote a more competitive industry by strengthening the internal market, which will lead to innovation, diversity and inward investments. The clear strategy is necessary to obtain more cooperation of the different nations. This cooperation has to result in standardisation and certification, by which all systems and platforms will be compatible. (and not e.g. the problems Saab and Dassault have in their race with USA's airplane producers, considering compatibility).

Thus, a compatible products will encourage EU member states to buy products, made in Europe. By this way, the EU invests in its own industry and will be able to create growth and development. Compatible products aren't only usable for European Countries. Companies will be able to sell their products worldwide! To achieve this, the EU must internationally support its defence companies. For the total of this industrial framework, European synergy is needed.

b. Civil-military synergy

There are multiple sectors in which civil operations and organisations have advantage, e.g. CBRN and RPAS. The EU can by this means search possibilities to develop capabilities for both military as civil threats²¹. As the EU also deploys units in civil operations, it just needs to find a way to achieve a synergy between these two worlds.

c. EU Synergy

Integration is the word! Unite the armed forces and boost the logistical capacity. Reform the structures of all the armed forces and prepare them to work together. This will reduce the cost of the organisation of all the armed forces in its totality.

The logistics and maintenance has to be united or made compatible, that all maintenance and transportation is all the same in the EU. This will ease the organisation of the defence, but also the operations.

But to do so, the member states will have to communicate better.²²

d. Boost Research & Development

As explained already above, the cuts in budgets of R&D will do most harm to the EU. The institution has to react as fast as possible to re-boost and promote defence R&D. The effects if not will be disastrous, and not only on the defence level: dependence of other world players; industrial shrink-down; governmental financial problems and loss of power and image in the world.

A smart aspect for to do R&D on, is the lowering of energy dependence (and especially the fossil carburant) in the military chains.

e. Change the tone¹²

Replace the emphasis from money to what we really need: security and stable industries. The money will come by itself, especially if investors feel that risks to invest in Europe lowers.

As Catherine Ashton in name of the EDA underlined: we have to explain the citizens of the need of defence in times of economical and social crisis and convince them thereof. With the support of the citizens, the politicians will follow and there will be political will to further develop European Defence. The EU has to act in long terms again.

f. Actions

The EU has taken many initiatives lately, speaking of new capabilities in CSDP and the impact of the crisis thereon.

The European Council put defence again as topic on the agenda, which lead to the three objectives¹³:

- 'Operational effectiveness'
- 'Defence capabilities'
- 'A stronger European defence industry'

It encouraged the research to a fairer system of sharing the financial burden of CSDP.

The EU Commission exclaimed: «towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector.» (24/07/2013)¹⁴

The EDA¹⁵ worked a 'Strategic Level Defence Roadmap' out to minimise the impact of defence cuts; anchor systematic and long-term defence cooperation to develop necessary capabilities and requested for pioneer projects for both military and military capabilities.

12 (Keller)

13 (European Council, 2013)

14 (Barcikowska, ISS Alert 25, 2013)

15 (European Defence Agency)

8. Conclusions

The crisis in the euro zone has shown us serious cuts in defence budgets done by most of the member states of the European Union.

Although new capabilities are set by the European Council and Europe can still be seen as the second most powerful, lack on political will and financings in Research and Development make it very difficult for the EU to develop its CSDP properly as wished.

The shrinking of budgets on defence, mostly because of risk aversion and shortterm thinking will induce serious effects in the future: the EU's capabilities, its power and influence on the rest of the world.

Demilitarisation can be linked to deindustrialisation as direct effect, because of the close bonds of both sectors. It is thus important to strengthen this bond and to encourage investments in defence industries, if the EU wants to get rid of its economic crisis.

Solutions are diverse and feasible, from an industrial framework, over the civil-military synergy, to better communications. But most importantly, support in R&D must be strengthened. For that, the EU has to persuade the member states and its inhabitants of the need of security in times of crisis.

As the EU sees the issues, it must take actions. For this reason, the European Council put Defence as topic for the summit in December 2013.

In its conclusions, it mentioned the EU's future capabilities and the main objectives.

It can't be denied that the EU still has a long way to go, but thanks to the summit, first concrete actions are planned.

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European security and defence nowadays: International commitments, military capabilities and the economic crisis

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List of Acronyms

CSDP : Common Security and Defence Policy.

CBRN : Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear.

ISTAR : Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissance.

NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

USSR : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

WEU : Western European Union.

Introduction

«You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.»¹ We sometimes talk about Europe having reached a Kantian stage, in the hope of seeing it as an area of «perpetual peace»². Since 1945, four factors have given support to the idea of an improbable major war in Europe: American protection, the disappearance of the Soviet threat, nuclear deterrence and the end of intracontinental tensions thanks to the advent of the European Union. In European public opinions, these factors tend to spread the illusion of a lasting removal of war.

If the hypothesis of an inter-European confrontation really seems to be far from having any relevance, it is quite difficult to go along with the idea of a distancing of war, including on European soil. In the 21st century, new threats are appearing without dismissing the ancient ones. High-intensity conflicts are still striking several countries, even on the edge of the European area. Similarly, the traditional sovereign missions of states are still appropriate: surveillance and control of maritime and air zones, protection of their citizens on national soil and abroad... Thus the great novelty of this century is probably the new continuum that exists henceforth between threats coming from the outside and those developing inside a country. Security and defence are thus no longer independent, but on the contrary are the two facets of the same political preoccupation, the transboundary nature of contemporary threats having made their differentiation obsolete. It is quite obvious when we think of the challenges that states are facing nowadays: terrorism, piracy, illegal migration, organized crime or cyberattacks. The risk is huge, all the more so as these threats are more and more interrelated and reinforce each other, compelling security and defence actors to take charge of them in a global and combined way.

Within the framework of this new security environment, we may wonder about European defence and security nowadays. However, the first thing to clarify is the way we understand the adjective «European». Usually, it can refer both to the European area - which, despite adversary and often controversial boundaries, roughly extends from the North Cape to the Mediterranean Sea and from the Atlantic Ocean to Russia - and to the economic and political territory of the European Union. In the latter case, the adjective »European« refers to the specific institutions and procedures of the Union. Linked with the aforementioned topic, it seems relevant to attempt to understand how the European Union perceives and takes charge of the security and defence of the European area. Some more specific questions stem from this initial interrogation: Who provides European defence and security? How are they ensured? Which means have to be employed? Does it go through external intervention? Against whom has Europe to be defended? These questions, indiscriminately formulated, are in fact echoing our general topic: the international commitments and military capabilities of Europe.

Finally, it would be rather hard to think about the subjects mentioned above without adding a temporary factor: the economic and financial crisis. Far from being a trendy concern, today's crisis is heavily weighing on security and defence issues. Originating from the United States of America in 2008, this banking and financial crisis spread to Europe as early as 2009, turning both into an economic crisis and into a budgetary crisis. Affecting the real economy, it implies inflation and the rise of unemployment rates. It was also a direct attack on the European states' public finances, after the numerous national decisions to financially intervene in order to support banks and the European economy. Consequently, states have now been involved for some years in austerity policies designed to re-establish financial discipline and rationalize public spending. Yet, these policies have serious repercussions on the security and defence capabilities of European countries and thereafter of the European Union.

1 Aphorism attributed to Trotsky by Alan Furst in *Night Soldiers : a novel*, 1988.

2 KANT Immanuel, *Perpetual peace : a philosophical sketch*, 1795.

Thus, this question is burning: «Does the economic and financial crisis jeopardize the European project to be a security provider, owning military capabilities, on the international stage?» Indeed, it has to be admitted that this crisis poses the threat of a demilitarization of Europe. Nevertheless, it can also appear as a providential opportunity to revive the European defence project. Yet, the question of the founding of such European defence remains, while it cannot come down to a circumstantial impetus.

I. The threat of European demilitarization

Former Obama Administration Secretary of Defence Robert Gates expressed one of the deepest concerns of the American government in these terms : «The demilitarization of Europe [has become an] impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st century»³ Here, Gates identified a strong trend of the European area: the decrease of military forces equipment and functioning budgets in Europe for several decades. The crisis that is affecting European finances today even more increases the recurrent pressure on military capabilities, to the extent that some can be afraid of a strategic drop in the status of Europe, the latter being in an awkward posture to keep its international role.

1) Europe, a natural actor of international security

«As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is *inevitably* a global player.»⁴ The first reference document for a European security strategy considers the European Union as a near-natural international actor. We can easily understand this *inevitable* aspect acknowledging the history and the development of numerous European states. As ancient great continental or maritime kingdoms or republics, these states have over the centuries assumed the role of unavoidable actors of the international system. Another factor strengthening the weight of Europe is the French and British membership of the United Nations Security Council. Finally, the major contribution to UN operations - in money, equipment and troops - of countries belonging to the European area makes them recognized security providers in the world. And, apart from their involvement in the UN collective security system, European states actively participate in the organization of a rapidly changing planet and in its security through the institutional frameworks of NATO and the European Union, within what we henceforth call - since the signing of the Lisbon Treaty - the CSDP.

After long centuries of war on the continent, the European Union's history contains a peace project. Thus it has great ambitions in terms of international security and peace. Since 1992, the Union has defined the so-called Petersberg tasks: humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions and crisis management missions, including peacemaking missions with offensive means.⁵ In 2001, the Gothenburg Summit added nine supplementary tasks⁶ to these initial tasks. All these missions constitute the heart of the European Union's international commitments. Having adopted a European Security Strategy⁷ in 2003, reaffirmed and updated in 2008, the European Union additionally tried to base its international role on an analysis of global challenges and major threats

³ GATES Robert, former American Secretary of Defence ; extract from a speech delivered in Washington upon a meeting on the NATO Strategic Concept, 23 February 2010.

⁴ « A Secure Europe in a Better World », European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 2. Emphasis on "inevitably" added.

⁵ *Petersberg Tasks*, Council of the Western European Union, Bonn, Germany, June 1992.

⁶ Disarmament, police, rule of law, military consulting and assistance, administration reinforcement, civil protection, conflict prevention, post-conflict stabilisation and enhancement of customs capacities.

⁷ « A Secure Europe in a Better World », European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003. "Providing Security in a Changing World", Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, Brussels, 11 December 2008.

so as to determine three main strategic aims : to face threats, to build neighbourhood security and to work towards international law and human rights. In terms of capabilities, the European Council of December 1999 focused on the development of crisis management capabilities, leading to the drafting of the »Helsinki Headline Goal«, updated in 2004⁸, which provides a quantitative and qualitative framework for armed intervention across the full spectrum of missions. One of the objectives is thus the deployment of 60,000 soldiers in 60 days at the most for one year at least. Diplomatic, civil and military instruments go towards building this role of security provider.

2) Reinforcement of the decreasing defence spending trend.

However, the economic crisis led to a massive decrease of available financial resources for the states. Although cut rates considerably vary, two thirds of the European countries have cut military spending since 2008⁹. Some drastic budget cuts have even reached a quarter of their defence budgets : -27% for Bulgaria, -26% for Latvia or -23% for Estonia in 2011¹⁰. In 2012, only four countries succeeded in spending at least two percent of GDP on defence: France, the United Kingdom, Cyprus and Greece.

In these times of austerity, defence budgets are indeed the most affected. The first reason, which is not entirely devoid of cynicism, is the fact that defence budgets are easier to reduce than social budgets, such as education or health budgets, that directly concern citizens' daily lives. Defence budgets are also used as a convenient way for saving money because the adverse effects of cutting on defence are relatively hidden, due to their long-term and abstract nature. Lastly, public opinions today seem less favorable to defence spending and foreign operations, in front of expensive missions and unpopular conflicts that appear disconnected from daily security.

Nevertheless, these budget restrictions, made on the cost of operations, personnel¹¹, and investment in armament acquisition or R&D, are true threats to the European states' ability to carry out missions across the whole spectrum of operations. Furthermore, these major defence cuts are often made in the form of emergency measures, without deep dialogue at the European level, which could lead to a substantial reduction in European military capabilities and means of action in international crisis, in other words to a strong threat for the European area.

3) A looming mortgage of European action.

The first major danger is a likely «capability break» regarding some military capabilities. Overall there are three kinds of states in Europe: states that intend to keep the whole extent of their military capabilities, states that already have capability gaps and states that have kept only a capability niche (*Special Operations for Romania, CBRN for the Czech Republic...*). The budget pressure will be the highest on the first ones which will have difficulty in preserving their capabilities. In case of a slowdown in equipment modernization or a renunciation to some purchases, these countries could undergo a capability downgrade. This dropping out begins to be apparent in the abandonment of some capabilities: for instance, the United Kingdom has renounced to renew its airborne maritime reconnaissance component.

The renouncement to military capabilities as well as the excessive specialization hang a real sword of Damocles over European technological competence. Indeed, armament programs being long-term programs, it is less difficult to abandon a technological savoir-faire than recover it once it is lost. Short-term savings are likely to question the technological independence of Europe as regards armament.

8 « Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 », Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10/11 December 1999. "Helsinki Headline Goal 2010", European Council, 17/18 June 2004.

9 SIPRI Yearbook 2013, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013.

10 *Ibid.*

11 For the years 2014-2019, 54000 posts cut in France; and 20000 posts done away in the British forces.

Now, European countries are already lacking several military capabilities to conduct large-scale operations in an autonomous way: air-to-air refuelling, strategic transport, unmanned aerial vehicles, ISTAR capabilities, satellites, smart munitions, etc. The latest operations in which some European countries have been involved - operations in Libya in 2011 and the French operation in Mali - have again highlighted these well-known shortfalls in Europe's arsenal. Indeed, these operations could not have occurred without a strong American support. The danger of inadequacy and deficiency in military capabilities in relation to new threats is thus looming.

Another danger is a reduction in expeditionary operations. Today, for Europeans, renouncing to foreign operations represents an accrued threat on their own territory. Indeed, as the European Internal Security reminds it: «Most threats to the internal security of the EU either originate outside Europe or have a clear nexus to other parts of the world»¹². European security and defence nowadays are henceforth playing out both inside and outside. Consequently, it is essential to retain a credible projection capability, in order to fight threats both on the fringes of Europe and beyond. A decrease of military commitments abroad could lead to the outbreak or resurgence of lawless zones, sheltering criminal and/or terrorist groups having Europe as a target. The 2004 Madrid bombings and the 2005 London attacks are here to remind us that Europe is far from being an impregnable citadel.

At a time when global defence spending is topping \$1 750 billion, Europe is running the risk of being dropped down while lowering the flag above its defence budget. The American defence budget remains stable at \$682 billion (40% of the world's defence spending), the Chinese and Russian ones are increasing, and Europe is less and less able to keep its forces and intervene abroad. Notwithstanding, despite the weight of the economic crisis, the sum of all European countries' defence budgets still ranks 2nd in the world: \$307 billion¹³. Thus Europe seems to possess a means to keep its ambitions and its international commitments: the path of common initiative.

II. The opportune goad for reviving the common defence project.

As mentioned earlier, today's economic and financial crisis is deeply threatening the European ability to act on the international stage as a security provider, while putting pressure on Europe's defence budgets and projection capabilities. As a consequence, is this an impediment to European defence and security? Most certainly. Nevertheless, this crisis could be recognized as a strong and opportune incentive for member states to examine ways to cooperate more closely on European defence. Beyond traditional policies, the financial constraint may encourage member states to seek new resource-saving solutions and thus develop more regional initiatives.

1) New thinking on how to handle defence spending.

The first strong and positive effect of the economic and financial crisis is probably the awareness of European states that they are not able, nowadays, to consider their defence in an isolated way, both in terms of armament programs and operations. For several decades, armament costs have indeed been constantly increasing, due to the technological innovations that are now the hallmark of quality equipment. In order to continue acting on the full scope of defence operations, European states have to procure this kind of equipment. This requirement clearly asks for a regional reflection on common programs.

Furthermore, the economic and financial crisis that Europe is facing is compelling the member states to redesign their military capabilities. Imposed by budget constraints, restructuring is also an opportunity to adapt national capabilities to the new geostrategic environment. One must admit that some equipment is no longer topical. For instance, in 2008, there remained 10,000 tanks in Europe,

¹² *Joint Report by EUROPOL, EUROJUST and FRONTEX on the state of Internal Security in the EU, Brussels, 7 May 2010.*

¹³ All figures used previously are coming from the *SIPRI Yearbook 2013, Op. cit.*

as so many relics of the Cold War. The pressure on defence budget could help the quick removal of these types of equipment.

Another field in which a vast reflection could be opened is the problematic replications of force deployment in foreign operations. For example, the fight against piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden is mobilizing European vessels and personnel as part of four operations : Europe's Operation Atalanta, NATO's Operation Ocean Shield, the first multinational coalition Combined Task Force 150 and the second multinational coalition *Combined Task Force 151*. The context of budgetary contraction could profitably lead to a strong rationalization of force employment.

2) Old and new projects for common defence.

The call for integrated military cooperation is nothing new. Since the Treaty of Brussels of 1948 and the creation of the WEU in 1954, European member states have been trying to develop common defence. But, in its last incarnation as the CSDP, this project is still far from actually existing. One of the major causes of this situation is what could be called the »nationalist reflex« of EU member states. If we consider the historical construction of most European states while referring to Max Weber's and Norbert Elias¹⁴ theses, we have to admit that defence is seen as one of the supreme pillars of national sovereignty. Thus governments are not well-inclined towards cooperating in this field. Furthermore, this „nationalist reflex“ can be detected in the repeated attempts of member states to favour their national industry in joint industrial programs.

The context is changing. And today's economic and financial crisis is providing a new avenue for regional military cooperation. Member states are looking for means to diminish defence costs, avoid redundancies and duplication of equipment and make economies of scale. This is an opportunity to revive old projects that had been at a standstill for some years or to launch new cooperation initiatives. Two main examples can be cited: the Ghent Initiative led by Germany and Sweden in November 2010 and the Lancaster House Treaties signed by France and the United Kingdom also in November 2010.

Innovative in the sense that it directly tasks a European agency to find further opportunities for cooperation, the Ghent Initiative is at the origin of the «Pooling and Sharing» concept. In order to increase efficiency and cost- effectiveness, this concept identifies two ways of cooperation for capabilities that do not have to be exclusively maintained at the national level: the idea of pooling implies the mutual use of capabilities and support structures, while the idea of sharing implies the abandonment of some specific capabilities that are detained by other partners which the country can rely on. Consequently, the Ghent Initiative is a huge step forward as part of deeper and wider defence integration.

In the same way, the Franco-British defence agreement is a direct answer to the restrictive financial situation in Europe. Both affected by a significant decrease of their defence budgets, the two countries have chosen to conclude a new military alliance in a wide range of areas, from operations (especially the *Combined Joint Expeditionary Force*) and training to equipment programs, technology and industrial cooperation. The most significant provision is probably the pooling of their nuclear capabilities and structures, nuclear defence being ordinary considered as the spearhead of national sovereignty. But the fear of losing one's international role of security provider and autonomous actor has proven to be a strong incentive to cooperate.

3) An external goal for enhancing European cooperation.

The crisis that started in 2008 and established a tense economic climate in Europe also resulted in a significant contraction of our best ally's spending. With a modest annual growing rate of

14 WEBER Max, *Economy and Society*, 1925 and ELIAS Norbert, *On the process of civilization*, 1939.

2,8% in 2013 and a federal debt that exceeded 105% of the GDP in 2013, the United States is facing the same pressure on its financial resources. Adding to this difficult economic situation the fact that the United States has been involved in ruinously expensive military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the country is struggling to put its financial house in order. And in this context, the American willingness to use its scarce financial and capability resources to underwrite European defence and security is nothing obvious. Both Robert Gates and Leon Panetta, former Secretaries of Defence in the Obama Administration, have called for increased “burden sharing”. The American speech is more and more crystalline: Europe will have to acquire means to conduct operations covering the whole spectrum of interventions from civilian assistance to war-fighting, autonomously, that is to say at its own initiative and with its own capabilities. This call for greater “burden sharing” echoes NATO’s “Smart Defence” initiative, developed during the 2012 Chicago Summit, which encourages European states to cooperate so as to maintain their ability to underwrite and promote international security. Just as Mr. Rasmussen said: “And that means all Allies must continue to invest in NATO - politically, militarily and financially. And we must all shoulder a faire share of the burden, just as we all share in the benefits.»¹⁵

As a consequence, the financial and economic crisis which is so hardly undermining Western countries could be a historical chance to strengthen the process of defence Europeanization. Nevertheless, using two Kantian concepts, the crisis could be the *origin* of the reviving of European defence, but in no way could it be its *basis*. The basis of European defence consists of an understanding of the interests of European countries linked with an analysis of the context in which military capabilities could be employed. Indeed, it is quite difficult to consider how the military capabilities and resources could be defined without having previously delimited the concrete situations in which they could be used. In that way, it appears to us that justifying the enhancement of «common defence» by a large-scale reduction of military costs and founding it on the following principle of «doing best with less» might be a wrong approach. The economic and financial crisis has probably to be considered as a strong shortterm incentive, but it does not stand for a political will and a strategic ambition.

III. The need for clarification of international commitments.

The economic and financial situation has provided a stimulus both to existing initiatives and to innovative proposals of regional military cooperation. But reducing the rationale behind closer military cooperation in Europe to an attempt of making savings is misunderstanding the foundations that underlie the planning of military capabilities. On the contrary, this planning has to be based on geostrategic considerations and coherent policies allowing to precisely define the seize and conditions of use of the military tool.

1) What place for NATO?

The first step towards coherent planning of military capabilities is the clarification of the NATO-EU relationship. Since its creation in 1949, NATO has carried a strong weight in Europe: created to face the USSR, steered by the United States, the organization has been the guarantee of European security. Till the end of the Cold War, NATO has taken on a role of external protector. Still today, some countries are relying on the Atlantic Organization to provide for their security. *Air Baltic*, for instance, the NATO operation carried out with joint military aircraft, contributes to the air defence of the Baltic States. Other states from Eastern Europe, lacking this equipment in their own forces, are also using NATO equipment to participate in foreign operations. As a consequence, NATO has long been considered as a brake on the development of European defence. Furthermore, long-standing Atlanticist countries such as the United Kingdom have historically worked to make NATO the ultimate

¹⁵ NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Conference « A New Era for EU-US Trade », speech, 07 October 2013, read online in December 2013.

referent in all cases, bypassing every attempt to build autonomous European defence. But the Berlin Plus Agreements, signed in March 2003, succeeded to create a new framework of relations between the EU and NATO. One of the major aims was to facilitate cooperation and to allow access to NATO planning capabilities and assets for EU- led operations, so as to avoid duplication. The agreement also included arrangements for coherent and mutual requirements to reinforce capabilities within NATO's defence planning. Nevertheless, financial and capability disparities are still an issue in Europe, while the United Kingdom and France are bearing 40% of the defence spending of the European Union. At a time when many are calling for burden sharing, this issue has to be resolved.

2) Will the United States always protect Europe?

The NATO appeal for European autonomy goes together with the current redefining of the transatlantic partnership. The United States has long been the first protector of European countries, but the focal point of America's attention has nowadays shifted further east. Today, the United States aspires to counterbalance the growing Chinese economic and military power. Through strengthened alliances in Asia, the opening of a new military facility in Australia and the withdrawal of some American troops from Europe, this strategic pivot to the East ought to convince Europe that it has now to be at the helm of its own security. And it was precisely the desire of the American government which decided during the last conflicts in the European neighborhood to « lead from behind ».

3) Defending whom, against what, and how?

Today there is an urgent need for European states, of course, as well as the European Union, at the institutional level, to ponder over their geostrategic ambitions and over the perception they have of their own action on the international stage.

Despite noteworthy attempts by the European Union, both at the strategic level and at the capability level, it has to be assumed that the European common defence will not emerge overnight. The decisions taken as regards security and defence are still the sum of the interests of each individual member state. It is a matter of fact that today there still exist strategic cultures proper to each country, resting upon history, geography and collective references. NATO has already enabled some homogenisation of procedures and good interoperability, but it has taken its course over a too short period to radically remodel the strategic and tactical cultures. The dissent that has surfaced regarding the Iraqi War in 2003 and was brought out again at the time of the Libyan intervention in 2011 are clear proof of that. Thus, European states now need to clarify their respective stances and reach an agreement on a few core interests.

Even before translating their general geostrategic ambitions into practical projects, European states ought to clarify their positions towards their idea of the role and use of diplomatic and military tools. For long, it seems that non-coercive instruments have been favored by the European Union, the latter putting more emphasis on civil, humanitarian or assistance missions. Nevertheless, civilian or civil-military aspects could be inadequate in front of contemporary threats and European countries should look for common ground so as to take advantage of military capabilities.

Now, not to dither to make use of one's military capabilities also requires that priorities justifying their utilization have been defined. In this regard, European states still have to accurately ascertain what their core interests are, both at the geographical and strategic level. It is indeed necessary to plan the preservation or the procurement of military capabilities, to know where one's interests are directly threatened. Some regions of the European area or of the European close neighbourhood (the Balkans, Caucasus, the Maghreb, the *Near East*) being not fully stabilized, it seems imperative to focus on them. Likewise, future strategic areas such as the Arctic, of which Denmark and Norway are riparian, require close attention. Providing security in such areas could also involve an updated partnership with Russia, from an exclusive security and defence point of view. Looking for the lowest

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common denominators to achieve a common defence project, European countries could finally define the few threats concerning the whole European area, starting with piracy, terrorism, weapons and drugs trafficking linked with terrorism. On this basis, the European engagement in the fight against piracy in the Indian Ocean seems to us to be a true success that ought to be widened to additional fields that are directly endangering the vital interests of European states.

Conclusion

Since 2009, despite lasting global ambitions reaffirmed during the last European Council on Security and Defence, European states have been reducing their defence spending with consistency and resolution, nay giving up on, some of their military capabilities. Added to other factors - older ones -, the economic and financial crisis, with its harmful effects, leads us today to fear a demilitarization and a strategic drop in the status of Europe. Yet, it is also an opportunity for the European common defence project, making henceforth indefensible the purely nationalist rationale of some states and working in favour of the “Pooling and Sharing” concept encouraged by the European Union. But to manage the economic crisis by pooling and sharing military capabilities at the European level should not conceal the fact that both European and international defence and security require huge investments, however unpopular they may be in austerity times. Indeed, it has to be reminded that defence and security underpin the need for sustainable economic growth: they are a prerequisite for stability and trade. Furthermore, beyond this aspect, it is indispensable to drop the economic screen through which most of the defence and security issues are analyzed nowadays. Now the geostrategic angle has to be reintroduced at the heart of the debate - an angle which has to be the basis of international commitments and military capability development. Now, despite the historical weight of Europe, counting for something in today’s world is not something natural. It implies having provided oneself with the appropriate means, diplomatic, civil or military ones. Nowadays, having security provider status requires communication work towards European public opinions, in order to raise lucid political awareness of the security threats of the 21st century. It also involves deepening security and defence capabilities within the framework of reinforced cooperation as well as clarifying the role devoted to military forces in the European states. Lastly, it is necessary to define a basis of «core interests» on which the countries could stand together. Still not being a coherent actor compared to the United States, Russia or China, Europe is busily looking for figuring prominently in the international system. And it does have the means of this ambition, thanks to member states that still own first ranking military forces and the ability to intervene abroad. But such capacities have utterly to be maintained because, now as before, «not all is achievable with military instruments, yet nothing is achievable without them»¹⁶.

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European defence and security nowadays: International commitments, military capabilities and the economic crisis

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List of Acronyms

CDP	Capability Development Plan
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EATC	European Air Transport Command
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDTIB	European Defence Technological and Industrial Base
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HR	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
MS	Member States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
P&S	Pooling and Sharing
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
R&D	Research and Development
SMEs	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States

Introduction

«Where did we start? As a peace project among adversaries. What is our greatest accomplishment? The spread of stability and democracy across the continent. And what is our task for the future? To make Europe a global power; a force for good in the world.»¹

In this quote from 2006, former High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, sums up what has been the major role of the EU in the field of security and defence in the past and describes his optimistic vision of the Union as a global power in the future. It is clear though that he does not just talk for himself, since this vision had also found its way into the ESS and was as such adopted by the European Council in 2003.² Yet, since then, there has also been plenty of controversy over the CSDP. While there is apparently a consensus among European leaders about the Union's long-term goals in the field of CSDP, agreement on concrete steps forward seems hard to reach. In other words, the relevance of the Union for European security in the past and its desired path for the future seem clear, which leaves one question open: How do we fill in the gap?

This question is becoming more and more urgent. Recently, there have been growing concerns over European military capabilities which have put into question Europe's ability to face the global challenges of this century. After poor performances during some of their military operations, it seems European forces are not well-equipped to provide security in their own region and depend heavily on US support. The economic crisis has on top of that contributed to a further decline of defence budgets.

Looking at input from both policymakers and commentators, this paper seeks to recapitulate the discussion about European military capabilities and explores the Union's role in the development of capabilities. In the sense of the title, the economic crisis and its impact on military capabilities will be viewed in light of the Union's and its MS' international commitments. The global challenges Europe faces, its own ambitions and the transatlantic partnership will be crucial factors in answering why European States need more capable military forces and what their future tasks might be. Finally, this paper discusses the benefits of Pooling and Sharing, its limitations and some of the difficulties it faces.

Global Challenges and the European Crisis

In the age of globalisation, new security threats transcend borders and become increasingly dispersed. As the HR, Catherine Ashton, put it in her recent report, the world of today was facing «increased volatility, complexity and uncertainty».³ The key threats and challenges to European security, as outlined in the ESS and reinforced through other strategic documents, are not confined to single states and can, albeit originating far from Europe's borders, crucially affect its security.⁴ In order to combat these threats and promote stability in the world, Europe needs to be able to effectively project force and, as stated in the ESS, «the first line of defence will often be abroad.»⁵ The unrest in North Africa and the Middle East and the ongoing flow of refugees arriving at Europe's southern borders have made it clear that the consequences will be felt for Europe if it fails to act accordingly.

¹ Council of the EU 2006, p. 4.

² See below and: European Council 2003, p. 1.

³ EEAS 2013, p. 1.

⁴ European Council 2003; European Council 2008.

⁵ European Council 2003, p. 7.

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Since most of the new threats are hard to address in a direct fashion, an effective CSDP has to employ a broad range of instruments. The Union's comprehensive approach thus encompasses both military and civilian capabilities, including political, diplomatic, economic, development instruments for the full crisis-management cycle of prevention, rapid response and recovery. However, military capabilities cannot be simply substituted with other means in foreign policy and recent military operations have shown that the Union might not be well-equipped for the tasks it needs to take on in the 21st century. The gained experience has led policymakers, such as the HR, to the realisation «that Europeans lack some of the necessary capabilities, in particular in terms of strategic enablers such as air-to-air refuelling, strategic airlift, intelligence and surveillance».⁶ Those worries are not entirely new, since different European shortcomings in defence and crisis-management had already been demonstrated during the breakup of Yugoslavia, but, more recently, the military intervention in Lybia sparked new questions about Europe's ability to provide security in its own backyard.

The underlying reasons are reflected in European defence budgets. Defence expenditures in Europe have on average been decreasing since the end of the Cold War, but in the wake of the recent economic crisis and the ongoing austerity measures, defence budgets in the EU had to take particularly critical cuts. Spending in defence has decreased every year since 2007 in both absolute value as well as in terms of GDP and overall government expenditure. As of 2011, EU States spent 1,55% of their GDP on defence, compared to 4,66% by the US. Over half of that expenditure was allocated solely for personnel, whereas the US spent only 33% on personnel. On R&D the EU and the US spent respectively 4,0% and 10,7%. Those European troops show furthermore a lack of deployability with an estimated 27,5% of land forces deployable and only 7,1% of them sustainable. Only 3,5% of the European troops were actually deployed on average in 2011, compared to 12,5% of the US troops. Looking at the total number of soldiers, European forces might have sufficient manpower, but they are certainly lacking readiness and sustainability due to improper equipment, especially regarding the above-mentioned strategic enablers such as airlift and air-to-air-refueling, intelligence and surveillance.⁷

When viewed in a more positive way, the discrepancy in defence expenditure patterns underscores a great potential for improvement, since reductions in personnel costs could make room for badly needed investments.⁸ However, given the time major new arms projects take to deliver results, the current lack of investment in R&D will have long-term consequences, further limiting European capabilities in the future. Moreover, budget cuts might harm the defence industry, thus driving up the costs of future projects as well. For the defence industry in Europe to be sustainable throughout the ongoing crisis and in the future, its current fragmentation needs to be overcome and national requirements need to be harmonised. These worries seem to have arrived at the level of the national Heads of State and Government and have most recently led the European Council to conclude that «Defence budgets in Europe are constrained, limiting the ability to develop, deploy and sustain military capabilities. Fragmented European defence markets jeopardise the sustainability and competitiveness of Europe's defence and security industry.»⁹

6 EEAS 2013, p. 2.

7 All data can be found in: EDA 2013a and EDA 2013b; For a quick overview see: Barcikowska 2013, p. 31.

8 This has been pointed out by: Barcikowska 2013, p. 31.

9 European Council 2013b, p. 1.

International Commitments and America's Rebalancing

Even among our allies, concerns about European military capabilities are in no way new, seeing as there has been talk about burden-sharing within NATO for a long time. What is actually new though is the strategic context. With the US rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region and the likely resulting disengagement from Europe and its broader neighborhood, commentators on both sides of the Atlantic have recently been calling on Europe to step up its own defence and take on more responsibility for global security.

The US focus on the Asia-Pacific region will not end the transatlantic partnership, but it will likely be a factor contributing to the change of its nature. The mutual defence clause of the Lisbon Treaty is not meant to replace Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty anytime soon and at the core NATO will remain a powerful deterrent against any direct territorial threat, but European forces might no longer be able to count on the same extent of American support as in the past for problems short of such a threat.¹⁰ That means Europeans will have to act more actively and build up the needed capabilities to protect their interests and provide security for themselves and their broader neighborhood. Some of the Union's ambitions for the future part it wants to play in international security actually go even further.

As the EU claims itself in strategic papers, it is «inevitably a global player».¹¹ For one, it is a major economic power, relying heavily on a functioning global trading system and secure trade routes. That alone should be enough incentive for Europeans to increase their global presence, but the EU also wants „to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world“.¹² This might be interpreted to include UN missions for peace-keeping as well as the implementation of the «responsibility to protect» principle. Those ambitions certainly go beyond the protection of direct interests and providing security on Europe's borders. Acting on them would require the capabilities for effective international crisis-management and, of course, also the political will to use them.

So far Europe has, however, relied mainly on soft power in its foreign policy, which has failed to deliver the desired results in international crisis when the going got rough. It has thus been pointed out that soft power by itself is not effective and that the two have to be properly balanced instead.¹³ As NATO's Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, recently said: «we Europeans must understand that soft power alone is really no power at all. Without hard capabilities to back up its diplomacy, Europe will lack credibility and influence.»¹⁴

Europeans are amongst the ones profiting most from a functioning global world order and international security. It is time for them to collectively contribute more to those ends. If Europeans actually want to live up to the Union's claim and be a global player, they will have to develop the necessary capabilities to effectively project force and take on the tasks that it outlined for itself in the Treaty of Lisbon: «joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.»¹⁵

10 In this regard I concur with the views expressed in: Lightfoot and Pavel 2012.

11 European Council 2003, p.1.

12 European Council 2003, p. 1.

13 For a discussion on EU soft power see: Nielsen 2013, p. 727.

14 Rasmussen 2013a.

15 TEU 2012, art. 43(1).

In the face of the economic crisis and the financial constraints of MS, it will become even more difficult for them to take on the above-mentioned tasks effectively. None of them will be able to cope with the complex threats of this century all by themselves and among new emerging powers European States will most likely fade into insignificance if they do not work closely together. With shrinking defence budgets, rising costs of technologically advanced military hardware and fragmented national defence industries, they will not be able to make the needed investments and maintain the necessary capabilities. At the moment, it seems that decisions in defence spending are guided rather by economic imperatives than by actual assessments of today's security environment and the threats it entails. The resulting lack of capabilities will affect European security far beyond the current crisis.

The Way to Go: Joint Development of Capabilities

A growing number of commentators and policymakers have been pointing towards P&S as the prime solution for Europe's problems. Most recently this has led the European Council to conclude that «Pooling demand, consolidating requirements and realising economies of scale will allow MS to enhance the efficient use of resources and ensure interoperability».¹⁶ The core idea is quite simple: MS pool resources to jointly develop capabilities that they cannot afford individually. However, when aggregating their demand, cooperating States first need to agree on which capabilities have highest priority, define shared requirements and agree on how to actually use their shared assets - all of which might turn out to be a difficult task. It is the prime assignment of the EDA to assist them with that task by defining operational requirements and promoting measures to satisfy them.¹⁷ Coordination in the area of capability development has in fact realised some success stories - the probably most prominent one being the EATC which the HR and the European Council have recently recommended as a blueprint for other cooperative models.¹⁸ The EATC and joint efforts of France and the UK, as European States who spend most on defence, in the procurement and operation of aircraft carriers show that the underlying logic applies not solely to smaller MS.¹⁹

A more efficient allocation of scarce resources is also sought at the supply side of the market. As the Commission and others have highlighted recently, the market for European defence is still fragmented, leading to duplication in development.²⁰ Through further integration of national defence markets EU policymakers hope to generate economies of scale, create higher competition, tackle market distortions and thus drive down costs. A strong EDTIB that is able to support joint arms projects is considered necessary for the future development of capabilities.²¹ Since SMEs are seen as key actors and drivers for innovation in the defence sector, the Commission proposed to promote greater cross-border market access which was welcomed by the European Council.²² The Commission and the HR have also stressed the need for more standardisation and mutual recognition of certification procedures in order to promote market competition, enhance interoperability and reduce costs. To this end, the European Council has tasked the EDA and the Commission to develop a roadmap for common defence industrial standards and certification procedures.²³

16 European Council 2013b, p. 5.

17 Council Decision 2011/411/CFSP, p. 2; TEU 2012, art. 42(3).

18 European Council 2013b, p. 6; EEAS 2013, p. 19.

19 This point has been made by: Menon 2013, p. 53.

20 European Commission 2013, pp. 5-6; EEAS 2013, p. 20; European Council 2013b, p. 1.

21 European Commission 2013, pp. 2-8; EEAS 2013, pp. 20-21; European Council 2013b, pp. 7-8.

22 European Commission 2013, pp. 9-10; European Council, p. 9.

23 European Commission 2013, pp. 8-9; EEAS 2013, pp. 20-24; European Council 2013b, p. 9.

Apart from the EU's efforts, NATO's Smart Defence initiative also aims at joint development of capabilities through P&S. Of course, there is an inherent risk that the two frameworks cause duplications and the general necessity of two separate initiatives has to be questioned. If interoperability within NATO is to be maintained, close coordination of capability development will be needed not just within the EU. However, seeing as the capability shortcomings in Europe are a European problem, it might be most efficient if Europeans solve it primarily in their own framework.²⁴ As explained above, a more coherent and capable European security policy is in the interest of NATO and the US as well. This should be a strong enough incentive for them to support efforts within CSDP and seek proper coordination with it.

So far cooperations have actually tended to take on mostly bilateral or regional shapes though. There are differing perspectives on this development among commentators.²⁵ On the one hand, there is the perception that those flexible frameworks offer pragmatic solutions and have, thus far, taken more concrete steps towards effective P&S.²⁶ Accordingly, the chair of the European Council, Van Rompuy, stated at the annual EDA conference 2013 that it is not just important to talk about the CSDP as such, but more about the «state of defence in Europe».²⁷ On the other hand, there is a worry that those different frameworks of cooperation will create «mutually exclusive islands of cooperation, each with its own regulations» which are still prone to unnecessary duplication.²⁸ Arguments have also been made in favor of a middle way, considering «more synergy between the clusters and the collective European level» as «the obvious answer».²⁹

Although setting up cooperation of some sort in the first place is definitely most important for now, there is little reason to believe that defence cooperation directly at the EU level is any less viable on the long run and in fact the EU might be best equipped to successfully implement P&S. Results might indeed not come as easy or fast, since the mills of EU integration sometimes tend to grind slowly, but the EU already has a broad variety of political procedures and institutions as well as vast regulatory power at hand and decades of integration in other fields have proven the Union's ability to produce tangible results.³⁰ With the EDA's CDP and other institutions and mechanisms involved in CSDP, the EU is already capable to identify capability shortfalls and all that it needs to coordinate capability development appropriately is more support of MS. It is now up to them to make good use of all these instruments and take decisive action to drive forward cooperation and innovation. The Treaty of Lisbon has also provided the option for a group of MS to set up a PESCO and make more binding commitments to each other within the Union framework.³¹ A stronger CSDP and closer cooperation in the development of capabilities could thus be achieved without initially getting all 28 MS aboard. While there is a justified worry about a two-speed EU, the implementation of PESCO is still up to interpretation. If they do it right, participating MS might be able to break new ground through PESCO and, at the same time, develop it to become inclusive in time. In any case, some MS will have to take a step forward - be it through PESCO or a different approach - if the CSDP is to strengthen the state of European defence, but at the moment a lack of political will seems to be the major obstacle in the way.

24 In this regard I follow some of the arguments in: Biscop 2012, pp. 104-106.

25 For a brief comparison see: France 2013, p. 62.

26 E.g. Wallace 2013, p. 16.

27 European Council 2013a, p. 5; Menon 2013, p. 55.

28 Briani and Camporini 2013, p. 11.

29 Biscop 2013, p. 2.

30 Here I come to a similar conclusion as: France 2013, p. 62.

31 TEU 2012, art. 42(6).

What Europeans Need to Learn First

For the last centuries defence has always been a defining feature of national sovereignty. It is thus no surprise how reluctantly MS take steps towards shared capabilities and a stronger CSDP. Yet, in the face of dwindling defence budgets they lack more and more of the capabilities that they need to be a credible security actor. By clinging on to their national prerogatives, they actually become more dependent on others.³² Therefore, European leaders need to understand two things.

First, the capabilities which they jointly develop will still be owned by individual MS and as the General Secretary of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said at the European Council: «They benefit the nations that have them. And they allow those nations to make a stronger contribution to addressing crises, in any framework they choose - be it EU or NATO or any other way.»³³

Secondly, by refusing to cooperate more closely, on the long run, MS actually forfeit their autonomy as they will eventually become incapable of providing their own security, while on the contrary, closer cooperation could enable them to protect their interests. Full control over all defence-related issues is of no use if there is no actual power to be exercised. In the long run MS will therefore have to choose the lesser evil and transfer some of their sovereignty if they want to keep a say on the world stage.

At the same time it is important not to get caught up too much in all the excitement about P&S and keep in mind its limitations. After all, it is no silver bullet against the economic crisis and, to cite a more critical commentator, «Europe cannot pool and share its way out of this dilemma. In the end, one needs to buy things - planes, tanks, rifles, computers - and pay the people using them.»³⁴ Defence budgets cannot be cut infinitely and expenditures need to be determined primarily by the strategic context and not by fiscal imperatives.

Of course, governments are accountable to their constituents for their spending and hope to present them with a substantial peace dividend. Public opinion is therefore of great importance for the current crisis. Europeans need to understand that today capable military forces are still necessary for the protection of their own collective interests - and might be even more so in the future. After decades of peace in Europe and with the end of the Cold War, the European public does not feel threatened anymore and some of the experiences of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan might have alienated them further from geostrategic thinking. In the face of newly arising threats this perceived sense of security seems more like an illusion though. Thus, the complex global challenges of this century need to be communicated to the European public in an intelligible manner. The Heads of State and Government, who are crucial for the communication with their respective nations, seem to have arrived at this insight and stated on top of their recent conclusions at the European Council that «defence matters».³⁵

The CSDP is sometimes criticised for its supposed inability to let its promises be followed by substantial action, but the European Council was expected to change the track and take a leap forward. While it certainly did not meet all expectations in terms of concrete action, the European Heads of State and Government pointed in the right direction and encouraged further innovation and closer cooperation through the EU. They also welcomed much of the work that has been done by the Commission and the EDA and, furthermore, confirmed their intention to drive forward important

32 This point has been convincingly made by different commentators: Howorth 2012, p. 3; Major and Mölling 2013, pp. 15-17 and Biscop 2012, pp. 102-103.

33 Rasmussen 2013b.

34 Keller 2011, p. 8.

35 European Council 2013b, p. 1.

projects, namely the development of UAVs, air-to-air refuelling capacity, satellite communication and cyber defence.³⁶ These ambitions cannot be easily dismissed as idle talk and it seems that European leaders are actually taking some of the urgent defence issues more serious now because the timeframes for progress were set much smaller than in the past. In contrast to the five years that have passed since the last European Council on defence in 2008, they agreed this time to »assess concrete progress on all issues« as soon as June 2015.³⁷

Conclusion

With receding acuteness of the economic crisis, its security dimension is now brought more into focus. In the next few years critical policy implications will have to be decided, for it is clear that the current practice cannot be carried on much longer if Europeans want to stay secure and retain a meaningful position in international relations. Even without the current crisis, this would have been the case though. Newly emerging powers, America's rebalancing and the increasingly dispersed threats of this century all make a strong case for Europeans to work closely together and collectively take on greater responsibility for global security. The current financial constraints only add further incentive to do so.

With so much focus on the current crisis it should not be forgotten that Europeans not only face the same challenges, but also share the same values and interests. The discussion about European defence cooperation should be less about how Europeans could save more through cooperation and more about how they could *achieve more* through cooperation. P&S is a necessity for the future of European defence and, once implemented, might prove indispensable in times of austerity. Yet, P&S alone will not allow Europe to achieve its own ambitions and sufficiently provide its security in an increasingly complex security environment.

The military alliances that were characteristic for the past century might not be enough to address Europe's new challenges adequately. The transatlantic partnership will continue to be a cornerstone of Europe's security and will still come to bear in case of an existential threat, but it cannot take on the full range of tasks that Europeans set out for themselves. They will have to act more actively in the future and further develop towards a comprehensive approach in order to take on all necessary tasks appropriately.

Regional and bilateral cooperations might be making concrete progress for now and acute problems can be solved on an ad hoc basis. Thus it seems that those flexible frameworks are the easiest solution for the current crisis - but they might not be the best solution. They might turn out as rather short-sighted compared to the long-term solution that could be achieved through the advancement of the CSDP. The EU has well-established institutions at its disposal and can mobilise a broad range of instruments that combine external and internal action. Only through the Union can MS utilise a truly comprehensive approach. At the moment, Europeans only seem to be looking for a way out of the crisis, but there is, of course, a Europe after the crisis and on the long run Europeans need to move forward on the path they have set out for themselves. If Europeans want to live up to their own ambitions, as in any field of EU integration, they will have to look past some of their differences and focus more on common objectives.

36 European Council 2013b, pp. 5-6.

37 European Council 2013b, p. 10.

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Economic crisis and its impact on military budgets, in particular on the development of new EU capabilities in support of CSDP.

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2nd CSDP

OLYMPIA



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1. Global economic crisis

The global economic crisis in 2008 was indicated by several important indicators. The primary cause was the U.S. mortgage crisis in 2007, which gradually grew into a global financial crisis in 2008, there was a significant role of oil price, which highly increased in the first half of 2008, which led to a decline in real GDP and consumer prices rose. [1] Those prices were driven up by oil speculative trades (pension funds and hedging commodity purchased to reduce portfolio risk arising from equity markets), a weak US currency and rising demand of China before the Olympic Games. In autumn 2008, a financial crisis fully hit, it wiped out not only the world's leading banks and stock markets, but also the price of oil. This is a peak in July (147 USD per barrel) fell within two months of the third, continued to fall until the end of 2008 has broken through \$40 per barrel. [2] A substantial credit crisis then led to the bankruptcy of large and well established investment banks as well as commercial banks in various nations around the world; increased unemployment; and the possibility of a global recession.

According to the UN, the world economy was facing the biggest decline since the Great Depression of the thirties of the 20th century. [3] This was predicted in the economic growth estimate for 2009. The International Monetary Fund claimed in its forecast in January 2009 that global economic growth would fall in 2009 to 0.5%, while in 2008 it had been 3.4%. Nevertheless, in November 2008, there was previous growth forecast predicting to 2.2% in 2009. [4] In March 2009 the banking house Goldman Sachs brought far grimmer estimate - according to this, the world economy in 2009 should decrease to 1.0%. Also, the World Bank expected the first decline in the global economy since 1945. IMF suggested a possibility of downward revision of its estimate to negative values. [5]

The cause of deepening the crisis was that despite the wide range of policy decisions and actions of financial flows remained under the pressure, and pulled down the real economy. There still was not restored a confidence of investors and consumers by the solutions undertaken to rescue economies. Asset prices continuously fell, as well as decreased a household wealth and thus declined consumer demand.

In those times, in the Eurozone as a whole, the industrial production reported a fall by 1.9% in May, which was the steepest one-month decline for the zone since the exchange rate crisis in 1992. European car sales fell about 7.8% in May compared with a year earlier. [6] Retail sales fell by 0.6% in June from the May level and by 3.1% from June in the previous year. Germany was the only country out of the four biggest economies in the Eurozone, which registered an increase of trades in July; however the increase was sharply declined down immediately. Economic analysts said that the decline raised the risk of the Eurozone to enter in a recession in the critical year 2008. [7] After that, the Eurozone's economy was reported to have declined by 0.2 percent. [8]

2. Common security and defence policy

The idea of a common defence policy for Europe was detected after the WWII, so it could be dated in 1948 when the UK, France, and the Benelux signed the Treaty of Brussels. «*The agreement included a mutual defence clause laying down the foundations for the creation of the Western European Union (WEU), which remained until the late 1990s, together with NATO, the principal forum for consultation and dialogue on security and defence in Europe.*» [9]

The common European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was created by Council Joint in March 2002. Since that time, more than 30 civilian and military missions and operations have been launched under the command of CSDP. The EU is constantly trying to improve its crisis management capabilities. According to this idea headline goals are created, both civilian as

well as military. They have been defined and adapted to match the changing security environment and also the problems connected to economic crisis.

The common security and defence policy (CSDP) has become an integral part of the common foreign and security policy of all countries in EU and NATO. It provides the Union with operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union is able to use such assets in tasks outside its own border as same as inside its regions for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks is to be undertaken using capabilities provided by the member states. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This situation would lead to a increasing common defence, if the European Council will unanimously be supporting.

- The CSDP includes a strong conflict prevention component. [Drafted following the Cologne agreement that the EU should possess an autonomous military capacity to respond to crises;
- Include the ability of Member States to deploy forces up to corps level, capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks;
- Ensure that the EU possesses the military capabilities required to conduct the full range of missions encompassed by the Petersberg tasks.

2.1 European Defence Agency

The European Defence Agency (EDA) is the Union's agency facilitating defence cooperation among its member states for the whole life-cycle of a capability including cooperation in research and technology as well as procurement or training. [11] Agency of the EU assisting the member states in their efforts to improve European defence capabilities in support of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the Union. This agency is responsible for developing of new EU capabilities in support of CSDP. It could help the member states to settle up problems cause by economic crises, if there is an effort to fulfill common defence policy with restricted military budget.

3. Military budget

Member States of NATO reduce their defence spending due to the ongoing economic crisis, which they should not do. Instead of this, they should work more and better on coordination with their defence capabilities. This was stated by the head of the Prague NATO Parliamentary Assembly Karl Lamers. [12] In reducing of defence budgets according to him, there are some threatens to occur also security crisis.

Lamers spoke at home four days of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Prague, attended by lawmakers of all 28 members of the alliance. The Assembly is an advisory body of NATO. Financing weapons in NATO in times of crisis is a real challenge by Lamers. «*We cannot react to it by reducing the defence budget,*» he said. According to him, NATO needs a new direction and political will to ensure greater solidarity for collective defence.

According to previous, it is suitable to discuss about military budget. They are composed by military expenditures. These expenditures data are collected by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and they are derived from the NATO definition.

The world bank closer defines that data include [13] all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped

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for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid. Excluded are civil defence and current expenditures for previous military activities, such as for veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion, and destruction of weapons. This definition cannot be applied for all countries, however, since that would require much more detailed information than is available about what is included in military budgets and off-budget military expenditure items. (For example, military budgets might or might not cover civil defence, reserves and auxiliary forces, police and paramilitary forces, dual-purpose forces such as military and civilian police, military grants in kind, pensions for military personnel, and social security contributions paid by one part of government to another.)

There are significantly falls in amount of money spend for military. World military expenditures totalled \$1.75 trillion in 2012, registering a decline of 0.5 percent in real terms year-on-year for the first time since 1998, according to data released on Monday by a Sweden-based security think-tank. [14]

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) attributed the fall to austerity policies implemented in the majority of developed countries due to the global economic crisis that began in 2008.

The SIPRI noted, however, that deep defence cuts in the United States and other NATO countries, as well as in Australia, Canada and Japan were largely offset by significant increases elsewhere in the world, including in Russia and China.

This could be a potential shift in the balance of world military spending from the rich Western countries to emerging regions, the SIPRI said in a comprehensive annual update to its Military Expenditure Database.

According to other sources [15], however, it cannot be pronounced entirely clear opinion that it took place recently by the economic crisis had a negative impact on the amount of defence budgets of specific countries. According to the author's view, the economic crisis, supported by comparison, cannot be described as a trigger, which should result in a general reduction of defence budgets. Very likely there are other influences and factors causing this downward trend. It would therefore be very useful to try to identify those factors that underlie a progressive decrease in the size of defence spending, which could for example be the subject of another discussion and controversy on the subject. Probably, there should the idea of the futility of the military.

Author's conclusions are based on the data captured in the charts of the development in defence spending. In some countries, although there have been some reduction in the «critical» in 2008, but in some countries on the contrary, there was an increase from the previous period. In most states are experiencing lately to reduce defence spending has declining tendency and this is for a longer period than would be only the consequences of the economic crisis.

4. EU capabilities in CSDP

The European Council is still dealing with issues of security and defense policy. «The *main purpose is to seek synergies and savings in resources devoted to defence in European countries that will do some things together, which is very reasonable and we support it,*» said the Prime Minister [16]. Czech Republic Moreover, with the help of the Visegrad group was that small and medium enterprises of the defence industry will gain better access to European markets. This is one way to solve a common defence policy and also the consequences of the economic crisis, which has signed the defence spending.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has repeatedly urged European countries not to cut defence spending. During an appearance at the

Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament Rasmussen said that Europe may be on the world stage to become a mere spectator when European countries are not willing to invest enough money to defence and security. All statements regarding the strengthening of European defence will be just empty words, the NATO chief said [12].

According to Rasmussen, Europe needs a strong common defence policy. The continuing decline in defence spending in the budgets of European countries but will inevitably lead to a weakening of the role of our continent on the world stage. «The only way to avoid this is to maintain defence spending. Stop the cuts and again start to invest in security when our economy recovers,» were words of the head of NATO.

Europeans must understand that the very 'soft' power, in fact, has absolutely no force without specific capabilities to support its diplomacy. Europe should lose its credibility and influence and it could become a spectator on the world stage instead of being a powerful player which can and should be.

In this respect, there were hopes that the December EU summit, which was devoted to defence issues. It was to be the first time when the EU heads of state would discuss about defence spending for the first time since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008.

Rasmussen also stressed that the European Union and NATO have to more than ever collaborate and coordinate their activities. As an example of successful coordination should be introduced the mission in Kosovo, where the alliance provides security, while the EU is developing infrastructure.

5. Current situations in Europe

While Europe's citizens largely support the establishment of a common security and defence policy, most European leaders have demonstrated a clear lack of interest in creating one. It seems to be a paradox.

One possible reason is that financially strained European governments lack the means to fulfil their citizens' expectations. But that is unconvincing, given that the issue was framed in almost identical terms three decades ago, when budgetary constraints were not a problem. In fact, it could be argued that such constraints should spur, not impede, the creation of a European defence structure. After all, member countries would then be able to pool their resources, harmonize programs, and rationalize costs, thereby reducing individual governments' financial burden.

Another, far more credible explanation is that Europeans' interpretations of more active and stronger security policy widely differ. Indeed, current discussions in Europe concerning the use of force are dominated by three main perspectives, championed by France, the United Kingdom and Germany.

France, which has once again intervened in Africa — this time to restore order in the Central African Republic — is the only European Union country that seems genuinely interested in satisfying popular demand for more robust European security structures. The French consider Europe to be a kind of superpower — a status that implies a corresponding military capacity. [17]

While this view probably stems from France's historical political and military prowess, it also reflects the country's current interests. As Europe's greatest military power (despite the U.K.'s larger defence budget), France would play a key role in any wide-ranging European military operation.

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The U.K., for its part, shares France's belief that military power is a prerequisite to strategic effectiveness. [18] It claims that its opposition to a European defence structure stems from its belief that NATO — and thus the United States — is critical to European defence. But, given that no other EU country has seriously considered excluding NATO, this argument seems to be little more than an excuse.

The truth is that the only kind of defence the British accept is that conducted by a coalition of European states acting under their national flags, as occurred in Libya. In the U.K.'s view, European operations should be limited to humanitarian and peacekeeping objectives. While it supported the fight against piracy off the Horn of Africa, that was more a policing operation than a military one, and it was guided by a shared interest in protecting trade routes from the Middle East and Asia.

Germany's vision of European defence is very different from the French and British perspectives. Unlike the U.K., Germany supports a European security and defence policy, proudly highlighting its consistent military budget and major presence in European missions (larger than that of the overstretched French).

And, though Germany shares the U.K.'s belief that NATO bears primary responsibility for protecting Europe, its view of European engagement is even more restrictive. In Germany's view [19], European military intervention should be limited to the continent, and should not include combat operations.

In fact, a majority of Europe's citizens prefer that European forces be deployed only for noncombat missions. [20] And so far, virtually all European military operations have been aimed at evacuating European nationals, delivering humanitarian aid, or maintaining peace in the aftermath of conflict.

These differing views explain the uncertainty surrounding France's recent interventions in Africa. The French have lamented the miniscule support offered by the rest of Europe for its operations in Mali and the Central African Republic — exemplified by Germany's refusal to create a fund for EU member-state operations.

But, given the urgency of the situations in Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic, this lack of support has not undermined France's efforts as much as prior consultation with European leaders would have done. Had the Germans been consulted, they probably would have rejected the interventions anyway.

This conflict between the need for rapid response and the requirement for deliberation explains why the EU's much-discussed battle groups are unlikely ever to be deployed. The fact that most Europeans are satisfied with limited political and military involvement outside of Europe makes increased defence cooperation even less likely.

A pessimist would say that Europeans are unable — or at least unwilling — to rethink their defence policy, because the U.S. ultimately ensures their security through NATO. According to this view, France's efforts to encourage both transAtlantic integration and autonomous political action are insufficient to change most Europeans' minds.

A more optimistic interpretation is that Europe needs defence structures that account for the role of member states — not just for that of the EU. From this perspective, Europe does have a significant military presence, whether in Afghanistan and Libya or Mali and the Central African Republic. That is a start

6. Conclusions

Initially crisis in the banking sector, then the economic and financial crisis and today also debt crisis that originally broke out in 2008 in the United States of America, kicked off a period of economic recession, which has the second world war period and that more or less continues to this day. And not just in the USA. The impacts of the crisis were felt almost all European countries (including the developed countries of the euro area) in which the crisis was imported from overseas.

This crisis has its impact on defence spending, which rather declines in the long term. The situation is visible in most countries of Eastern Europe which as stowaways who benefit from collective defence, but are unable or unwilling to pay the necessary costs. However, their amount was determined even before joining the Alliance. This has negative consequences in several ways. First, it reduces the overall cohesion of NATO and reduces its own defences. Second, it is difficult to establish additional procedures and joint meetings, when reliance is not whether states are able to meet their obligations.

What makes the East Wing Alliance, interference units due to lack of funds cannot be called otherwise than undercutting the branch upon which our security and prosperity. The situation in the Central European armies clearly reached a critical point. Each soldier could tell anyone that if any part of the army is cancelled, it's fast, but its renewal is a matter of a whole generation, and it is extremely expensive.

When such action should not be seen as crazy weakening of defence capability of our countries and the Alliance, than it must be included in whole- alliance plan, it must be covered by establishing appropriate cooperation at least in Central Europe, and may not be their main and often the only reason for lack of funds, far below commitments to NATO or to EU budget.

We can only hope and keep working toward the goals CSDP, which are clearly set up. Since 2010, to be able to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union.

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The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the eastern mediterranean as geopolitical aspect of Europe

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EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Bcm	Billion cubic meters
East Med	Eastern Mediterranean

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Introduction

After the end of World War Two the United States of America declared rights for their coastal fisheries and established conservation zones which were areas in the United States where fishing activities had been or in future may be developed and maintained within the Truman proclamations which established governmental control of natural resources in areas adjacent to the coastline. [1]

Right after the Truman proclamations, the twelve nautical mile limit for the territorial sea became almost universally accepted.

This act inspired the International Law Commission of the United Nations to add this subject to its agenda. The United Nations held three conferences on the Law of the Sea, and the last one in 1973 led to the creation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS).

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The convention, which came into force in 1982, introduced a number of regulations. Mainly setting the limits including internal waters, territorial sea, archipelagic zone, continental shelf, exploitation regime, scientific regime and, most relevant to the purpose of this essay, it defined the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Territorial waters are according to UNCLOS defined as a belt of coastal waters and according to international law as a sovereign territory of the state; this sovereignty also extends to seabed below and airspace above. [2]

UNCLOS, PART V, articles 55 states the specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone. The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which fall the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States, and governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.[2]

- All the meaning and the importance of the EEZ is described in paragraphs 55 to 75. The breadth of EEZ shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles (370 km) from the coastal baseline.
- The coastal state has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage living resources in the EEZ
- The state also has rights to seabed, which is in UNCLOS defined as the continental shelf up to 350 nautical miles (648 km) from coastal baseline.
- Freedom of navigation and flight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, as well as other uses consented on the high seas, are still allowed. [2]

Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean

The convention is globally accepted by the majority of coastal states because EEZ has a lot of advantages for these coastal states.

In the Mediterranean the majority of coastal states have signed and ratified UNCLOS with the exception of Morocco and Libya which have signed but not ratified and Israel, Syria and Turkey which haven't even signed the convention.

The previous paragraph implies that most of the states in the Eastern Mediterranean haven't signed the convention. The question is why.

The situation in this area has always been unstable since the time of the Osman Empire, following with the foundation of Israel after World War II and recently the situation is concerned with recognising the Cyprus Republic by Turkey, Israeli - Palestinian conflict, Israel-Lebanon situation over setting the maritime borders, and since UNCLOS came into force there are sharp discussions over the delimitation of EEZ.

The essential issue in this area is, according to the article 74 of UNCLOS, the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. The article states that those states shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law in case of stating the EEZ borders in a spirit of understanding and cooperation. [2]

As stated, the states should find an understanding. These states include Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Cyprus. But still it doesn't look like there is going to be an understanding in upcoming years. Here are three essential reasons why

- Highly migratory and vulnerable fishing stocks in the area.
- Recent hydrocarbon discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean.
- Turkey not profiting for defining EEZ according to the rules of UNCLOS.

Highly migratory and vulnerable fishing stocks

In the Eastern Mediterranean there are a lot of fishing stocks, a huge part of which are highly migratory. Those stocks occur in territorial waters or high seas (out of the territorial waters, the theoretical part of EEZ) of all the East Mediterranean countries which may claim them during migratory periods. Concerning high migratory fishing stocks, all the states need to find consensus and reach an agreement, regarding coordination of the measures necessary for conservation and optimal utilization of these vulnerable stocks.

All the states in the eastern Mediterranean will have to dedicate special attention to vulnerable species like the swordfish. Fishermen from Mediterranean states like Italy, Greece, Syria or Turkey exploit this species in Turkish territorial waters and high seas so the states need to find a general agreement regarding the need to protect swordfish among all fishermen.

The Mediterranean's living resources are shared between 21 bordering countries. Those resources should be used for the prosperity and sustainable development of the all riparian nations rather than political conflicts or debates.

Hydrocarbon deposit in the Eastern Mediterranean

At the time around the millennium the East Med (Eastern Mediterranean) states started to explore offshore and soon after they rejoiced from the first hydrocarbon discoveries.

First the American-Israeli consortium represented by the American firm Noble Energy discovered gas deposits in Israel's Mari-B field, which has been in production since 2004. Later in 2009 the same company reached another success and discovered the Tamara field containing 178.4 billion cubic meters (bcm). Soon enough they discovered the nearby Leviathan field that contains up to 450 bcm of gas, making it the largest gas discovery in the last ten years.

Again it was Noble Energy who received concession to explore offshore of Cyprus EEZ in block 12 and discovered the Aphrodite gas field 34 kilometers west of Israel's Leviathan gas field. It is believed it holds 92 to 169 bcm of natural gas.




Figure 1 South-East Mediterranean hydrocarbon deposits [4]

Figure 1 shows the Hydrocarbon deposits in South-Eastern Mediterranean. The discontinuous line shows purposed the EEZ borders in the area. The yellow unit is Cyprus EEZ Block 12.

Israeli hydrocarbon deposits and it's future

In Israeli territorial waters and the declared EEZ between Israel and Cyprus, which is not globally accepted, a great amount of hydrocarbons have been discovered.

More importantly, this discovery is nothing short of a geopolitical meaning. To understand its magnitude it's necessary to realise that the amount of deposits reaches a number hovering around 800 bcm of natural gas. For a small country like Israel, such a bonanza could not have come at a better time.

The discoveries at Tamar and Leviathan solved the Israeli problem. Israel will no longer have to import natural gas. Its dilemma now is deciding where to export the excess and how to create the most geopolitical gains from its new status as an energy exporter. In the coming years, Israel will have to decide whether to direct its gas to Asia or to compete with Turkey over access to the European gas market.

If the Middle East were a stable place, Israel would build a gas pipeline to its neighbours, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, which are all clamouring for gas. That would make the most commercial sense but, politically, Israel needs to forget about this solution.

SECTION B

Geographically, the most natural market is Europe, where any non-Russian gas is more than welcome. There are three ways for Israel to access this market. The first is to construct a pipeline to Turkey, where Israeli gas would join product from the Caspian region en route to Central Europe. This option is highly unlikely to be realized in the current atmosphere of Israel-Turkey relations, however the situation has changed during past few years.

From a geopolitical standpoint, gas exports to India would be most beneficial to Israel. With hundreds of millions of its citizens facing energy poverty, India urgently needs reliable natural gas suppliers.

The last possibility is to build up a pipeline from Israeli and Cyprus hydrocarbon deposits to Cyprus following through Crete to Greece and continuing through Italy to Central Europe where it would be available to the rest of the European states. The project is called the East Med pipeline.

This is a challenge that is feasible but costly and can only be justly assessed when further exploration is concluded and additional natural gas deposits are confirmed. If however the scientifically estimated deposits are proven to exist, it is undoubtedly the best long term option and solution, not only for the countries involved but the EU as well.

If this particular solution could be realised both the source and the transportation means would be owned and controlled by EU-member countries alone.

Ironically, the biggest casualty of such an energy corridor will be none other than Turkey, which now enjoys an unchallenged status as an energy bridge between East and West. Energy transit fees are an important source of income to the Turkish economy.

Lebanon claiming Israeli gas fields

The Lebanese government argues that the Israeli field extends into Lebanese waters. In connection with this statement former Israeli Minister of National Infrastructure Uzi Landau immediately responded “We will not hesitate to use our force and strength to protect not only the rule of law but the international maritime law” in interviews. Generally it’s hard to establish where Israel’s sea boundary ends and Lebanese waters begin.



Later Lebanon submitted to UN its official view regarding the maritime border, indicating that it considered Tamar and Leviathan gas fields to be outside Lebanese territory though it indicated other prospective fields in the region may be within Lebanese territory. The US expressed support for the Lebanon proposal.

No such arrangements can be reached with Lebanon, as Israel does not maintain diplomatic relations with it. Therefore, there is no agreed-upon joint naval border between the two countries.

Figure 2 Israeli-Lebanon disputed zone [3]

Figure 2 indicates disputed zone between Lebanon and Israel displayed as the blue triangle which the Lebanon claims as the prospective fields.

Position of the Republic of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean

Cyprus has a strategic position in this area and has maritime borders with all the East Med states concerning Greece, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt. In the case of EEZ, Cyprus has signed agreements on its EEZ with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel. The agreement on EEZ with Lebanon was signed but the latter is waiting for ratification by the Lebanese parliament. It has been highlighted that the problem was not between Cyprus and Lebanon but between Lebanon and Israel.

Asked when Lebanon might ratify an agreement between Cyprus and Lebanon on their respective EEZs, it was said by Uzi Landau "I can assure you that at most within 15 days, the agreement can be ratified right after we launch an agreement with Israel«.

When the republic declared its own EEZ, the zone was divided into 12 blocks. As stated before, the Aphrodite gas field was discovered in 2011 in block-12 by American Noble Energy. This discovery played significant role for the Republic of Cyprus. However the gas reserves are nearly one third less than initially estimate



Figure 3 Cyprus EEZ [5]

Figure 3 shows the division of the Cyprus Republic's EEZ toward Egypt, Israel and Lebanon.

The main concern for the Cyprus Republic foreign policy is the long-term Cyprus- Turkish disagreements. Ever since the founding of the Republic of Cyprus Turkey does not recognise either the republic nor EEZ and states that any findings need to be shared between the Greek and Turkish side of Cyprus.

Since 2004, Turkey has attempted to gain entry to the European Union, a move which has been vetoed by the Republic of Cyprus, whilst Turkey continues to block access to her air and sea ports for Cypriot transport routes.

Turkey's approach to the EEZ

Turkey has a long coastline in the Mediterranean Sea and has traditionally had fishing rights to the whole area due to citizens who live in that area depending on fisheries. This area has also economical and strategic importance due to three of the main harbours located there, namely Antalya, Mersin and Iskenderun. These harbours play a crucial role for the country's oil, commodity, goods and minerals imports and exports to and from Turkey.

The problem is that if the Turks accepted the EEZ they wouldn't have much profit from it because of the diversity of states in the Eastern Mediterranean according to the geographical diversity in the area.

One of the main issues is the location of the island of Kastelorizo. It's a Greek island located 1300m out of the Turkish mainland. If Greece were to demand the island's rights to EEZ, Turkey's EEZ would be considerably reduced. This case could be called extreme because this otherwise not significantly important island is in the case of delimitation of maritime borders concerning EEZ a geopolitical game-changer




Figure 4 Impact of Kastelorizo to Turkish EEZ delimitation [6]

Figure 4 shows the position of Kastelorizo in the Mediterranean as the red dot in the picture. As we can notice if Greece didn't claim the island's EEZ, Turkey's EEZ would continue straight down and Turkey would have to solve the EEZ delimitation with Egypt.

This solution wouldn't be the best for EU. As we can see from the picture if Greece were to remain consistent Cyprus' and Greece's EEZ would have the same maritime border, which would be the best possible outcome from the EU perspective. But Turkey would never agree to this delimitation so we need to think about another possibility. If Greece didn't insist on Kastelorizo having EEZ rights, then it could be used as leverage in future negotiations. An interesting fact is that Greece negotiated the EEZ delimitation with Egypt which stopped those negotiations because Greece claimed its rights for EEZ south of Kastelorizo.

Another Turkish concern lies in the Aegean Sea. Greece's territorial sea extends six nautical miles in the Aegean Sea. This situation is because the proximity of the Greek islands to the Turkish coast creates great problems in the delimitation of their respective territorial seas. For this reason, both

countries have claimed a breadth their territorial water of six nautical miles. Because of the diverse situation caused by the huge count of Greek islands in this area, it's not in a favor of Turkey to set up EEZ boundaries in the Aegean Sea, because according to UNCLOS Turkey wouldn't have any profit from it.

Taking into account the EEZ between Egypt and The Republic of Cyprus, the agreement was signed without taking into consideration other nations' interests in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. This agreement can't be accepted because this delimitation doesn't protect the right of Turkey concerning high migratory species in the fishing industry.

Because Turkey does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus, all the actions of the republic that are not prospective also for Turkey are considered as actions against international law. For example the exploration and exploitation of natural resources off the southern coast of Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus claims that they take all the actions in their EEZ, but because the agreement wasn't signed by Turkey all those moves are from the Turkish point of view not accepted. For these reasons Turkey sent military battleships to this area to protect their rights.

According to Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, a former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus, who expressed her opinion about Turkish aggressiveness against Cyprus which claim they are not being aggressive but are defending its own interests with words «You defend your interests and you defend your rights when you have the rights. It's going into our exclusive economic zone it is conducting as they say a seismic research and as they refer they will go ahead with exploration and possible exploitation or extraction activities within our EEZ. The EEZ of a member of European Union and on the other hand they take as a candidate for a member of the EU».

Turkey claims they would like to be a part of EU, but by those activities against the member state of EU it seems that Turkey is trying to isolate itself from the EU. Using the words of Turkish officials, including the prime minister, they say «If the Cyprus problem won't be solved we would freeze our relationship with EU». This is an insult for the EU. The problem is that Turkey doesn't recognise one of the member states of the EU.

Geopolitical importance of hydrocarbon deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean for the European Union

For the last decades EU states have been dependent on the natural gas and oil from Russia and North Africa, specifically Lybia and Algeria. Prognosis says that by 2020 the European Union is going to be facing a serious energy shortage because the increasing demands which won't be able to be secured by Russia and the North African states. With the newly discovered hydrocarbon reserves in the East Med this gap could be easily counterbalanced.

The worldwide possibility to export crude oil is around 40 million barrels/day and is dropping steadily. Europe requires 15 million barrels/day from which 3.5 million barrels/day produces itself. By 2020 the daily global oil production is expected to fall to 65 million barrels/day, when around 30 million barrels/day will be able to be exported. These quantities could not satisfy the EU crude oil daily needs. So Europe by 2020 won't be able to source its oil needs and it is crucial to find a credible oil source.

Concerning natural gas the current amount of NG consumed every year by the European Union hovers around 500 bcm annually and by 2020 the demand is going to be almost twice this number. Almost the half of current consumption is imported from Russia and North Africa. In the future we can expect that those countries will lower the amount of exports in order to satisfy their own needs. However, this extra demand can now be satisfied from discoveries and expected resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Taking those facts into consideration the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean plays a huge geopolitical role concerning the future development of the European Union as whole.

Possible ways to transport hydrocarbons to Europe and their geopolitical impact

There are two possibilities for delivering gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe. The first is through Turkey. For Israel the pipeline to Turkey would be the cheapest and shortest way to get gas into Europe. The pipeline would also put to bed the Israeli-Turkish heat over the Mavi Marmara incident of May 2010, when 9 Turks were killed by Israeli missile on Gaza-bound ship.

The thing is that if Israel and Turkey could find agreement on this matter the pipe would have to go through the Cyprus EEZ. The Turks may turn a blind eye, but what about Cyprus? It would be impossible to convince the Greek-Cypriots to entrust their most valuable natural resources to a country that still illegally occupies almost 37% of their land.

Another fact in Israeli-Turkish cooperation is that trade between the two countries grew by 25% over the past few years, however the situation still remains unstable. The option of exporting gas through Turkey is practical, despite political tension. Gas should be used as a stabilizing factor which leads to cooperation between countries and includes multinationals and international parties with an interest in regional stability.

For Turkey it would definitely be the best solution and it also could solve the issue of Turkey not having geopolitical access to those natural resources, and they would also profit out of fees from having a pipeline installed in their economic and sovereign areas.

Another possibility to distribute hydrocarbons to Europe was mentioned by the Turkish President Abdullah Gül is to build a new pipeline through Turkey directly from Iraq so the EU states could benefit from the Iraqi stocks. This pipeline could be interconnected with the hypothetical Cyprus-Israel-Turkey pipeline from East Med.

The other solution is to build a pipeline from Cyprus through Greece and across the Mediterranean, getting those supplies into Europe as mentioned in the section regarding Israeli hydrocarbon deposits and their future. From the European point of view it would be the best solution. All arguments have already been described.

The best possibility to stabilise the atmosphere in the Eastern Mediterranean would be building two pipelines to transport natural gas. The first would be the East Med gas pipeline from Israel via Cyprus, Crete and through western Greece to Italy where it could be easily reachable by EU states. The second pipeline would go from Israel to Turkey, where it would merge with the direct pipeline from Iraq. Both pipelines would then continue into Europe. As this solution would be the best for the EU it wouldn't satisfy worldwide needs for hydrocarbons and it would be economically, and financially, too demanding.

Conclusion

The Eastern Mediterranean is a problematic area of great geopolitical significance. The area has been unstable for a long time and the recently discovered hydrocarbon deposits could result in many agreements between the East Med states and contribute a great deal on the road to resolving the political problems in the region. On the other hand it also could make the environment even hotter.

From the EU perspective the EU should support all drilling in the East Med area and develop pressure towards exporting the gas and oil reserves to a Europe which is desperate for new gas suppliers. For

Europe and the European Union as a whole it is crucial to gain new sources of natural gas outside of Russia.

It could be said that it doesn't matter from which direction hydrocarbons from the East Med would come, but it would be more beneficial if it were distributed by the East Med pipeline because for the first time in European history both the source and the transportation means would be owned and controlled by EU- member countries alone.

The significance of south-eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons for the EU is beyond doubt. Over and above its huge hydrocarbon deposits, is the fact that Greece and Cyprus are EU-member states and Israel an honest and trustworthy ally. Europe is confronted with a unique challenge and a remarkable opportunity, and the need for EU action is stronger than ever.

Let me use the words of Sabine Freize from Atlantic Council Summit «How the gas will be transported, will be decided based on business calculations and the region's politicians will need to be more proactive if they want to shape the outcome».

In the case of establishing EEZ in this area Turkey plays a significant role. Imagine a situation where the Republic of Cyprus agrees on dividing the EEZ in favour of Turkey and Greece refuses its claim for EEZ south of the Kastelorizo, under the condition of Turkey recognising the Republic of Cyprus. This action would have a great geopolitical impact for EU, but the hypothetical East Med pipeline wouldn't go through EU state's EEZ any longer and Greece would lose a great amount of its preliminary proposed EEZ. This foreign policy could be called the policy of concessions, which is not always beneficial and is literally just in the sky.

The EU should take a huge interest in the Turkish-Cypriot relationship and stand behind the Republic of Cyprus as its member. The EU should show a dedicated and direct opinion and support gas drilling in Cyprus offshore for the profit of Cyprus and the EU as whole. Cyprus does not have backing only from the EU but also from UN, US and Russia.

If the EU is successful with the negotiations around hydrocarbon export to Europe it will make a great geopolitical relationship with the Israel and the EU will also gain wider geopolitical influence.

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How identifying common european foreign policy interests could advance CSDP

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




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List of acronyms

CSDP	– Common security and defence policy
CFSP	– Common Foreign and Security Policy
EU	– European Union
ESS	– European Security Strategy
GDP	– Gross Domestic Product
IMF	– International Monetary Fund
USA	– United States of America
GNC	– General National Congress
EUBAM	– European Union Border Assistance Mission

Introduction

Today, in the beginning of year 2014, it is more than 20 years since first goals of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) were presented in so called Treaty on European Union (EU), the Maastricht Treaty. Since then these goals have been there to tackle all the challenges and situations the EU has faced until now. Firstly, I am going to deal with these goals because they should reflect EU's interest.

In 1999, a new domain for efforts of the EU on the field of both military and civilian crisis management was established by Cologne treaty. It was the European Security and Defense Policy. The objectives were set according to its superior policy – the CFSP. They have been specified by the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 and reinforced in Report on Implementation of ESS in 2008. What I'm trying to explain is, that the CFSP goals have influenced or were transformed into real actions mediated by CSDP.

So inevitably an important question occurs: has the political and security environment remained unchanged since 1993? Is the situation in the second decade of a new century really so similar to that in 90s of twelfth century? And, what is of even more importance, is it right to make the ESDP/ CSDP according to these «old» statements? The first part of the paper is going to deal with current objectives of CFSP and those of CSDP from the point of view of their relevance and timeliness.

Secondly, the topic is about CFSP **interests**. In my opinion, interests of country or union in the present reality could be completely different from the goals, which were set by politicians years ago. The second part of the paper is dedicated to examination of EU real interests and their comparison with goals written in the treaties.

Objectives of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defense Policy

First of all, let us see on political environment in early 1990s of last century. In 1991 after six years of liberalization thanks to the leader of the Communist party Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was dissolved. The Cold war had been finally over and new better and more secure world was ahead. The threads of the time were little. There were local conflicts on Balkan Peninsula, at the time quite far beyond the EU's borders. There were some minor threads of separatist groups, for instance in Spain or Northern Ireland.

However, the EU was mostly concerned about economical prosperity, national internal security, transformation of Eastern Europe countries, implementing their markets in one etc., as it is written in Article 21 and following articles of Maastricht Treaty.¹ The expressions used in the document are vague and established a framework for further development. Although the CFSP was set as a pillar of the EU, there was no need to specify the targets at the time. The objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy shall be:²

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In my opinion these objectives were perfectly formulated. However perfectly for the emerging foreign policy to set a first framework in a much different world than it is today. Why do I think, that the world is so much different now?

A different world


First of all, the power in the world is slowly shifting from the traditionally prosperous centers in Euro-Atlantic area to the Eastern and Southeastern Asia. In 1993, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of China was about 1,5 trillion dollars. Twenty years after in 2013 Chinese GDP is about 8,5 trillion dollars, some sources (see the graph below) estimate even more!

1 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European union. In: EUR-Lex.europa.eu. 2012. Dostupné z: <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:0013:0046:EN:PDF>

2 Maastricht Treaty Title 5. Hellenic Resources Network [online]. 2012 [cit. 2013-12-28]. Dostupné z: http://www.hri.org/docs/Maastricht92/mt_title5.html

Economic Growth in China


Gross Domestic Product (PPP) in Trillions of International Dollars



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database Oct 2010

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database Oct 2010

On itself, the fast growing GDP doesn't have to mean necessarily something serious, but let us have a look at military expenditures.



Source: Globalsecurity.org

China was able to invest in the army thanks to its huge economic power, because shown in percentage of GDP China still spends around 2% of GDP. Nowadays the total Chinese expenditures have overcome 100 billion dollars. In addition to it, China is very active at business all over the world. She is buying companies from America and Europe, investing in African poorest countries and overtaking debts of countries in crisis.³ She wants access to the foreign markets, technical know-how and raw materials. So its still growth, growth and growth. China is apparently looking for its place in the world, but as being stronger and more important in the world their interests will clash with those of other powers of the world, including the EU.

And China is not alone as India was almost untouched by economical crisis and now is increasing military expenditures. Even Russian Ministry of Defense has announced, that Russia – our neighbor - is implementing an ambitious 20 trillion ruble (\$640 billion) rearmament program planned to run up until 2020.⁴ Next year, the expenditures will be increased by incredible 25 %! It looks like powers in the world realize that much happened since the Cold war and something has to be done to be among the best. And what is Europe doing?

Europe has gone considerably far on the way of unification. Most of the countries in the Eastern Europe successfully entered the union, free trade zone has been established and Euro has been spread around the continent. As for security environment, CFSP and CSDP has been established and dozens of security and humanitarian missions launched in our neighborhood. The EU can proudly call itself «The largest economy in the world.»⁵ But the economy is Europe's biggest advantage a disadvantage in the same time. Once the financial crisis started, and some of the members of the EU had troubles with national budgets, more and more eurosceptics criticized the Union and the process of general unification slowed down.

Second impact of the crisis were cuts in military expenditures. The Europeans – living in relative safety far from any conflicts – did not see reasons to maintain large conventional armies any more. The exact numbers of military expenditures are not available but if we see the percentage of GDP spent on military, we can observe significant downfall. Last year with two percent of GDP was 2000 and nowadays it is around 1,5 % of GDP.⁶ Total expenditures are still the second highest⁷ but the armies are still too separate and can hardly be counted as one body.

New objective

So, back to the objectives of CFSP. The situation nowadays is much more different than it was back in 1993. Europe is losing in the race for power in the world because the process of unification is slowing down. Fortunately or maybe unfortunately, the objectives are really so vague that they can be hardly criticized. If the EU would like to make war, why not? It probably fits the first objective: «safeguard the common values.» Does the EU want to make peace? Of course! It fits to the third objective. Do the member states want to care about humanitarian crisis in Africa because of close relations? No problem, look at the last objective. I do not think these goals are wrong. At this level, they **have** to be general in order to allow subordinate organizations, such as CSDP, set their own

3 China buys up the world. The Economist [online]. 2010 [cit. 2013-12-28]. Dostupné z: <http://www.economist.com/node/17463473>

4 Russian Military Budget. Globalsecurity.org [online]. 2013-20-11 [cit. 2013-12-28]. Dostupné z: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mo-budget.htm>

5 In 2012 the GDP of the USA was about 15 trillions and the EU's about 16,5 trillions. United States GDP. Trading Economics [online]. 2013, 2013-12-28 [cit. 2013-12-28]. Dostupné z: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp>

6 European Union - Military expenditure: Military expenditure (% of GDP). Index Mundi [online]. [cit. 2013-12-28]. Dostupné z: <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/european-union/military-expenditure>

7 268 billion dollars

more precise objectives. However, there must be some progress seen. The world must know that the EU does not ignore that the armament race began once again,⁸ that it does not ignore Chinese influence everywhere. We must say that we are not just puppets of the USA. **But**, I am not saying that the EU should take path of Russia or China, which means «to be the best at all cost», regardless of human rights and environment. When I look at the European Union, I can see a lighthouse in the world. Europe is very democratic, very green and human rights are above all. I think it should remain this way because peace and harmony is the only future mankind has. Therefore I must say that the objectives of CFSP are written very well. I would only add one more:

- to ensure that European Union will speak in one voice and to maintain EU's strong position in the world.

Common security and defense policy objectives

The objectives of the CSDP were set in ESS:⁹

- Countering the threats
- Building Security in our Neighborhood
- International Order based on Effective Multilateralism

I have no objections to these goals. What is important in relation to the topic of the paper, they clearly correspond to those of CFSP. Now let us see at how would «my» objective advance these?

If we want EU speaking in one voice, we need better coordination. If we want strong Europe, we need to be capable of deploying our troops all together. Now look at the «Report on Implementation of ESS in 2008». The first objective was reformulated to:

- A more effective and capable Europe

The describing paragraphs contain following definitions: «We must strengthen our own coherence through better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making.» or «appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters capability are key» or «we must continue to strengthen our efforts on capabilities, as well as mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements. »

In my opinion this objective together with the definitions is very well written and very «on time». This truly is what Europe needs these days – to make the unification faster and try to act as one.

In this example we can see the objectives of CSDP have changed in a very progressive way independently from those of CFSP. Therefore from the point of view of CSDP it is really not important whether the superior objectives are changing or not. If it is obvious that something has to be done in a different way, let us do it!

The conclusion of this chapter is plain enough. Identifying of CFSP interests via reformulation of new objectives in new documents could advance CSDP. That is because CSDP objectives closely correspond to those of CFSP. And it works also the other way round. CSDP does not have to wait and can through the European security strategy change their own ideas.

⁸ World military expenditures are now more than 50% higher than in 1998. Recent trends in military expenditure. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [online]. 2007 [cit. 2013-12-28]. Dostupné z: http://archives.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_trends.html

⁹ Handbook on CSDP. Vienna: Armed Forces Printing Shop, 2010. ISBN 978-3-902275-31-8. Dostupné z: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/csdp_handbook_web.pdf

Interest versus objective

So far, I have written about objectives. However, objective and interest can but does not have to be the same. In this part of the paper I am going to explain as simply as possible my opinion about these two different expressions. I am also going to give examples in order to make my thoughts more understandable and to show that there are real problems. And European officials could sometimes reconsider their policy. So, how to explain a difference between an objective and an interest?

I have already discussed objectives. Objective is a «*specific result that a person or system aims to achieve within a time frame and with available resources.*»¹⁰ An **Interest** is a little bit harder to be defined. An interest on the field of foreign policy is an aggregate of individual and group interests in a state. And now something more practical.

For example CSDP has an objective to maintain respect for human rights and one of the interests of CFSP is also ensuring of human rights. But for example ensuring secure flow of oil and gas from Near East is an interest of CFSP, although you would not find anything close to this topic in the objectives. And back to the topic, how would identifying of this interest advance CSDP?

From 6-20 January 2009, gas flows were interrupted from Russia to the EU via Ukraine. A majority of Member States was affected directly and indirectly. Although the disruption was a commercial matter between Gazprom of Russia and Naftogaz of Ukraine, EU apparently was involved.¹¹

In an assessment of this disruption several lessons learned – or solutions - for future crisis were mentioned:¹²

- A national energy supply crisis quickly becomes an European issue; conversely, European intervention can work more effectively than individual national reactions and ensure security of gas supply across the EU.

- Likewise, the dependence of parts of the EU on a single supplier or a single source is a major concern to consumers across the EU and calls for new efforts to increase supply diversification in supplier, supply route and supply source.

As you can see there are **interests** defined in the articles. One of the interests is orientation on more safe and secure ways to transport oil and gas. For example from the Near East across Turkey or from Libya. This is a clear interest and both European Commission and CFSP has to deal with it. The way across Turkey is reliable thanks to good relationship between the EU and Turkey. But what about Libya?

Libya is nowadays still a disrupted country. It held elections for a General National Congress (GNC) in July, but a weak interim government failed to disband a myriad of armed groups around the country, end arbitrary detention and torture against detainees, or address the forced displacement of groups perceived to be pro-Gaddafi.¹³

Throughout the year, Libyans suffered from ongoing violence, with tribal clashes, deadly attacks on foreign diplomatic missions and international organizations, the destruction of Sufi

10 What is an objective?. Business Dictionary [online]. [cit. 2013-12-28]. Dostupné z: <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/objective.html>

11 The January 2009 Gas Supply Disruption To The Eu: An Assessment [online]. Brussels, 2009[cit. 2013-12-28]. Dostupné z: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2009/doc/sec_2009_0977.pdf

12 The January 2009 Gas Supply Disruption To The Eu: An Assessment [online]. Brussels, 2009[cit. 2013-12-28]. Dostupné z: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2009/doc/sec_2009_0977.pdf

13 Libya. World Report 2013 [online]. 2013 [cit. 2013-12-28]. Dostupné z: <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/libya>

religious sites, kidnappings for financial and political reasons, and targeted killings of former Gaddafi security officers. Non-Libyans from sub-Saharan Africa faced arrests, beatings, and forced labor.¹⁴

This is really not what I call a secure environment and the EU wants to rely on the oil sources in the area. If Europeans really want to buy Libyan oil – and they probably would have to in several decades anyway – a peaceful and stable environment has to be set. The elections were not enough - a central government voted by majority of the people is not an authority for tribes and rebel groups. In my opinion this is a perfect place for a large scale peacekeeping military operation. The EU should not save money in this important case. But what are we doing now almost 3 years after revolution? The EU is currently running a €30 million programme and The EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) ran by around 100 civilians was launched this year.

30 million Euros and 100 civilians for a whole country! This mission corresponds to the general objectives of CSDP. EUBAM is there for building of secure environment neighborhood, which is a second objective. They also deal with some threads stated in ESS, like migration.¹⁵

Of course, from this point everything is all right. However, in my opinion if Libya would be declared an absolute priority (or an interest), it would force CSDP to do much more in order to secure such an important source of strategic natural resources.

In addition to it, there are tools how to do it. *«The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy of the common security and defense policy and inform it of how these policies evolve. She shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration...The European parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it and to the High Representative. Twice a year they shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy, including the common security policy.»*¹⁶

As we can see there are mechanisms to set actual goals. In the case of Libya I assume there is an underestimation of the situation, but there are ways how to fix it. The important thing is, that identifying of interest of CFSP could advance CSDP in a significant way and there are already ways of how to identify them.

What the European interests should be?

So far, I have written about how identified interests can be useful, but not very much about what they should be. This is not exactly a topic of this paper so I am going to be very brief.

What should the top interests for the European Union be? Of course we could mention peace, stability, human rights etc. But is it really the way which will bring us good future? I think that EU stands on a crossroads, in fact it has stood there for several decades.

One way is a «way of compassion». It means that in today's world of human indifference and race for personal wealth the EU can stand as an island of freedom and humanity. It can spread noble thoughts across the world and support democracy everywhere.

The second way is a «way of strength». It means that the EU could join the other world powers

¹⁴ Libya. World Report 2013 [online]. 2013 [cit. 2013-12-28]. Dostupné z: <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/libya>

¹⁵ Libya. European Union External Action [online]. 2013 [cit. 2013-12-28]. Dostupné z: <http://eeas.europa.eu/libya/>

¹⁶ Amendments to The Treaty On European Union and to The Treaty Establishing The European Community. Eur-lex.europa.eu [online]. 2007 [cit. 2013-12-28].

Dostupné z: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0010:0041:EN:PDF>

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in pursuit of primacy in the world regardless the common people and under a false impression of democracy.

Which of these ways we should take? The first one sounds very good, but we must think also about long-term consequences. What happens if we allow radical Syrian rebels to win and rule over the country? So much we want them to decide freely that a new problem can occur – an unstable islamistic state, much worse for Europe than former regime. And the human rights would not be secured anyway. And what happens if we allow foreign cultures brought here by migration to settle down on European soil? Will they all live in peace with us? And for how long?

Personally, I cannot say which ways is the right one. As usual, it will be probably somewhere in the middle, where the path must be built first.

Conclusion

The topic of this paper includes more a personal point of view than a strictly scientific work. Because of this fact, I have written mostly about my ideas. These ideas may and may not be true, but they are my personal opinions and they reflect a vision of future European Union I have in my mind.

Nevertheless, I am very optimistic about the future of the EU. In my opinion, great things are ahead of us and we can be proud being a part of it.

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**European defence
and security nowadays:
international commitments,
military capabilities and
the economic crisis.**

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2. Abbreviations

AU.....	African Union
BG.....	Battle Group
CFSP.....	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP.....	Common Security and Defence Policy
ECAP.....	European Capabilities Action Plan
ECOWAS.....	Economic Community of West African States
EDA.....	European Defence Agency
EDTIB.....	European Defence Technological and Industrial Base
ESDP.....	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS.....	European Security Strategy
EU RRF.....	EU Rapid Reaction Force
EU.....	European Union
FOC.....	Full Operational Capability
ICC.....	International Criminal Court
IFV.....	Infantry Fighting Vehicle
IGAD.....	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MS.....	Member State
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSS.....	US National Security Strategy
OSCE.....	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCC.....	Prague Capabilities Commitment
TF.....	Task Force
TherMilAk.....	Theresianische Militäarakademie
UN.....	United Nations
WMD.....	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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4. Introduction

The world changes steadily but in the last years these changes have become faster and faster. There is a faster information flow, new actors, many new threats and in some countries unclear political situations. So what is the European Union (EU) going to do, to protect its boundaries and its people? In the following chapters the meaning of words like international commitments, military capabilities, economic crisis are described and what are the threats the EU has to deal with.

The following research question will be answered:

How does the economic crisis influence the international commitments and the military capabilities and what are the possibilities to deal with it?

To answer this leading question, there are two sub-questions to deal with the topic:

- How does the situation of the EU look like nowadays?
- What are the possible solutions?

The aim of this essay is to give a short and clear overview about the current situation of the EU according to the economic crisis, the military capabilities and the international commitments.

5. Body of the Thesis

The following chapters deal with the European security and defence nowadays.

5.1 Current Structure

These chapters deal with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)¹ and the European Security Strategy (ESS).

Through the European Political Co-operation the CFSP was founded and introduced in the Maastricht Treaty (entered into force on 1. November 1993). The Maastricht Treaty created the EU as a single institutional framework based on three pillars. The second pillar was labelled CFSP, which is more far-reaching than European Political Co-operation. In its Article J.4 it states that CFSP includes “all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.” After the wars of secession in the Balkans it was clear that the EU needs tangible crisis management capabilities to act efficiently. The first step was the St. Malo Declaration in 1998. Numerous European Council summit meetings defined the military and civilian capabilities needed to fulfil the Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking). The Cologne European Council Meeting (1999) laid the foundations for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which was renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1. December 2009. The Helsinki European Council Meeting (1999) introduced the Headline Goal 2003, and the Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting (2000) identified four civilian priority areas. ESDP became operational through the initiation of the first ESDP missions in 2003. Since this time, the EU has initiated over twenty crisis management operations and missions. The Lisbon Treaty established the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which merges the two positions of High Representative for CFSP (held by Dr. Javier Solana between 1999-2009) and of the Commissioner for External Relations (held by Benita Ferrero-Waldner between 2004 and early 2010). The Lisbon Treaty extended the so-called “Petersberg Tasks”, that now include “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation” (art.28B/ Article 43 (1) TEU). Additionally, the fight against terrorism, including by “supporting third states in combating terrorism in their territories”. Finally, the Treaty ensure political and military solidarity among EU Member States via the inclusion of a mutual assistance clause (art.28A7/Article 42 (7) TEU) and a “solidarity clause” (Title VII, art.188R1/Article 222 TFEU).²

¹ Formerly European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

² Cf.: Lindstrom, G. In: Rehr, J. & Weisserth, H. (2012). HANDBOOK ON CSDP – THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Vienna. Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria. Second Edition. P. 14f.

The following picture shows a short summary of the content of the ESS.



Figure 1: The European Security Strategy – A summary overview.³

The EU presented its first ESS in December 2003, outlining key threats and challenges facing Europe.⁴ It was published under the lead of Javier Solana, the Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) until 2009. He mentioned that the title of the Strategy: “A Secure Europe in a Better World” – is the ultimate aim of their actions.⁵ The ESS provides the conceptual framework for the CFSP, including what would later become the CSDP. It mostly tells us how to do things, it is not exactly clear on what to do, it is incomplete in terms of objectives. It must be translated into sub-strategies and policies to be able to put it into action. The problem is, that such a “sub-strategy” for CSDP is missing. Because of that, there is a difference between the ambition “to share in the responsibility for global security” and the practice of CSDP operations and capability development. Three dimensions would have to be covered. First, which tasks or types of operations the EU can undertake, because the Member States (MS) are divided over the use of force under the EU flag. Secondly, priority regions and scenarios have to be defined in relation with our interests: where and why should the EU deploy troops and perhaps even go to war? Finally, the EU has to decide what scale of effort it wants to devote to these priorities. *“More often than not, the EU has failed to achieve consensus on how to respond to such crisis (e.g. Iraq in 2003), even when the instruments and means to do so were at hand. A clear-cut strategy should be able to avoid internal divides and ensure the EU’s participation in internal*

³ Biscop, S. In: Rehrl, J. & Weisserth, H. (2012). HANDBOOK ON CSDP – THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Vienna. Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria. Second Edition. P. 22.

⁴ Cf.: Lindstrom, G. (2012). Op. cit. P. 14.

⁵ Cf.: Solana, J. In: Rehrl, J. & Weisserth, H. (2009). EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY – A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD. Brussels. General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. P. 3.

decision-making."⁶ So the main question is, what the EU, as the political expression of Europe and as a comprehensive foreign policy actor, wants to contribute as a global security provider, regardless of whether a specific operation is undertaken under CSDP or NATO or UN command.⁷ The ESS is not perfect, because it could only be built on consensus in areas where it existed.⁸ The success of CSDP as an integral part of CFSP is reflected by the fact that the EU's assistance is increasingly in demand. Battle groups and Civilian Response Teams have enhanced the capacity to react rapidly.⁹ The motto of the ESS became: "*Be more active; be more capable; be more coherent; be more multilateral.*"¹⁰

5.1.1 International Commitments

The EU has, especially in the practice of the civil-military approach to the crisis coping – in particular cooperation with the UNO, the NATO, the OSCE and the African Union (AU) – extensively expanded.¹¹ In the meeting of Helsinki (1999) there was also the decision of the target by the EU to cooperate comprehensively and fully with the NATO.¹² There is a similarity between the threat assessment in the ESS and the 2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS) and there is a strong emphasis in the ESS on a transatlantic partnership. This has to be seen as a political message to Washington.¹³ But it is also possible for the EU to use force in a situation where it has priority for it, although the US reverts to do so. "*... the EU had already unanimously taken positions contrary to those of the US, e.g. on the ICC, on the Kyoto Protocol and on various trade issues.*"¹⁴ Operation Artemis in the DRC (12. June – 1. September) was the first EU military operation without the use of NATO assets and outside of Europe.¹⁶

The weak spot of the EU are the strategic transport, the telecommunication and the satellite surveillance. The European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) is the instrument of the MS to improve and strengthen their military capabilities, which is coordinated with the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) of NATO of November 2002. Since the Berlin plus-Agreement the EU can use NATO capabilities for own operations even if the NATO does not participate. To coordinate the

6 Biscop, S. . (2012). Op. cit. P. 18.

7 Cf.: Biscop, S. . (2012). Op. cit. P. 21.

8 Cf.: Ibid. P. 19.

9 Council of the European Union. (2009). EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY – A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD. Brussels. General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. P. 21f.

10 Lindstrom, G. (2005). The European Security Strategy (ESS): Is Venus Becoming Mars?, in: NATO Defence College, Security Strategies and their Implications for NATO's Strategic Concept. Rome. NDC Occasional Paper No 9. P.27-32, P. 28.

11 Cf.: Hauser, G. (2010). Europas Sicherheit und Verteidigung – Der zivil-militärische Ansatz. Frankfurt am Main. Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften. P. 7.

12 Cf.: Ibid. P. 11.

13 Cf.: Biscop, S. (2012). Op. cit. P. 18.

14 Cf.: Ibid. P. 19.

15 Ibid. P. 19.

16 Cf.: Ibid. P. 18.

development of efficient military capabilities between NATO and the EU the NATO-EU Capability Group was created.¹⁷

But there are other co-operations, too. For example the African Union (AU). The EU developed the partnership to the AU by the appointment of a long-term military liaison officer. This includes the support of the AU to solve the conflict in Darfur/Sudan at political level and in form of personnel, technical and logistic help. According to planning and dislocation of the AU-Mission in Darfur, the EU supported the AU by use of the EU- coordination cell in Addis Abeba and provided military planner, police planner and observers for them. The EU further supports sub-regional African organisations like ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) during construction of capacities for peace and security. This includes technical consultants for readiness units of ECOWAS.¹⁸

*“Our neighbourhood policy has created a strong framework for relations with partners to the south and east, now with a new dimension in the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership.”*¹⁹ The aim is, to address the movement of people, to ensure police and judicial cooperation and to prevent a crisis before it occurs. It’s in the interest of the EU that the countries on its borders are well-governed.²⁰

5.1.2 Military Capabilities

*“In recent years the EU has created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale. The EU is in such a unique position to have at its disposal all the means and tools necessary for effective international crisis management. The challenge now is to bring together these different instruments and capabilities and to ensure that they all follow the same agenda.”*²¹ The ESS says, that the EU, that spends more than 160 billion Euro for defence, should be able to conduct more operations simultaneously. In 2006, the 27 Member States spent 204 billion Euro for their military. About two million Soldiers were on duty at this time.²² When we compare the military capacity with those of the USA it looks like that: **EU-27**²³: 2.013.990 soldiers (active); 9.823 main battle tanks; 22.844 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV); 2.410 combat aircraft; 134 combat ships; 7 carrier (aircraft/helicopter); 80 tactical submarines. Budget: 209,7 billion Euro.²⁴ **USA**: 1.498.890 soldiers (active); 6.873 main battle tanks; 22.466 IFVs; 3.949 combat aircraft; 121 combat ships; 11 carrier (aircraft/helicopter); 63 tactical submarines. Budget: 709,4 billion Dollars.²⁵

17 Cf.: Hauser, G. (2010). Op. cit. P. 78f.

18 Cf.: Hauser, G. (2010). Op. cit. P. 101f.

19 Council of the European Union. (2009). Op. cit. P. 7.

20 Cf.: Council of the European Union. (2009). Op. cit. P. 7, P. 16.

21 Weisserth, H. In: Rehrl, J. & Weisserth, H. (2012). HANDBOOK ON CSDP – THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Vienna. Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria. Second Edition. P. 66.

22 IISS (2008). European Military Capabilities – Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations. London. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). P. 6.

23 Now, of course, with the 28. Member State of the EU, Croatia, with its entry at 1. July 2013, it would be a little bit more.

24 Cf.: Hauser, G. (2010). Op. cit. P. 119.

25 Ibid. P. 120.

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At the meeting of the European Council in Helsinki (10.-11.12.1999) the ESDP was founded with the plan (Helsinki Headline Goal), to build EU crisis management troops till 2003, which should consist of troops of the Member states. The strength should be up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or between 50.000 and 60.000 soldiers) to be able to fulfil the Petersberg Tasks. Those troops should be deployable in less than 60 days. The operational life of those EU Rapid Reaction Force (EU RRF) should be at least one year. From the declared contributions which are declared in a Force Catalogue, results a reserve of more than 100.000 people and about 400 combat aircraft and 100 combat ships.²⁶ The problem is that the number of troops declared by Member States can't be assessed, because that are numbers they are theoretically willing to deploy for CSDP operations. Those forces are no pre-identified units. The combined armed forces of the Member States are about 2 million troops. It's not clear how many of them Europe really needs. But the forces are not the main problem. Everything depends on the political will.²⁷



Figure 2 : What makes a Capability?²⁸

In the EU, the civil-military co-ordination and co-operation is one of the non plus ultra. The main axes is the development of civilian capabilities to help and to give support to failing states to prevent threats and to gather influence without military pressure. Nevertheless, the development of military capabilities is an essential part of the ESS to mend threats, which are not able to be controlled by civilian engagement. "²⁹... all Member States agree that in principle the use of force is an instrument of last resort which requires a Security Council mandate."³⁰

26 Ibid. P. 11.

27 Cf.: Biscop,S. (2012). Op. cit. P. 21.

28 Horvath, G. In: Rehr, J. & Weisserth, H. (2012). HANDBOOK ON CSDP – THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Vienna. Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria. Second Edition. P. 80.

29 f.: Ibid. P. 79.

30 Biscop,S. (2012). Op. cit. P. 19.

There are often task forces (TF) mentioned, but what is that per definition? A task force (non-military) is a working group for a limited time with extensive decision-making powers to solve complex problems.³¹ But a task force (military) can also be a unit or formation established to do work on a single defined task or activity, it is a standard part of NATO terminology. In most cases the task forces are named after the operational space. If a TF consists of a mixture of sub-units of various branches of the armed forces (land, air and naval forces) so it is called a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). A TF usually has a size of a battalion to a brigade and can exist within the framework of international operations also from sub-units of different nations.³²

For a EU operation, the following military units are available in principle:

- The Eurocorps: It has been ready since 1995 and is available under the lead of the UNO, the NATO and the EU. It consists of five “Framework nations” and four “Sending nations”.³³
- The Eurofor: It has been ready since 1998 and is a non-permanent structured force consisting of four states: France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. This force counts up to 30.000 soldiers.³⁴
- The Euromarfor: Founded in 1995, is a non-permanent structured naval force formed by France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.³⁵
- The Eurogendfor: The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) was founded in 2006 and is a police force with military status. Up to 3000 police officers can be available within 30 days.³⁶
- The Battle Groups (BGs): Founded in 2007, two high ready Battle Groups (“Full Operational Capability” – FOC-Phase) à 1.500 up to 3.000 soldiers are available for 6 months and within 5-10 days ready for use. Those infantry battalions have an operational life of 30 days but can be extended to 120 days. To 2009 were 19 BGs reported, which are not all in the FOC-Phase. BGs are principally designed for the upper range of the Petersberg Tasks. The BGs shall be complementary to the high readiness troops of NATO, which have a strength between 17.000 and 25.000 soldiers. That means that BGs should not be the same or a duplication of NATO force, they should complement each other. Previously, no BGs have been used.³⁷

31 UDEN, Dictionary “Task Force” <http://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Taskforce> [03.01.2014].

32 http://www.helpster.de/task-force-informatives_196140#anleitung [08.01.2014].

33 Cf.: Hauser, G. (2010). Op. cit. P. 99f.

34 Cf.: Ibid. P. 100.

35 f.: Ibid. P. 100.

36 Cf.: Ibid. P. 100.

37 Cf.: Ibid. P. 84-87, P. 101.

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Following problems can be mentioned:³⁸

- The military assets often are not compatible within the MS because of different types, communication technology, and so on.
- It's not exactly clear how many troops we need.
- There is no clear strategy which says when we use a certain asset (e.g. BGs). For example, in this or that situation we use the BG. The high readiness troop has no effect when the political decision takes an indefinable time because it's not clear if the BG should be used or not. This weakens the whole system. The problem is political not military.

5.2 Threats

As already mentioned, there are five key threats (Terrorism, Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Regional conflicts, State failure and Organised crime). But there are some additional concerns the EU has to face. First, there is the Cyber Security, because modern economies are heavily reliant on critical infrastructure (transport, communication, power supplies and the internet). It could be used as a new economic, political and military weapon. Secondly, the Energy Security, because most of our oil and gas has to be imported. A further challenge is the Climate Change which is a "threat multiplier".³⁹ *"Natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration. Climate change can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible."*⁴⁰

5.3 Influence of the Economic Crisis on the Current Situation

According to the Athena-mechanism, the common costs for military operations are divided among the MS by a pattern of the gross national income of the countries. In short, to finance the CFSP. Countries can refuse to pay, but then they lose their say in defence issues.⁴¹ The mass of the cost of an operation is carried by the troop-contributing country. This works after the principle: Costs lie where they fall.⁴²

Problem: The troop- contributing country has to bear most of the costs on its own. And because of the financial crisis there is the pressure of shrinking national defence budgets. As result, most countries reduce their forces to save money and hope, that the richer/other countries will send their troops. If this disarmament is not a coordinated procedure, there will be more and more capability shortfalls.⁴³

38 Inference of the author.

39 Cf.: Council of the European Union. (2009). Op. cit. P. 11ff.

40 Ibid. P. 15.

41 Cf.: Hauser, G.(2010). Op. cit. P. 110f.

42 Cf.: Ibid. P. 132.

43 Inference of the author.

Additionally, the economic crisis influences the whole world. Such a crisis is a “threat multiplier” because the people of poor countries want to have a good life too. And often they believe, that Europe is the heaven on earth and the solution for all their problems. So they try to migrate to the EU, regardless of the price, because they have nothing to lose.⁴⁴



Figure 3 : Migrants on a ship trying to reach the EU.⁴⁵

The Economic crisis also triggers troubles within the MS. In most cases the EU neglects to inform its citizens in a short and simple way what’s going on and lose the acceptance and understanding of its own population. The political decisions can be the best, if they are not supported by the population, they are not effective and cause just bigger problems. Even if the foreign relations are ok, the system can fall apart from the inside, because of a lack of information and a lack of transparency which makes it easy for demagogues to denigrate the EU.⁴⁶

5.4 Solutions

The action of the EU is preventive, that means that we should be able to act before the situation in our neighbourhood becomes worse, when there are signs of proliferation and before there is a humanitarian crisis. To be more active, there has to be a transformation of our forces in flexible, quick operational and mobile forces. To do so, our resources for defence have to be increased and have to be used more efficient. By making a systematic use of pooled and shared assets, which could reduce duplication, reduce overhead costs and in medium term would increase our capabilities.⁴⁷

The European Defence Agency (EDA), created in 2004, is playing a major role in military capability development. Its main task is to identify possibilities for co-operation between MS, encouraging harmonisation of national capability development and procurement efforts, and promoting synergies within the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).⁴⁸

“ Co-operation among the Member States in addressing the military capability shortfalls under the effects of the financial crisis became even more important during the recent years. New initiatives, as for example the pooling and sharing of military capabilities have been launched...., in order to

44 Inference of the author.

45 APA/sem, <http://www.format.at/articles/1349/931/370287/eu-schotten-50-millionen-schutz-aussengrenzen> [04.01.2014].

46 Cf.: Portisch, H. (2011). Was jetzt. Salzburg. Ecwin Verlag. P. 57f.

47 Cf.: Hauser, G. (2010). Op. cit. P. 120.

48 Cf.: Horvath, G. (2012). Op. cit. P. 80.

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*maintain existing capabilities or to commonly create new ones while under the pressure of shrinking national defence budgets.”*⁴⁹ Additionally, the EDA should take care of, how many troops Europe needs.⁵⁰ *“The consistency between the EU’s capability development with that of NATO is ensured through Staff to Staff talks and a joint EU-NATO Capability Group.”*⁵¹

In order to shorten the political decision making process, whether a force (e.g. BG) should be used or not, there should be clear boundaries or guidelines which regulate such use.⁵²

In order to relieve a troop-contributing country with the high amount of cost, there should be a new system to deal with the situation. For instance, MS should pay a fair share, according to their gross national income, in case they don’t send troops to a mission.⁵³

We have to bear in mind that *“Europe must be in a position to project and protect its core interests and shared values. That is the common political goal of all the Member States.”*⁵⁴ So Europe has to speak with one voice and it has to think and act as a Union with respect to security and defence. This is the basis of a Common Security and Defence Policy. Our CSDP has to be implemented, that our CFSP is accepted as a credible instrument of international policy. Only in this case, the CFSP is perceived as a coherent and comprehensive political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, civil and military instrument.⁵⁵ *“As far as military capabilities are concerned, the European Headline Goal provides the quantitative and qualitative framework for armed intervention across the full range of the mission spectrum.”*⁵⁶ And also on the non-military side, there is an arsenal of political, diplomatic and civil instruments. The CSDP has combined both, civil and military resources into a single institutional framework. In theory it’s readily acceptable, but the practical implementation is one of the principal challenges the Union has to face, because the roles and responsibilities of civilian and military players are not always clear and in some case of civil-military coordination it’s entirely new territory.⁵⁷ But those problems can be solved through practice, and the ongoing procedure of “lessons learned”, short trial and error.⁵⁸

The EU has to deepen its efforts in case of contact to the own citizens, in order to show them what’s going on. And this doesn’t end with the amount of bureaucrats and diplomats working in the EU, and not with their salaries and privileges. It is especially interesting what they are doing there and whether it makes sense and what that means for each one of us. This is the basis for everything.⁵⁹

49 Ibid. P. 80.

50 Proposal of the author.

51 Horvath, G. (2012). Op. cit. P. 81.

52 Proposal of the author.

53 Proposal of the author.

54 Weisserth, H. (2012). Op. cit. P. 74.

55 Cf.: Ibid. P. 74.

56 Ibid. P. 74.

57 Cf.: Weisserth, H. (2012). Op. cit. P. 74f.

58 Inference of the author.

59 Cf.: Portisch, H. (2011). Op. cit. P.57f.

6. Conclusion

How does the economic crisis influence the international commitments and the military capabilities and what are the possibilities to deal with it?

As shown in the chapters before, the economic crisis has multiple influence as “threat multiplier” on our system. Dwindling sympathy for the EU by its own citizens, migration to the EU and shrinking of national defence budgets. Because of that, transparency, coordination and cooperation with partners like NATO, the AU and our neighbourhood is one of the most important things at this time. To prevent a crisis before it occurs.⁶⁰

In my opinion, no country can deal with the challenges (threats, economic crisis, global warming,...) on its own. The MS need each other, to play an active role of shaping the events happening on earth (within international commitments or even use of force if necessary). For that, it’s necessary to speak politically with one voice and to **ensure the understanding of the population** within the MS. The basis for everything is the political will, especially in kind of developing military capabilities and pooling and sharing. But the most important thing is, to make the actions of the EU credible for their citizens, that it’s necessary and useful what they are doing.⁶¹

60 Conclusion of the author.

61 Opinion of the author.

7. References

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
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Rehrl, J. & Weisserth, H. (2012). HANDBOOK ON CSDP – THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Vienna. Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria. Second Edition.

Section C





REPUBLIC OF GREECE

Ministry of Defense

**Invitation to the COMMON MODULE «2ND CSDP OLYMPIAD»
15 JUNE 2013– 9 MAY 2014**

Residential phase taking place in Greece, 7th – 9th May 2014

Athens, 18 April 2013

The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Greece, supported by the ESDC Secretariat, has the honour of hosting the Second "CSDP OLYMPIAD" within the framework of the European Initiative on the Exchange of Young Officers, modelled on Erasmus.

The main goal of the "CSDP OLYMPIAD" common module is to acquaint our cadets with the basic knowledge on CSDP, providing them with the incentive to acquire the necessary knowledge, in order to draw up a paper on a CSDP - related issue, which in turn will be published and circulated within the relevant EU Institutions and stakeholders. In addition, they will be provided with the opportunity to compete with their fellow cadets from other Member States in a CSDP knowledge Competition.

The "CSDP OLYMPIAD" module consists of three main parts:

- an Internet – based Distance Learning Course "IDL",
- drafting and submitting a paper on a CSDP -related topic
- Designing a book cover with CSDP Subject and
- a residential European Competition (7-9)May 2014 in Greece).

It is our great pleasure to invite you to participate in this Common Module with up to 4 cadets.

Please also be informed that all expenses concerning the accommodation of cadets during the residential phase will be covered by the Greece Ministry of Defence. However the travel costs will remain the responsibility of the participating Member States.

Attached to this letter you will find details concerning the content of the "2nd CSDP OLYMPIAD", an indicative program and the registration process.

We would encourage the use of the administrative "Framework regarding the European Initiative on the Exchange of Young Officers, modelled on Erasmus" (ESDC SC Decision 10-1). Additional administrative and other details will be sent to the participants in due time.

Major General John Manolakos
Director of Hellenic National Defense General Staff (HNDGS) Training Branch

TENTATIVE PROGRAM
2nd CSDP Olympiad 7-9 MAY 2014

S/N	TIME		ACTIVITY	COMMENTS
	FROM	TO		
7 MAY 2014				
1	NLT 1500		Representatives' arrival at the airport	
2	0800	1730	Settlement of the representatives at the academy's hosting environment and the hotel accommodation	
3	1430	1600	Representatives lunch at the academy	
4	1730	1750	Transfer to the auditorium for the competition opening ceremony	
5	1800	1900	Competition opening ceremony	Στολή Εξόδου
6	1900	1945	Transfer to Mess Hall	
7	2000	2200	Official Reception at the Mess Hall	Στολή Εξόδου
8	2200	2300	Return (Academy-Hotel)	
8 MAY 2014				
1	0800	0830	Breakfast at the academy - hotel	
2	0830	0900	Transfer from the hotel – Gathering – Schedule preparation	
3	0900	1100	Presentation of the top 10 projects at the auditorium (20' per project)	Στολή 8γ
4	1100	1130	Coffee Break	
5	1130	1140	Group photo capture	
6	1140	1320	Presentation of the top 10 projects at the auditorium (20' per project)	Στολή 8γ
7	1320	1350	Presentations review by the committee and voting by the contestants and the IG members for the nomination of the best project	
8	1350	1400	Break time	
9	1400	1500	Lunch at the Academy	Στολή 8γ
10	1500	1600	Transfer to the hotel – Departure preparation for Acropolis	Πολιτικά
11	1600	1700	Departure to Acropolis	Πολιτικά
12	1700	1900	Tour at the Acropolis museum	Πολιτικά
13	1900	2030	Dinner at the Mess Hall	Πολιτικά
14	2030	2300	Walk in traditional Plaka – Free time	
15	2300	0000	Return (Academy-Hotel)	
9 MAY 2014				
1	0700	0800	Breakfast at the academy	
2	0800	1030	Written part competition among the teams at the academy (6 teams of 5-6 each in respective tables)	Στολή 8γ
3	1030	1330	Students' transfer to Glyfada – Free time	
4	0930	1030	Tour of the IG members at the museum and the Academy's facilities	
5	1030	1330	IG meeting at the Academy's conference room	
6	1400	1430	Announcement of the results in all categories and small awards ceremony	Στολή Εξόδου
7	1430	1530	Farewell lunch at the Academy	Στολή Εξόδου
8	1600		Guests' departure to the airport	











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LIST OF CANDIDATES WITH DATA FOR IDL CODES							
NUM	FIRST NAME	LAST NAME	INSTITUTION	NATIONALITY	E-MAIL ADDRESS	DATE OF BIRTH	TOPIC CHOSEN
1	David	Flicker	Theresan Military Academy	Austria	David.Flicker@gmx.at	29/3/1988	The parameter "energy" in the European Security.
2	Manuel	Kurbatfinsky	Theresan Military Academy	Austria	m.kurbatfinsky@gmx.at	16/10/1991	European Defence and Security nowadays: International Commitments, Military Capabilities and the Economic Crisis.
3	Armin	Rath	Theresan Military Academy	Austria	rath.armin@ymail.com	4/9/1992	The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean as geopolitical aspect of European Security.
4	Elena	Iosif	HELLENIC NAVAL ACADEMY	Cyprus	e.iosif@snd.edu.gr	8/7/1992	The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean as geopolitical aspect of European Security
5	Andreas	Antoniou	HELLENIC ARMY ACADEMY	Cyprus	Andreas_niou@hotmail.com	19/8/1991	European Defence and Security nowadays: International Commitments, Military Capabilities and the Economic Crisis.
6	Rodosthenis	Dionysiou	HELLENIC ARMY ACADEMY	Cyprus	rodosthenis@me.com	3/5/1992	The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the EasternMediterranean as geopolitical aspect of European Security
7	Dimitris	Kantilaftis	Hellenic AirForce Academy	Cyprus	dimitris.kantilaftis@gmail.com	6/6/1992	The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean as geopolitical aspect of European Security.
8	Odysseas	Paterakis	HELLENIC NAVAL ACADEMY	Greece	o.paterakis@snd.edu.gr	20/11/1991	The contribution of the Common Security Defence Policy in developing a globally leading role for the EU in the field of counter-terrorism by taking collective operational action by political and military means from the Member-States
9	Athanasios	Bouzelos	HELLENIC ARMY ACADEMY	Greece	thanbou1611@yahoo.gr	16/11/1992	The contribution of the Common Security Defence Policy in developing a globally leading role for the EU in the field of counter-terrorism by taking collective operational action by political and military means from the Member States
10	Vasileios	Teazis	HELLENIC ARMY ACADEMY	Greece	basiteaz@hotmail.com	23/9/1992	" European Defence and Security nowadays: International Commitments, Military Capabilities and the Economic Crisis" .
11	Vaios	Karastathis	Hellenic AirForce Academy	Greece	vkarastathis@gmail.com	13/12/1992	European Defence and Security nowadays: International Commitments, Military Capabilities and the Economic Crisis
12	Sergio	Vaira	CARABINIERI	Italia	sergio.vaira@carabinieri.it	5/10/1990	Security Sector Reform in civil crisis management
13	Paolo	Fanelli	ACCADEMIA AERONAUTICA – ITALIAN AIRFORCE	Italia	paolo.fanelli@aeronautica.difesa.it	7/8/1991	"The role of the European Defence Agency in broadening and deepening of euro-atlantic industrial and technological capabilities and the prospects of European cooperation in the field of armaments."
14	Matteo	Gentile	SCUOLA DI APPLICAZIONE	Italia	matteo.ei@hotmail.it	27/12/1990	How identifying common European foreign policy interests could advance CSDP
15	Michal	Kizal	GENERAL TADEUSZ KOSCIUSZKO MILITARY ACADEMY OF LAND FORCES	Polish	michalkizal@tlen.pl	19/4/1990	European Defence and Security nowadays: International Commitments, Military Capabilities and the Economic Crisis.

16	Adrian Czeslaw	Napora	MILITARY LAND FORCES ACADEMY in WROCLAW (WSOWL)	Polish	acnapora@gmail.com	24/11/1990	The role of the European Defence Agency in broadening and deepening of euro-atlantic industrial and technological capabilities and the prospects of European cooperation in the field of armaments.
17	Arkadiusz	Rutkowski	Military University of Technology	Polish	arorutkowski@gmail.com	31/8/1990	"Mutual assistance" (Article 42.7 TEU), "solidarity" (Article 222 TFEU) or the Petersberg tasks: what is the real task of the European armed forces?
18	Michal	Appl	University of Defence Brno	Czech Republic	Michal.Appl@seznam.cz	27/9/1989	How identifying common European foreign policy interests could advance CSDP
19	Michal	Formanek	University of Defence Brno	Czech Republic	formanekmichal@seznam.cz	20/6/1988	The contribution of the Common Security Defence Policy in developing a globally leading role for the EU in the field of counter-terrorism by taking collective operational action by political and military means from the Member States
20	Miroslav	Hovorka	University of Defence Brno	Czech Republic	mihovorka@gmail.com	16/7/1986	Economic crisis and its impact on military budgets, in particular on the development of new EU capabilities in support of CSDP.
21	Adam	Krumnikl	University of Defence Brno	Czech Republic	adamkrumnikl@seznam.cz	27/5/1991	The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean as geopolitical aspect of Europe.
22	Jozef	Cnops	Royal Military Academy, Belgium	Belgium	Jozef.cnops@student.rma.ac.be Jozef_cnops@hotmail.com	09/04/91	: 'Exchange of information between Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and the law enforcement community in Europe: the legal and operational barriers.'
23	Alexandre	MALBECQ	Royal Military Academy, Belgium	Belgium	alexandre.malbecq@gmail.com	19/11/1992	The contribution of the Common Security Defence Policy in developing a globally leading role for the EU in the field of counter-terrorism by taking collective operational action by political and military means from the Member States
24	Nicolas	Protin	Royal Military Academy, Belgium	Belgium	nicolas.protin92@gmail.com	21/8/1992	"The progressive framing of a common European defence The role and impact of member states' national defence policies"
25	Sijn	VERMEIR	Royal Military Academy	Belgium	Sijn_vermeir@hotmail.BE Sijn.vermeir@student.rma.ac.be	10/3/1992	The influence of the economical situation of Europe on CSDP.
26	GONZALO	VALLESPIN TERRY	NAVY	Spain	gvaller@fn.mde.es	26/6/1990	The importance of a maritime security strategy for the EU
27	Miguel Angel	Borrallio Gomez	Spanish Air Force Academy	Spain	mibogo86@gmail.com	5/7/1991	"How identifying common European foreign policy interests could advance CSDP"
28	Fernando	Garcia Prieto	Spanish Army	Spain	rmedcas@et.mde.es; garci115@hotmail.com	11/5/1990	"CSDP and the progressive framing of a common european defence. Parameters of an implementation of Article 42 (2) of the TEU"
29	Stigynn	Gagne-Lecacheur	Air Force Academy	France	gl.sigynn@yahoo.fr	8/5/1989	European Defence and Security nowadays: International Commitments, Military Capabilities and the Economic Crisis".
30	Matuš	Daňo	Armed forces academy of Milan Rastislav Štefánik	Slovak	matusko.dano@gmail.com	9/9/1992	European defence and Security nowadays: International Commitments, Military Capabilities and the Economic Crisis.
31	Erik	Póda	Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik	Slovak	lt.erik.us@gmail.com	31/8/1991	The contribution of the Common Security Defence Policy in developing a globally leading role for the EU in the field of counter-terrorism by taking collective operational action by political and military means from the Member States

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32	Ham	Hoogveld	Netherlands Defence Academy	Dutch	Hba.hoogveld@nlida.nl	13/12/1986	the role of the European Defence Agency in broadening and deepening of euro-atlantic industrial and technological capabilities and the prospects of European cooperation in the field of armaments.
33	Gabriela Catalina	Marica	Military Technical Academy	Romania			European defence and Security nowadays: International Commitments, Military Capabilities and the Economic Crisis.
34	Andrei Cosmin	Jitaru	Military Technical Academy	Romania			The parameter "energy" in the European Security.
35	Andreas	Gruber	University of the German Armed Forces	Germany			European defence and Security nowadays: International Commitments, Military Capabilities and the Economic Crisis.

LIST FOR VOTING									
A/A	COU- NTRY	INSTITUTION	NAME		TITLE	SCORE			
1	AT 	Theresan Military Academy	Manuel	Kurbatfinsky	European Defence and Security nowadays: International Commitments, Military Capabilities and the Economic Crisis.				
2	CH 	University of Defence Brno	Michal	Appl	How identifying common European foreign policy interests could advance CSDP.				
3	CH 	University of Defence Brno	Michal	Formanek	The contribution of the Common Security Defence Policy in developing a globally leading role for the EU in the field of counter-terrorism by taking collective operational action by political and military means from the Member States.				
4	CH 	University of Defence Brno	Miroslav	Hovorka	Economic crisis and its impact on military budgets, in particular on the development of new EU capabilities in support of CSDP.				
5	CH 	University of Defence Brno	Adam	Krumnikl	The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean as geopolitical aspect of Europe.				
6	BE 	Royal Military Academy	Jozef	Cnops	Exchange of information between Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and the law enforcement community in Europe: the legal and operational barriers.				
7	BE 	Royal Military Academy	Stijn	Vermeir	The influence of the economical situation of Europe on CSDP.				
8	ES 	Naval Academy	Gonzalo	Vallespin Terry	The importance of a maritime security strategy for the EU.				
9	FR 	Air Force Academy	Sigynn	Gagne-Lecacheur	European Defence and Security nowadays: International Commitments, Military Capabilities and the Economic Crisis.				
10	GER 	University of the German Armed Forces	Andreas	Gruber	European defence and Security nowadays: International Commitments, Military Capabilities and the Economic Crisis.				